pendent claim in Texas

2023Like Section 16.064, the text plead “jurisdictional standing” was “tantamount to a dismissal for ‘lack of jurisdiction’” and “satisfied the ‘dismissed for lack of jurisdiction’ requirement set out in section 16.064(a)”). 10 See Vale v. Ryan, 809 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ) (holding the “federal court’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a pendent state claim is tantamount to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306, 310, 315 (Tex. App.—Austin 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (stating that article 5539a applies when prior case is “mistakenly

2015Under the highly defendants' March 19, 2001 motion to dismiss as moot. deferential standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 45– 46 (1957), and viewing the allegations of Hinds' amended SO ORDERED. complaint in the light most favorable to him for purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Royal Bank of Footnotes 1 In view of the filing of the amended motion to dismiss, defendants' March 19, 2001 motion to dismiss is denied as moot. 2 He also appears to assert a pendent claim asserting a violation of the Texas Constitution.

2004Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541 , 551 (5th Cir.2003) (‘"In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 , 100 S.Ct. 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980), the Supreme Court intimated that a party prevailing on a substantial claim that is pendent to a civil rights claim is entitled to a recovery of attorney's fees when the civil rights claim and the pendent claim arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.

2004This Circuit, along with other circuits, has followed the Supreme Court's direction.'") (quoting Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 , 103 S.Ct. 3115 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1983)).

2004This Circuit, along with other circuits, has followed the Supreme Court's direction.'") (quoting Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 , 103 S.Ct. 3115 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1983)).

2004Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541 , 551 (5th Cir.2003) (‘"In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 , 100 S.Ct. 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980), the Supreme Court intimated that a party prevailing on a substantial claim that is pendent to a civil rights claim is entitled to a recovery of attorney's fees when the civil rights claim and the pendent claim arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.

2004Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541 , 551 (5th Cir.2003) (‘"In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 , 100 S.Ct. 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980), the Supreme Court intimated that a party prevailing on a substantial claim that is pendent to a civil rights claim is entitled to a recovery of attorney's fees when the civil rights claim and the pendent claim arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.

2004This Circuit, along with other circuits, has followed the Supreme Court's direction.'") (quoting Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 , 103 S.Ct. 3115 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1983)).

1991The federal court, in its discretion, may decline to hear pendent state claims based on “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.” Id. at 726 , 86 S.Ct. at 1139 .

1991The federal court, in its discretion, may decline to hear pendent state claims based on “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.” Id. at 726 , 86 S.Ct. at 1139 .