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65 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Ritzie v. Reece-Campbell, Inc. (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2025Ritzie v. Reece-Campbell, Inc., 2015-Ohio-5224, ¶ 11 (“[t]o qualify for [TTD] compensation, a claimant must demonstrate that he or she is medically unable to work as a result of the allowed conditions of the claim”). 2020Ritzie v. Reece-Campbell, Inc., No. 18AP-785 3 146 Ohio St.3d 259 , 2015-Ohio-5224, ¶ 11 ("To qualify for temporary-total-disability compensation, a claimant must demonstrate that he or she is medically unable to work as a result of the allowed conditions of the claim."). | 2 | 2 |
State ex rel. Jennings v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2007Comm. 98 Ohio St.3d 288, 20 [0]3-Ohio-737 [ 783 N.E.2d 898 ], the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McCoy: “It is important to note that this holding is limited to claimants who are gainfully employed at the time of their subsequent disabilities.” In this case, there is no medical evidence that the injured worker left his job at the flower shop due to the allowed conditions in the claim. 2007Comm. 98 Ohio St.3d 288, 20 [0]3-Ohio-737 [ 783 N.E.2d 898 ], the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McCoy: “It is important to note that this holding is limited to claimants who are gainfully employed at the time of their subsequent disabilities.” In this case, there is no medical evidence that the injured worker left his job at the flower shop due to the allowed conditions in the claim. | 1 | 2 |
State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc.green2 sentences2019Metz v. GTC, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 359 , 2015-Ohio-1348 , 30 N.E.3d 941, ¶ 14 (“The commission is not required to list all the evidence that it considered in its order, but only that which it relied upon to reach its conclusion”). 2019Metz v. GTC, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 359 , 2015-Ohio-1348 , 30 N.E.3d 941, ¶ 14 (“The commission is not required to list all the evidence that it considered in its order, but only that which it relied upon to reach its conclusion”). | 1 | 1 |
| State ex rel. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gormangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State ex rel. DeZarn v. Industrial Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(a) places the burden on the injured worker to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the disability is permanent and that the inability to work is causally related to the allowed conditions.” Further, under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(b), the SHO must determine whether “the inability to work is due to the allowed conditions in the claim,” and under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(g), the SHO must “review all relevant factors in the record that may affect the injured worker’s ability to work.” That includes considering whether a claimant’s inability to work 2017According to Wal-Mart, James failed to meet his burden under McCoy, 97 Ohio St.3d 25 , 2002-Ohio-5305 , 776 N.E.2d 51 , because he was not working when the alleged period of disability began and he did not produce evidence that he lost his job with Casper for reasons related to the allowed conditions in his claim. | 5 | 2009–2020 |
State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2020Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(a) places the burden on the injured worker to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the disability is permanent and that the inability to work is causally related to the allowed conditions.” Further, under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(b), the SHO must determine whether “the inability to work is due to the allowed conditions in the claim,” and under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(g), the SHO must “review all relevant factors in the record that may affect the injured worker’s ability to work.” That includes considering whether a claimant’s inability to work 2020Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(a) places the burden on the injured worker to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the disability is permanent and that the inability to work is causally related to the allowed conditions.” Further, under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(b), the SHO must determine whether “the inability to work is due to the allowed conditions in the claim,” and under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(g), the SHO must “review all relevant factors in the record that may affect the injured worker’s ability to work.” That includes considering whether a claimant’s inability to work | 5 | 2009–2020 |
State ex rel. Crim v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation
green
2 sentences2007Accordingly, the court determined "a teacher is entitled to temporary total disability compensation as a result of the allowed conditions of a claim if the teacher proves an intent to obtain employment during the summer and an intent to resume the teaching position after the summer recess." Id. at 485 . {¶ 7} Relator's objection asks us to ignore the specifc language of Crim requiring that a teacher prove an intent to obtain employment during the summer and an intent to resume the teaching position after the summer recess. 2007Crim v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 481 , holds "that a teacher is entitled to temporary total disability compensation as a result of the allowed conditions of a claim if the teacher proves an intent to obtain employment during the summer and an intent to resume the teaching position after summer recess." The Staff Hearing Officer finds no evidence that proves an intent to obtain employment during the summer months. | 3 | 2007–2025 |
State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2021Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). {¶ 19} " 'Permanent total disability' means the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim." Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). 2021Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). {¶ 24} " 'Permanent total disability' means the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim." Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). | 3 | 2006–2021 |
State ex rel. Ramirez v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2016Comm., 69 Ohio St.2d 630 (1982). {¶ 32} Relator asserts that the commission abused its discretion arguing that all of the relevant medical evidence clearly demonstrates that he was temporarily and totally disabled during the relevant time periods as a result of the allowed conditions in his claim. 2007Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630 . *Page 16 {¶ 40} Relator first argues that, although Dr. Adebayo specifically noted that he had reviewed and accepted both the allowed conditions in the claim as well as the findings of the examining physician, that, in reality, Dr. Adebayo had not. | 3 | 1988–2016 |
State ex rel. Teece v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2009Comm. (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 165 . {¶ 47} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 , TTD compensation is payable to a claimant when the allowed conditions in the claim prevent the claimant from performing his or her former position of employment. 2006Comm. (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 165 . {¶ 17} In this mandamus action, relator makes the following arguments: (1) his activities did not constitute "work" and should not have precluded him from receiving TTD compensation; (2) the commission abused its discretion by declaring an overpayment for the period after May 11, 2004, because relator had surgery relative to the allowed conditions in the claim; and (3) the commission's decision to declare fraud and an overpayment is against public policy. | 3 | 2006–2009 |
State ex rel. Noll v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2017In doing so, the SHO found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, a "lack of persuasive medical documentation to support that [Pacheco] could no longer perform his modified job duties as a result of the allowed conditions in the claim." Id. at 330 . {¶ 14} On August 19, 2015, Pacheco filed a request for reconsideration of the SHO's July 15, 2015 order. 2006Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203 . {¶ 19} In this mandamus action, relator argues that the evidence in the record does not support the finding that any temporary disability keeping claimant from working is related to the allowed conditions in the claim. | 2 | 2006–2017 |
State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2015McCoy, 97 Ohio St.3d 25 , 2002-Ohio-5305 , 776 N.E.2d 51, at ¶ 35 ; Ashcraft, 34 Ohio St.3d at 44 , 517 N.E.2d 533 . 2015McCoy, 97 Ohio St.3d 25 , 2002-Ohio-5305 , 776 N.E.2d 51, at ¶ 35 ; Ashcraft, 34 Ohio St.3d at 44 , 517 N.E.2d 533 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State ex rel. Chrysler Corp. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2008Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 158 , 169 . {¶ 46} Here, as of July 30, 2006, the date of Yoder's letter to Dr. Heck, there was no finding by the commission that the allowed conditions of the claim had reached MMI, nor was there an opinion or statement from Dr. Heck or any attending physician that the industrial injury had reached MMI. {¶ 47} Accordingly, as of July 30, 2006, relator was not required to show new and changed circumstances to continue the payments of TTD compensation. 2007Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 158 , 169 . {¶ 39} Here, there has never been a commission determination that any of the allowed conditions of the claim have reached MMI. | 2 | 2007–2008 |
State ex rel. Reliance Electric Co. v. Wright
green
2 sentences2005Co. v. Wright (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 109 , 110-111 , the court stated as follows: Generally, a workers' compensation claimant is entitled to PTD compensation under R.C. 4123.58 where the medical impairment due to the allowed conditions in the claim, either alone or in conjunction with nonmedical disability factors, prevents the claimant from engaging in sustained remunerative employment. 2002Co. v. Wright (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 109 , the court recently addressed this issue and stated as follows: Generally, a workers' compensation claimant is entitled to PTD compensation under R.C. 4123.58 where the medical impairment due to the allowed conditions in the claim, either alone or in conjunction with nonmedical disability factors, prevents the claimant from engaging in sustained remunerative employment. | 2 | 2002–2005 |
State ex rel. OneSource Emp. Mgt., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm.
neutral
1 sentence2026(Stip. at 149.) Dr. Mankowski found that Storts’s post-concussion syndrome had resolved without any residual pathology or impairment and that it was not possible for these “conditions, from more than 4 years ago, to be the cause or even a contributing factor to any ongoing neurological impairment that would be an obstacle to any work activities.” Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State Ex Rel. Alleyne v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (8-10-2004)
green
1 sentence2025Id. {¶ 14} 8. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2025Id. {¶ 19} 8. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State Ex Rel. Goodwin v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence2025A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” (Citation and quotation omitted.) Goodwin, 2010-Ohio-166, at ¶ 19 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm.
neutral
1 sentence2025Comm., 1994-Ohio-458 .) In the questionnaire completed on September 27, 2023, Dr. Soin unequivocally answered “yes” to the question of whether Kincer was “temporarily totally disabled from employment from [January 26, 2023] onward to the present (and continuing) due to the allowed conditions in this claim?” (Stip. at 271.) Although this response does not directly address the basis of the procedure, it is supportive of a finding that it clarified Dr. Soin’s opinion that an allowed condition was an independent basis for the procedure, which, according to Dr. Soin, caused a substantive change in | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State Ex Rel. Howard v. Millennium Inorg., Unpublished Decision (12-9-2004)
green
1 sentence2023Finally, the court noted the PTD claimant had “suffered a nearly 100 percent whole person impairment as a result of the allowed conditions in his claim.” Howard, 2004-Ohio-6603, at ¶ 12 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Clendenin v. Girl Scouts of W. Ohio (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022In order to permanently terminate one’s right to participate, the decision must “foreclose all future compensation under that claim.” Id. at 240. {¶ 20} Meanwhile, the “extent of disability” has been defined as that which “determines the amount of compensation and benefits payable under workers' compensation law for the allowed conditions of the claim.” Clendenin, 150 Ohio St.3d 300 , 2017-Ohio-2830 , 81 N.E.3d 438, ¶ 12 . 2022In order to permanently terminate one’s right to participate, the decision must “foreclose all future compensation under that claim.” Id. at 240. {¶ 20} Meanwhile, the “extent of disability” has been defined as that which “determines the amount of compensation and benefits payable under workers' compensation law for the allowed conditions of the claim.” Clendenin, 150 Ohio St.3d 300 , 2017-Ohio-2830 , 81 N.E.3d 438, ¶ 12 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman
green
2 sentences2020Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 83 , 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997). 2020Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 83 , 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State ex rel. McKee v. Union Metal Corp. (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2019McKee v. Union Metal Corp., 150 Ohio St.3d 223 , 2017-Ohio- 5541, ¶ 9-11, the Supreme Court set forth the legal framework to review a request for a writ of mandamus in regard to PTD compensation as follows: Permanent total disability is "the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment" as a result of the allowed conditions in the claim. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co.
green
1 sentence2019Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373 (1996). {¶ 30} Because there is some evidence in the record on which the commission relied to find relator's retirement was unrelated to the allowed conditions in his claim, it is this magistrate's decision that this court should deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. /S/ MAGISTRATE STEPHANIE BISCA NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Ci | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Harmon (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2019"Work is 'sustained' if it consists of an ongoing pattern of activity." Id., citing State ex rel. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State ex rel. Miller v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence2018Comm., 71 Ohio St.3d 229 (1994) criteria was satisfied because it found the surgery was related to the allowed conditions in the claim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State ex rel. Ignatious v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence2018Comm., 99 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2003-Ohio-3627 . {¶ 49} Relator argues that Dr. Bacevich's extensive review of claimant's medical records establishes that the surgery and treatment was not related to the allowed conditions in the claim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Zavatsky v. Stringer
green
2 sentences2017Zavatsky v. Stringer, 56 Ohio St.2d 386 , 384 N.E.2d 693 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus. 2017Zavatsky v. Stringer, 56 Ohio St.2d 386 , 384 N.E.2d 693 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State ex rel. Bradley v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence2016Comm., 77 Ohio St.3d 239 (1997). {¶ 28} While it is undisputed that "chronic rotator cuff tendinopathy" is a non- allowed condition, Bradley tells us that the mere presence of this non-allowed condition does not, in itself, destroy the compensability of the claim. {¶ 29} Here, the allowed conditions in the claim identified by Dr. Krahe in his December 20, 2014 C-9 can be independently causing a need for a TENS unit while the non-allowed rotator cuff condition also benefits from the TENS unit. {¶ 30} Given the above analysis, the magistrate concludes that the C-9 request itself provides the som | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State ex rel. Eckerly v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence2016Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 428 , 2005-Ohio-2587 , which deal with voluntary abandonment compared with the commission's finding of workforce abandonment; and (3) finding a workforce abandonment where there are no facts to suggest that relator's inability to work is anything other than related to the allowed conditions in her claim. {¶ 49} The magistrate finds that the commission did not abuse its discretion: (1) relator's absence from the workforce was an issue and the commission did not abuse its discretion by discussing the issue; (2) the SHO did not apply rationale from Hoffman and Eckerly; and ( | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State ex rel. Stephenson v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State ex rel. Ameen v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence2015Comm., 100 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2003-Ohio-5362 , 797 N.E.2d 78 . {¶ 9} To be entitled to wage-loss compensation, the worker must demonstrate an actual wage loss caused by the allowed conditions of the claim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State ex rel. Gibson v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State ex rel. Missik v. City of Youngstown neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Kinsey v. Board of Trustees green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State ex rel. Baker v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State ex rel. Saunders v. Metal Container Corp. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State ex rel. Smothers v. Mihm green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State ex rel. Richardson v. Quarto Mining Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State ex rel. Jackson Tube Services, Inc. v. Industrial Commission neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State ex rel. Cupp v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State ex rel. Value City Dept. Stores v. Indus. Comm. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State ex rel. Waddle v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.