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9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Blakegreen2 sentences2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se 2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se | 2 | 2 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se 2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se | 1 | 5 |
State Of Washington v. Docie Burchgreen2 sentences2019This court previously considered whether vehicular assault by driving under the influence is a strict liability offense under the Bash factors in Burch. 197 Wn. 2019This court previously considered whether vehicular assault by driving under the influence is a strict liability offense under the Bash factors in Burch. 197 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2005See Anderson, 141 Wash.2d at 365 , 5 P.3d 1247 . [6] We also note that, as the State points out, the Bash factors do not easily translate to the context of a sentence enhancement. [7] Urging the same rationale as the trial court used in Woolfolk, the State argues that knowledge is irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant is "armed," citing State v. Bilal, 54 Wash.App. 778, 782 , 776 P.2d 153 (1989). 2005See Anderson, 141 Wash.2d at 365 , 5 P.3d 1247 . [6] We also note that, as the State points out, the Bash factors do not easily translate to the context of a sentence enhancement. [7] Urging the same rationale as the trial court used in Woolfolk, the State argues that knowledge is irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant is "armed," citing State v. Bilal, 54 Wash.App. 778, 782 , 776 P.2d 153 (1989). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se 2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bilalgreen2 sentences2005See Anderson, 141 Wash.2d at 365 , 5 P.3d 1247 . [6] We also note that, as the State points out, the Bash factors do not easily translate to the context of a sentence enhancement. [7] Urging the same rationale as the trial court used in Woolfolk, the State argues that knowledge is irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant is "armed," citing State v. Bilal, 54 Wash.App. 778, 782 , 776 P.2d 153 (1989). 2005See Anderson, 141 Wash.2d at 365 , 5 P.3d 1247 . [6] We also note that, as the State points out, the Bash factors do not easily translate to the context of a sentence enhancement. [7] Urging the same rationale as the trial court used in Woolfolk, the State argues that knowledge is irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant is "armed," citing State v. Bilal, 54 Wash.App. 778, 782 , 776 P.2d 153 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bash
green
2 sentences2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se 2021When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative, as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 9 unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907 , 270 P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060). 23 No. 80045-1-I/24 “nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 (citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06 ); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166 ; se | 5 | 2016–2021 |
Staples v. United States
green
2 sentences2021The Bash factors are: (1) a statute’s silence on a mental element is not dispositive of legislative intent; the statute must be construed in light of the background rules of the common law, and its conventional mens rea element; (2) whether the crime can be characterized as a “public welfare offense” created by the Legislature; (3) the extent to which a strict liability reading of the statute would encompass seemingly entirely innocent conduct; (4) and the harshness of the penalty[ . . .]; (5) the seriousness of the harm to the public; (6) the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining t 2021The Bash factors are: (1) a statute’s silence on a mental element is not dispositive of legislative intent; the statute must be construed in light of the background rules of the common law, and its conventional mens rea element; (2) whether the crime can be characterized as a “public welfare offense” created by the Legislature; (3) the extent to which a strict liability reading of the statute would encompass seemingly entirely innocent conduct; (4) and the harshness of the penalty[ . . .]; (5) the seriousness of the harm to the public; (6) the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Bash
green
2 sentences2021Because the to convict instruction did not contain the “knowing possession” element, we reverse Pedro Barrera Flores’ conviction for alien in possession of a firearm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 130 Wn.2d 594 , 925 P.2d 978 (1996). 2021Because the to convict instruction did not contain the “knowing possession” element, we reverse Pedro Barrera Flores’ conviction for alien in possession of a firearm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 130 Wn.2d 594 , 925 P.2d 978 (1996). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Steen
green
2 sentences2021Specifically, sixth, we consider the ease or difficulty for the defendant in ascertaining the true facts of his alleged offense.43 If alien in possession of a firearm was a strict liability crime, it appears the noncitizen would have to 38 State v. Steen, 155 Wn. 2021Specifically, sixth, we consider the ease or difficulty for the defendant in ascertaining the true facts of his alleged offense.43 If alien in possession of a firearm was a strict liability crime, it appears the noncitizen would have to 38 State v. Steen, 155 Wn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Pappas
green
2 sentences2016Nor does the decision address the Bash factors. ¶45 Finally, we note that our Supreme Court in State v. Pappas, 176 Wn.2d 188, 194 , 289 P.3d 634 (2012), observed that “[i]n 2001, the vehicular assault statute was amended to eliminate the proximate cause requirement.” The issue in Pappas was whether the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, authorized an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault when the jury found that the victim’s injuries substantially exceed “substantial bodily harm,” which is the current level of harm required to convict. 2016Nor does the decision address the Bash factors. ¶45 Finally, we note that our Supreme Court in State v. Pappas, 176 Wn.2d 188, 194 , 289 P.3d 634 (2012), observed that “[i]n 2001, the vehicular assault statute was amended to eliminate the proximate cause requirement.” The issue in Pappas was whether the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, authorized an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault when the jury found that the victim’s injuries substantially exceed “substantial bodily harm,” which is the current level of harm required to convict. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. McKim
green
2 sentences2005In Bilal the Court of Appeals held that this court's decision in State v. McKim, 98 Wash.2d 111 , 653 P.2d 1040 (1982), requiring that before a sentence could be enhanced under former RCW 9.95.040 (1975) the evidence must support the conclusion that the accused was armed or that he knew an accomplice was armed, was superseded by the legislature's enactment of RCW 9.94A.125 as part of the Sentencing Reform Act in 1981. 2005In Bilal the Court of Appeals held that this court's decision in State v. McKim, 98 Wash.2d 111 , 653 P.2d 1040 (1982), requiring that before a sentence could be enhanced under former RCW 9.95.040 (1975) the evidence must support the conclusion that the accused was armed or that he knew an accomplice was armed, was superseded by the legislature's enactment of RCW 9.94A.125 as part of the Sentencing Reform Act in 1981. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.