invariable rule in Washington

1952Bank of Kelso, supra. In Ton v. Stetson, 43 Wash. 471, 475 , 86 Pac. 668 , we said: “While it is true that in some cases, where the evidence is sufficient to show a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred, it is not an invariable rule that it must necessarily be inferred.

1932St. 886, and in Charlton v. Markland, 36 Wash. 40 , 78 Pac. 132 ; though in Ton v. Stetson, 43 Wash. 471 , 86 Pac. 668 , the rule was apparently limited as follows: “While it is true that in some cases, where the evidence is sufficient to show a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred, it is not an invariable rule that it must necessarily be inferred.

1952Bank of Kelso, supra. In Ton v. Stetson, 43 Wash. 471, 475 , 86 Pac. 668 , we said: “While it is true that in some cases, where the evidence is sufficient to show a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred, it is not an invariable rule that it must necessarily be inferred.

1932St. 886, and in Charlton v. Markland, 36 Wash. 40 , 78 Pac. 132 ; though in Ton v. Stetson, 43 Wash. 471 , 86 Pac. 668 , the rule was apparently limited as follows: “While it is true that in some cases, where the evidence is sufficient to show a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred, it is not an invariable rule that it must necessarily be inferred.

1949Bank, 142 Ore. 692 , 21 P. (2d) 221 .

1949Bank, 142 Ore. 692 , 21 P. (2d) 221 .

1938Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573 , 205 Pac. 1059 ; Jordan v. Skinner, 187 Wash. 617 , 60 P. (2d) 697 ; Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489 , 68 P. (2d) 1034 .

1938Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573 , 205 Pac. 1059 ; Jordan v. Skinner, 187 Wash. 617 , 60 P. (2d) 697 ; Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489 , 68 P. (2d) 1034 .

1938Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573 , 205 Pac. 1059 ; Jordan v. Skinner, 187 Wash. 617 , 60 P. (2d) 697 ; Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489 , 68 P. (2d) 1034 .

1938Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573 , 205 Pac. 1059 ; Jordan v. Skinner, 187 Wash. 617 , 60 P. (2d) 697 ; Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489 , 68 P. (2d) 1034 .

1938Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573 , 205 Pac. 1059 ; Jordan v. Skinner, 187 Wash. 617 , 60 P. (2d) 697 ; Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489 , 68 P. (2d) 1034 .

1938Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573 , 205 Pac. 1059 ; Jordan v. Skinner, 187 Wash. 617 , 60 P. (2d) 697 ; Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489 , 68 P. (2d) 1034 .

1932St. 886, and in Charlton v. Markland, 36 Wash. 40 , 78 Pac. 132 ; though in Ton v. Stetson, 43 Wash. 471 , 86 Pac. 668 , the rule was apparently limited as follows: “While it is true that in some cases, where the evidence is sufficient to show a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred, it is not an invariable rule that it must necessarily be inferred.

1932St. 886, and in Charlton v. Markland, 36 Wash. 40 , 78 Pac. 132 ; though in Ton v. Stetson, 43 Wash. 471 , 86 Pac. 668 , the rule was apparently limited as follows: “While it is true that in some cases, where the evidence is sufficient to show a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred, it is not an invariable rule that it must necessarily be inferred.

1915As pointed out in the Mc-Cauley case, the correct rule as adopted by this court is that stated in Rice on Evidence, vol. 3, page 45, as follows: “If the indictment itself alleges that the accused is the custodian of the document needed in evidence or where the evidence in the case shows it to be in his possession or in that of an accomplice who refuses to produce it on the ground of its criminating tendency, the state is not obliged to give notice to produce.” See, also, McKnight v. United States, 115 Fed. 972 ; United States v. Reyburn, 6 Pet.

1915This court said: “It was beyond the power of the court to enforce such a demand for the simple reason that the defendant could not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself; and while upon this question of giving notice to a defendant in a criminal case to produce papers or other exhibits there are conflicting decisions, and it is probably true that a majority of the cases require that such notice be given, we are unwilling to adopt it as an invariable rule.” In the very recent case of State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514 , 145 Pac. 470 , where the same question was under discussion, this cou

1915This court said: “It was beyond the power of the court to enforce such a demand for the simple reason that the defendant could not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself; and while upon this question of giving notice to a defendant in a criminal case to produce papers or other exhibits there are conflicting decisions, and it is probably true that a majority of the cases require that such notice be given, we are unwilling to adopt it as an invariable rule.” In the very recent case of State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514 , 145 Pac. 470 , where the same question was under discussion, this cou

1903Weber v. Laidler, 26 Wash. 144 , 66 Pac. 400 , 90 Am.

1903Weber v. Laidler, 26 Wash. 144 , 66 Pac. 400 , 90 Am.

1897As was said by the supreme court of Indiana in McGinnis v. State, 24 Ind. 500 : “ It is difficult to perceive what benefit could result, either to the state or the defendant, from the giving of such a notice, while to the defendant it is liable to work a positive injury, by producing an unfavorable impression against him, in the minds of the jury, upon his refusal to produce it after notice.” The rule is thus in Rice on Evidence (vol. 3, p. 45): “ If the indictment itself alleges that the accused is the custodian of the document needed in evidence or where the evidence in the case shoivs it to