invariable rule in California

2012With respect to the timing of Bauer’s information as it relates to the agreement in issue—as referred to by the trial court—our Supreme Court has stated in a medical malpractice case, “we rejected ‘an invariable rule which would require in all cases that an expert must have acquired a personal, working knowledge of the standard of care at the precise time when the alleged malpractice occurred.’ ” (Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ].) Those same principles should apply here.

2012With respect to the timing of Bauer’s information as it relates to the agreement in issue—as referred to by the trial court—our Supreme Court has stated in a medical malpractice case, “we rejected ‘an invariable rule which would require in all cases that an expert must have acquired a personal, working knowledge of the standard of care at the precise time when the alleged malpractice occurred.’ ” (Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ].) Those same principles should apply here.

1980In People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 406 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 890 , 392 P.2d 970 ], the court explained that "In civil appeals it has been the invariable rule that reversal is required when it is impossible to determine whether the verdict was based on admissible evidence submitted under correct instructions, or on erroneous determination of questions improperly submitted to the jury." [61] In language appropriate to the case at bar, we continued: "It is equally (if not more) important to grant the same benefit of the doubt to a defendant on trial for his life." The rule is perhaps most comm

1980In People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 406 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 890 , 392 P.2d 970 ], the court explained that "In civil appeals it has been the invariable rule that reversal is required when it is impossible to determine whether the verdict was based on admissible evidence submitted under correct instructions, or on erroneous determination of questions improperly submitted to the jury." [61] In language appropriate to the case at bar, we continued: "It is equally (if not more) important to grant the same benefit of the doubt to a defendant on trial for his life." The rule is perhaps most comm

1946In Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 389 [ 80 P. 234 ], it was said: “It is not an invariable rule that the rescission of a contract obtained by fraud will be denied merely upon the ground that the parties cannot be placed in statu quo.

1946In Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 389 [ 80 P. 234 ], it was said: “It is not an invariable rule that the rescission of a contract obtained by fraud will be denied merely upon the ground that the parties cannot be placed in statu quo.

2019(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060 , 1174, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 [in limine ruling is necessarily tentative because trial court retains discretion to make a different ruling as the evidence unfolds]; see also Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573 , 608, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 [noting that events at trial may change the context of the ruling and require a renewed objection].) Here, appellants' arguments suggest there was some change in the evidentiary *694 context as trial unfolded.

2019(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060 , 1174, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 [in limine ruling is necessarily tentative because trial court retains discretion to make a different ruling as the evidence unfolds]; see also Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573 , 608, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 [noting that events at trial may change the context of the ruling and require a renewed objection].) Here, appellants' arguments suggest there was some change in the evidentiary *694 context as trial unfolded.

1954Defendant has insisted and still insists that this theory, while interesting, is not legally tenable.” In support of the claim that appellant wife was not obliged to “tender the return of all things of value received” from respondent, as a condition precedent to the present action, appellant cites Locke Paddon v. Locke Paddon, 194 Cal. 73, 83 [ 227 P. 715 ], where it is said, “It is not an invariable rule that a rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud will be denied because the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. ...

1938The answer to appellants’ contention is to be found in the following quotation from Locke Paddon v. Locke Paddon, 194 Cal. 73, 83 [ 227 Pac. 715 ] : “It is not an invariable rule that a rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud will be denied merely because the parties cannot be placed in statu quo.

2019(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060 , 1174, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 [in limine ruling is necessarily tentative because trial court retains discretion to make a different ruling as the evidence unfolds]; see also Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573 , 608, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 [noting that events at trial may change the context of the ruling and require a renewed objection].) Here, appellants' arguments suggest there was some change in the evidentiary *694 context as trial unfolded.

2019(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060 , 1174, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 [in limine ruling is necessarily tentative because trial court retains discretion to make a different ruling as the evidence unfolds]; see also Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573 , 608, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 [noting that events at trial may change the context of the ruling and require a renewed objection].) Here, appellants' arguments suggest there was some change in the evidentiary *694 context as trial unfolded.

2013In many cases a direct liability is imposed upon the parties to the action, or upon some of them, for the remuneration of the receiver.’” (Baldwin v. Baldwin (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 851, 855 , italics omitted, quoting Andrade v. Andrade (1932) 216 Cal. 108, 110 .) Here, the court concluded that in the absence of any viable alternative for remunerating the receiver appellant had sought to have appointed, the costs of the receivership should fall on appellant.

1985In many cases a direct liability is imposed upon the parties to the action, or upon some of them, for the remuneration of the receiver.” ( 216 Cal. at p. 110 ; see also Baldwin v. Baldwin (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 851, 856 [ 187 P.2d 429 ].) But in this case it would not appear appropriate to impose such liability directly on the litigants because they did not seek a receivership, did not create the situation which gives rise to the present legal predicament, and are not parties in the ordinary sense.

1985“As a general proposition the costs of a receivership are primarily a charge upon the property in the receiver’s possession and *1220 are to be paid out of said property.” (Andrade v. Andrade (1932) 216 Cal. 108, 110 [ 13 P.2d 676 ]; see also 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Provisional Remedies, § 371, p. 309.) The Andrade court also emphasized that “this is not an invariable rule.

1985“As a general proposition the costs of a receivership are primarily a charge upon the property in the receiver’s possession and *1220 are to be paid out of said property.” (Andrade v. Andrade (1932) 216 Cal. 108, 110 [ 13 P.2d 676 ]; see also 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Provisional Remedies, § 371, p. 309.) The Andrade court also emphasized that “this is not an invariable rule.

1986Citing from its decision in Brown v. Colm, supra, 11 Cal.3d 639 , the Supreme Court recently stated in Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37-38 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ] as follows: “[W]e [reject] ‘an invariable rule which would require in all cases that an expert must have acquired a personal, working knowledge of the standard of care at the precise time when the alleged malpractice occurred.’ The court reasoned in part: ‘While a layman may not testify to a fact which he has learned only by reading a medical book, there is no question that a professional physician may rely up

1985Accordingly, entirely apart from his statements as to the standard of care, Dr. Fox' declaration contained factual assertions which if accepted would permit a finding of negligence and it was error for the trial court to reject his declaration on the grounds that it was conclusory. (7b) In any event, Dr. Fox was competent to testify as to the standard of care. (16) In Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 644 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 128 , 522 P.2d 688 ], we rejected "an invariable rule which would require in all cases that an expert must have acquired a personal, working knowledge of the standard of ca

1969(Dowell v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 483 [ 304 P.2d 1009 ].) [3] “It is the invariable rule that a court of equity will refuse to issue a writ of mandamus when it is useless, unenforceable or unavailing. ’•’ (Zagoren v. Hall (1932) 122 Cal.App. 460, 462 [ 10 P.2d 202 ].) For example, in Crangle v. City Council of *712 Crescent City (1933) 219 Cal. 239, 240 [ 26 P.2d 24 ], an appeal from denial of a writ to require the council to annul-a contract for an improvement was dismissed as moot where the contract had been completed and bonds sold to third persons.

1969(Dowell v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 483 [ 304 P.2d 1009 ].) [3] “It is the invariable rule that a court of equity will refuse to issue a writ of mandamus when it is useless, unenforceable or unavailing. ’•’ (Zagoren v. Hall (1932) 122 Cal.App. 460, 462 [ 10 P.2d 202 ].) For example, in Crangle v. City Council of *712 Crescent City (1933) 219 Cal. 239, 240 [ 26 P.2d 24 ], an appeal from denial of a writ to require the council to annul-a contract for an improvement was dismissed as moot where the contract had been completed and bonds sold to third persons.

1969(Dowell v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 483 [ 304 P.2d 1009 ].) [3] “It is the invariable rule that a court of equity will refuse to issue a writ of mandamus when it is useless, unenforceable or unavailing. ’•’ (Zagoren v. Hall (1932) 122 Cal.App. 460, 462 [ 10 P.2d 202 ].) For example, in Crangle v. City Council of *712 Crescent City (1933) 219 Cal. 239, 240 [ 26 P.2d 24 ], an appeal from denial of a writ to require the council to annul-a contract for an improvement was dismissed as moot where the contract had been completed and bonds sold to third persons.

1969(Dowell v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 483 [ 304 P.2d 1009 ].) [3] “It is the invariable rule that a court of equity will refuse to issue a writ of mandamus when it is useless, unenforceable or unavailing. ’•’ (Zagoren v. Hall (1932) 122 Cal.App. 460, 462 [ 10 P.2d 202 ].) For example, in Crangle v. City Council of *712 Crescent City (1933) 219 Cal. 239, 240 [ 26 P.2d 24 ], an appeal from denial of a writ to require the council to annul-a contract for an improvement was dismissed as moot where the contract had been completed and bonds sold to third persons.

1958The appellant failed to plead the custom, the proof of which he sought to introduce.” (Pray v. Trower Lumber Co., 101 Cal.App. 482 [ 281 P. 1036 ].) There is nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the purported custom and usage and defendants’ only argument on this point is that plaintiffs were lessors of farm land located in Kern County.

1958The appellant failed to plead the custom, the proof of which he sought to introduce.” (Pray v. Trower Lumber Co., 101 Cal.App. 482 [ 281 P. 1036 ].) There is nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the purported custom and usage and defendants’ only argument on this point is that plaintiffs were lessors of farm land located in Kern County.

2021(People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047, fn. 3 [dictum (plural, dicta) is a judicial comment that is unnecessary to the decision at hand].) The California Supreme Court long ago explained the effect of dicta: “It is the invariable rule, well understood by the profession, that an opinion of this court becomes authority only upon the point decided, and that obiter dicta are of no binding force or effect.” (Morse v. De Ardo 18 (1895) 107 Cal. 622, 626 , italics omitted; see Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [a decision is authority only for the points actually considered and actu

2021(People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047, fn. 3 [dictum (plural, dicta) is a judicial comment that is unnecessary to the decision at hand].) The California Supreme Court long ago explained the effect of dicta: “It is the invariable rule, well understood by the profession, that an opinion of this court becomes authority only upon the point decided, and that obiter dicta are of no binding force or effect.” (Morse v. De Ardo 18 (1895) 107 Cal. 622, 626 , italics omitted; see Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [a decision is authority only for the points actually considered and actu

2021(People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047, fn. 3 [dictum (plural, dicta) is a judicial comment that is unnecessary to the decision at hand].) The California Supreme Court long ago explained the effect of dicta: “It is the invariable rule, well understood by the profession, that an opinion of this court becomes authority only upon the point decided, and that obiter dicta are of no binding force or effect.” (Morse v. De Ardo 18 (1895) 107 Cal. 622, 626 , italics omitted; see Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [a decision is authority only for the points actually considered and actu

2021(People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047, fn. 3 [dictum (plural, dicta) is a judicial comment that is unnecessary to the decision at hand].) The California Supreme Court long ago explained the effect of dicta: “It is the invariable rule, well understood by the profession, that an opinion of this court becomes authority only upon the point decided, and that obiter dicta are of no binding force or effect.” (Morse v. De Ardo 18 (1895) 107 Cal. 622, 626 , italics omitted; see Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [a decision is authority only for the points actually considered and actu

2021(People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047, fn. 3 [dictum (plural, dicta) is a judicial comment that is unnecessary to the decision at hand].) The California Supreme Court long ago explained the effect of dicta: “It is the invariable rule, well understood by the profession, that an opinion of this court becomes authority only upon the point decided, and that obiter dicta are of no binding force or effect.” (Morse v. De Ardo 18 (1895) 107 Cal. 622, 626 , italics omitted; see Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [a decision is authority only for the points actually considered and actu

2012Five Bridges seeks support in the following sentence from Harman, supra, 7 Cal.3d at page 167 : “Modem appraisal practice dictates that the value of an easement be determined by comparing the market value of the dominant estates before and after the easement is terminated.” In the very next sentence, however, the court explained that “ ‘[t]he general mle is that the [value] of access rights is the difference in the market value of the [abutting] property before the taking of the access rights and its market value after the taking, considering its highest and best use. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Ibi

2012Five Bridges seeks support in the following sentence from Harman, supra, 7 Cal.3d at page 167 : “Modem appraisal practice dictates that the value of an easement be determined by comparing the market value of the dominant estates before and after the easement is terminated.” In the very next sentence, however, the court explained that “ ‘[t]he general mle is that the [value] of access rights is the difference in the market value of the [abutting] property before the taking of the access rights and its market value after the taking, considering its highest and best use. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Ibi

1985Co. (1894) 101 Cal. 585, 591-592 [ 36 P. 125 ]; Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, Inc. (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 222, 230 [ 344 P.2d 428 ]; Brown v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1955) 135 Cal. App.2d 709 , 716 et seq. [ 287 P.2d 810 ]; Forrest v. Fink (1925) 71 Cal. App. 34, 39-40 [ 234 P. 860 ].) Wigmore justifies the foregoing distinction by pointing out that a medical doctor possesses a professional experience which gives him a knowledge of the trustworthy authorities and the proper sources of information, as well as a degree of personal observation of the general subject enabling him to estim

1985Co. (1894) 101 Cal. 585, 591-592 [ 36 P. 125 ]; Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, Inc. (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 222, 230 [ 344 P.2d 428 ]; Brown v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1955) 135 Cal. App.2d 709 , 716 et seq. [ 287 P.2d 810 ]; Forrest v. Fink (1925) 71 Cal. App. 34, 39-40 [ 234 P. 860 ].) Wigmore justifies the foregoing distinction by pointing out that a medical doctor possesses a professional experience which gives him a knowledge of the trustworthy authorities and the proper sources of information, as well as a degree of personal observation of the general subject enabling him to estim