invariable rule in Florida

1985Although a trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial, see Cloud v. Fallís, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959); Ford v. Robinson, 403 So.2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); White v. Martinez, 359 So.2d 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), it is plain that the court in no way exercises that discretion if, as here, it follows an invariable rule of always denying such motions if they involve matters which arose at trial.

1985Although a trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial, see Cloud v. Fallís, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959); Ford v. Robinson, 403 So.2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); White v. Martinez, 359 So.2d 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), it is plain that the court in no way exercises that discretion if, as here, it follows an invariable rule of always denying such motions if they involve matters which arose at trial.

1985Although a trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial, see Cloud v. Fallís, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959); Ford v. Robinson, 403 So.2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); White v. Martinez, 359 So.2d 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), it is plain that the court in no way exercises that discretion if, as here, it follows an invariable rule of always denying such motions if they involve matters which arose at trial.

1974The invariable rule of construction regarding repealing statutes by implication is that earlier acts remain in force unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other, Sanders v. Howell, 74 So. 802 (Fla. 1917).

1937“Repeals by implication are not favored, and in order that the court may declare that one statute repeals another by implication, it must appear that there is a positive repugnancy between the two, or that the last was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case provided for, or that it revises the subject matter of the former.” See also Sparkman v. State, 71 Fla. 210 , 31 Sou. 34 . *787 In Muse, et al., v. Kaler Bros., et al., 120 Fla. 221 , 162 Sou. 507 , we had this statute under consideration and said: “This statute is in recognition of the commonly known fact

1937“Repeals by implication are not favored, and in order that the court may declare that one statute repeals another by implication, it must appear that there is a positive repugnancy between the two, or that the last was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case provided for, or that it revises the subject matter of the former.” See also Sparkman v. State, 71 Fla. 210 , 31 Sou. 34 . *787 In Muse, et al., v. Kaler Bros., et al., 120 Fla. 221 , 162 Sou. 507 , we had this statute under consideration and said: “This statute is in recognition of the commonly known fact

1937“Repeals by implication are not favored, and in order that the court may declare that one statute repeals another by implication, it must appear that there is a positive repugnancy between the two, or that the last was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case provided for, or that it revises the subject matter of the former.” See also Sparkman v. State, 71 Fla. 210 , 31 Sou. 34 . *787 In Muse, et al., v. Kaler Bros., et al., 120 Fla. 221 , 162 Sou. 507 , we had this statute under consideration and said: “This statute is in recognition of the commonly known fact

1916Loftin v. McMillan, 55 Fla. 246 , 45 South.

1881The State, 9 Fla., 246 . “ This is an invariable rule with regard to arrests of judgment upon matter of law that whatever is alleged in arrest of judgment must be such matter as would upon demurrer have been sufficient to overthrow the action or plea.” This question, the only one arising in this case, is in fact settled by the opinion, ante, on the motion to dismiss the appeal.