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9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Milesgreen1 sentence2012Within this framework, “reasonableness does have a role to play” along with history, precedent, and common sense in defining both the broad privacy interests protected from disturbance, id. at 894; see State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244 , 156 P.3d 864 (2007), as well as the scope of disturbance that is or may be authorized by law, see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 177, 178 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“[S]ociety will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a . . . higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.”); Day, 161 Wn.2d at 897 -98 & n.6 (holding that “legislative labeling” of a parking vio | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duncangreen1 sentence2012Within this framework, “reasonableness does have a role to play” along with history, precedent, and common sense in defining both the broad privacy interests protected from disturbance, id. at 894; see State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244 , 156 P.3d 864 (2007), as well as the scope of disturbance that is or may be authorized by law, see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 177, 178 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“[S]ociety will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a . . . higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.”); Day, 161 Wn.2d at 897 -98 & n.6 (holding that “legislative labeling” of a parking vio | 1 | 1 |
State v. Milesgreen1 sentence2012Within this framework, “reasonableness does have a role to play” along with history, precedent, and common sense in defining both the broad privacy interests protected from disturbance, id. at 894; see State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244 , 156 P.3d 864 (2007), as well as the scope of disturbance that is or may be authorized by law, see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 177, 178 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“[S]ociety will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a . . . higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.”); Day, 161 Wn.2d at 897 -98 & n.6 (holding that “legislative labeling” of a parking vio | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duncangreen1 sentence2012Within this framework, “reasonableness does have a role to play” along with history, precedent, and common sense in defining both the broad privacy interests protected from disturbance, id. at 894; see State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244 , 156 P.3d 864 (2007), as well as the scope of disturbance that is or may be authorized by law, see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 177, 178 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“[S]ociety will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a . . . higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.”); Day, 161 Wn.2d at 897 -98 & n.6 (holding that “legislative labeling” of a parking vio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Snappgreen1 sentence2012Within this framework, “reasonableness does have a role to play” along with history, precedent, and common sense in defining both the broad privacy interests protected from disturbance, id. at 894; see State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244 , 156 P.3d 864 (2007), as well as the scope of disturbance that is or may be authorized by law, see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 177, 178 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“[S]ociety will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a . . . higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.”); Day, 161 Wn.2d at 897 -98 & n.6 (holding that “legislative labeling” of a parking vio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Larson
green
2 sentences2005Larson, 93 Wn.2d at 640 . ¶19 The Larson court assumed for its analysis that a parking violation would be a traffic offense such that it would be reasonable for an officer to stop a car and detain the driver to check her license and registration. 2005Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 640 , 611 P.2d 771 . ¶ 19 The Larson court assumed for its analysis that a parking violation would be a traffic offense such that it would be reasonable for an officer to stop a car and detain the driver to check her license and registration. | 5 | 1990–2020 |
Minnesota v. Dickerson
green
2 sentences1999I, § 7, we said: "[A] stop based on a parking violation committed by the driver does not reasonably provide an officer with grounds to require identification of individuals in the car other than the driver, unless other circumstances give the police independent cause to question passengers." (Emphasis omitted.) See also State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 295-96 , 654 P.2d 96 (1982) (mere presence of defendant at suspect's home being searched pursuant to search warrant did not justify frisk of his person), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 1999I, § 7, we said: "[A] stop based on a parking violation committed by the driver does not reasonably provide an officer with grounds to require identification of individuals in the car other than the driver, unless other circumstances give the police independent cause to question passengers." (Emphasis omitted.) See also State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 295-96 , 654 P.2d 96 (1982) (mere presence of defendant at suspect's home being searched pursuant to search warrant did not justify frisk of his person), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 | 2 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Broadnax
green
2 sentences1999I, § 7, we said: "[A] stop based on a parking violation committed by the driver does not reasonably provide an officer with grounds to require identification of individuals in the car other than the driver, unless other circumstances give the police independent cause to question passengers." (Emphasis omitted.) See also State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 295-96 , 654 P.2d 96 (1982) (mere presence of defendant at suspect's home being searched pursuant to search warrant did not justify frisk of his person), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 1999I, § 7, we said: "[A] stop based on a parking violation committed by the driver does not reasonably provide an officer with grounds to require identification of individuals in the car other than the driver, unless other circumstances give the police independent cause to question passengers." (Emphasis omitted.) See also State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 295-96 , 654 P.2d 96 (1982) (mere presence of defendant at suspect's home being searched pursuant to search warrant did not justify frisk of his person), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences2014The court held: Assuming arguendo that a parking violation can be characterized as a traffic offense, as contemplated in [Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L. 2014The court held: Assuming arguendo that a parking violation can be characterized as a traffic offense, as contemplated in [Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Day
green
1 sentence2012Within this framework, “reasonableness does have a role to play” along with history, precedent, and common sense in defining both the broad privacy interests protected from disturbance, id. at 894; see State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244 , 156 P.3d 864 (2007), as well as the scope of disturbance that is or may be authorized by law, see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 177, 178 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“[S]ociety will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a . . . higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.”); Day, 161 Wn.2d at 897 -98 & n.6 (holding that “legislative labeling” of a parking vio | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hickey v. Riley
green
2 sentences1951In the case of Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321 , 162 P. (2d) 371 , the supreme court of Oregon said: "Parking is not a right, but a privilege, and, as such, is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power. 1951In the case of Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321 , 162 P. (2d) 371 , the supreme court of Oregon said: "Parking is not a right, but a privilege, and, as such, is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.