acquittal bar in Alabama

1994An acquittal is a bar to any subsequent action based on the same conduct as that on which the first charge was based, where the objective of the subsequent action is punishment, “because to entertain the second proceeding for punishment would subject the defendant to double jeopardy; and double jeopardy is precluded by the Fifth Amendment whether the verdict ivas an acquittal or a conviction.” Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398 , 58 S.Ct. at 632 (emphasis added). “ ‘If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same of

1994An acquittal is a bar to any subsequent action based on the same conduct as that on which the first charge was based, where the objective of the subsequent action is punishment, “because to entertain the second proceeding for punishment would subject the defendant to double jeopardy; and double jeopardy is precluded by the Fifth Amendment whether the verdict ivas an acquittal or a conviction.” Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398 , 58 S.Ct. at 632 (emphasis added). “ ‘If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same of

1960“It is also assumed without disagreement that the proper test for a plea of double jeopardy is that specified in the Eastep case, supra, taken from Brown v. City of Tuscaloosa, 196 Ala. 475 , 71 So. 672 : “ ‘ “A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, unless the accused could have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts averred in the second.” Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 115 , 32 South. 750 ; Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680 , 91 Am.

1960“It is also assumed without disagreement that the proper test for a plea of double jeopardy is that specified in the Eastep case, supra, taken from Brown v. City of Tuscaloosa, 196 Ala. 475 , 71 So. 672 : “ ‘ “A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, unless the accused could have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts averred in the second.” Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 115 , 32 South. 750 ; Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680 , 91 Am.

1960“It is also assumed without disagreement that the proper test for a plea of double jeopardy is that specified in the Eastep case, supra, taken from Brown v. City of Tuscaloosa, 196 Ala. 475 , 71 So. 672 : “ ‘ “A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, unless the accused could have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts averred in the second.” Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 115 , 32 South. 750 ; Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680 , 91 Am.

1916This prinicple is embodied in the rule long ago established in this state, as in many others, that: “A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, unless the accused could have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts averred in the second.” —Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 115 , 32 South. 750 ; Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680 , 91 Am.

1960“It is also assumed without disagreement that the proper test for a plea of double jeopardy is that specified in the Eastep case, supra, taken from Brown v. City of Tuscaloosa, 196 Ala. 475 , 71 So. 672 : “ ‘ “A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, unless the accused could have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts averred in the second.” Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 115 , 32 South. 750 ; Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680 , 91 Am.

1916This prinicple is embodied in the rule long ago established in this state, as in many others, that: “A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, unless the accused could have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts averred in the second.” —Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 115 , 32 South. 750 ; Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680 , 91 Am.

1960Dec. 496 ; People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192 , 69 Pac. 1006 , 56 L.R.A. 578 , 92 Am.St.Rep. 81 , note page 105. “ ‘As stated by Mr. Freeman in the note referred to ( 92 Am.St.Rep. 107 , c) : “Under this test it is the facts which are alleged in the two indictments, and not the testimony given in either, by which the identity of the offenses is to be determined.

1960Dec. 496 ; People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192 , 69 Pac. 1006 , 56 L.R.A. 578 , 92 Am.St.Rep. 81 , note page 105. “ ‘As stated by Mr. Freeman in the note referred to ( 92 Am.St.Rep. 107 , c) : “Under this test it is the facts which are alleged in the two indictments, and not the testimony given in either, by which the identity of the offenses is to be determined.

1954Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23 , 30 So. 348 .

1933But that he may be so prosecuted the state must, as said by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in a case not greatly dissimilar to this, “conduct its prosecutions for embezzlement in the common-law way, and not undertake to take advantage of a statute, enacted solely for the purpose of removing the many obstacles with which it was frequently confronted in prosecutions for embezzlement, in being required to allege and prove the specific act.” State v. Caston, 96 Miss. 183 , 50 So. 569, 570 .

1933But that he may be so prosecuted the state must, as said by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in a case not greatly dissimilar to this, “conduct its prosecutions for embezzlement in the common-law way, and not undertake to take advantage of a statute, enacted solely for the purpose of removing the many obstacles with which it was frequently confronted in prosecutions for embezzlement, in being required to allege and prove the specific act.” State v. Caston, 96 Miss. 183 , 50 So. 569, 570 .

1923King v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach’s Crown Cases, 816; State v. Johnson, 12 Ala. 840 , 46 Am.