rape shield rule in Arkansas

2021Price argues the posts were improperly excluded under the rape-shield rule, Arkansas Rule of Evidence 411, which limits evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct in order to “shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt.” Mouton v. State, 2018 Ark. 187 , at 6, 547 S.W.3d 76, 80 (quoting McCoy v. State, 2010 Ark. 373, at 9 , 370 S.W.3d 241, 247 ).

2021Price argues the posts were improperly excluded under the rape-shield rule, Arkansas Rule of Evidence 411, which limits evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct in order to “shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt.” Mouton v. State, 2018 Ark. 187 , at 6, 547 S.W.3d 76, 80 (quoting McCoy v. State, 2010 Ark. 373, at 9 , 370 S.W.3d 241, 247 ).

2025Wilder v. State, 2023 Ark. 60 .

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2018He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 4

2010Id.

2006This testimony falls squarely within the ambit of section 16-42-101 (b), which excludes ‘evidence of a victim’s prior aliegations of sexual conduct with . . . any other person which allegation the victim asserts to be true[.]’ ” Standridge, 357 Ark. at 115 , 161 S.W.3d at 819 .

2006This testimony falls squarely within the ambit of section 16-42-101 (b), which excludes ‘evidence of a victim’s prior aliegations of sexual conduct with . . . any other person which allegation the victim asserts to be true[.]’ ” Standridge, 357 Ark. at 115 , 161 S.W.3d at 819 .

2004This testimony falls squarely within the ambit of§ 16-42-101 (b), which excludes “evidence of a victim’s prior allegations of sexual conduct with . . . any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true[.]” See also Taylor v. State, 355 Ark. 267 , 138 S.W.3d 684 (2003) (victim’s denial that she had formerly made false accusations of rape against another person meant that the rape-shield statute applied to the facts in the case).

2004This testimony falls squarely within the ambit of§ 16-42-101 (b), which excludes “evidence of a victim’s prior allegations of sexual conduct with . . . any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true[.]” See also Taylor v. State, 355 Ark. 267 , 138 S.W.3d 684 (2003) (victim’s denial that she had formerly made false accusations of rape against another person meant that the rape-shield statute applied to the facts in the case).

2002He cites the case of Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458 , 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988), which quoted from Kentucky v. Stincer, 479 U.S. 1303 (1986), the rule that a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to the outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.

2002He cites the case of Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458 , 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988), which quoted from Kentucky v. Stincer, 479 U.S. 1303 (1986), the rule that a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to the outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.

2002He cites the case of Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458 , 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988), which quoted from Kentucky v. Stincer, 479 U.S. 1303 (1986), the rule that a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to the outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.