advisory hearing in Arizona

2008P. 13(a)(6); In re 1996 Nissan Sentra, 201 Ariz. 114, ¶ 15 , 32 P.3d 39, 43-44 (App.2001) (court will not address unsupported argument). ¶ 4 Reymundo contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition without prejudice because Rule 28(C)(7)(a) required the court to accept his plea at the advisory hearing and therefore he was effectively adjudicated delinquent upon making his admissions.

2008P. 13(a)(6); In re 1996 Nissan Sentra, 201 Ariz. 114, ¶ 15 , 32 P.3d 39, 43-44 (App.2001) (court will not address unsupported argument). ¶ 4 Reymundo contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition without prejudice because Rule 28(C)(7)(a) required the court to accept his plea at the advisory hearing and therefore he was effectively adjudicated delinquent upon making his admissions.

2008Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 122 , 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970). ¶ 6 Rule 28(C)(7)(a) provides in pertinent part that the juvenile court at an advisory hearing shall “[d]etermine whether the juvenile wishes to admit or deny the allegations” and, “[i]f the juvenile wishes to admit to allegations, the court shall accept the admission or plea if supported by a factual basis and a finding that the juvenile knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives the rights enumerated [in Rule 28(C)(1) through (4)].” (Emphasis added.) This language could be read in isolation to support Reymundo’s position.

2008Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 122 , 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970). ¶ 6 Rule 28(C)(7)(a) provides in pertinent part that the juvenile court at an advisory hearing shall “[d]etermine whether the juvenile wishes to admit or deny the allegations” and, “[i]f the juvenile wishes to admit to allegations, the court shall accept the admission or plea if supported by a factual basis and a finding that the juvenile knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives the rights enumerated [in Rule 28(C)(1) through (4)].” (Emphasis added.) This language could be read in isolation to support Reymundo’s position.

2007She contends that the court’s failure violates the due process rights guaranteed in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2007She contends that the court’s failure violates the due process rights guaranteed in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2025See Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491 , 495 ¶ 11 (App. 2014).

2017Reymundo addresses an admission a juvenile made at an advisory hearing but which the court deferred for acceptance — something Rule 28(E) expressly permits. 217 Ariz. at 591, ¶ 9 .

2011Id. at 909 (footnotes omitted), vacated upon guilty plea, United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2011 WL 4359899 at *1 . ¶ 23 For the five juveniles, there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, either during an advisory hearing or at a pretrial conference, that they had committed the charged offenses.

2011Id. at 909 (footnotes omitted), vacated upon guilty plea, United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2011 WL 4359899 at *1 . ¶ 23 For the five juveniles, there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, either during an advisory hearing or at a pretrial conference, that they had committed the charged offenses.

2007Ariz. Light & Power Co., 47 Ariz. 517, 526 , 57 P.2d 311, 314 (1936). ¶ 10 The language of Rules 28(A) and (C) requires the juvenile court judge to advise the juvenile and his or her parent or guardian of the charges in the petition, as well as advising the juvenile of his or her constitutional rights, which can be invoked or waived. 2 The thirty-day time period to conduct the advisory hearing may, however, be extended by other rules.

2007Ariz. Light & Power Co., 47 Ariz. 517, 526 , 57 P.2d 311, 314 (1936). ¶ 10 The language of Rules 28(A) and (C) requires the juvenile court judge to advise the juvenile and his or her parent or guardian of the charges in the petition, as well as advising the juvenile of his or her constitutional rights, which can be invoked or waived. 2 The thirty-day time period to conduct the advisory hearing may, however, be extended by other rules.

2003Although the state’s attempt to bring felony charges against Juvenile in this case by seeking to amend the traffic citation may not have been effective, there was no evidence that such action was deliberately undertaken by the state in order to gain a tactical advantage over Juvenile, or to harass him. ¶ 12 Moreover, although Juvenile correctly states that the juvenile court was not required to utter the magic words “in the interests of justice” in dismissing this matter with prejudice (see State v. Granados, 172 Ariz. 405, 407 , 837 P.2d 1140, 1142 (App. 1991)), it was required to make a reas

2003Although the state’s attempt to bring felony charges against Juvenile in this case by seeking to amend the traffic citation may not have been effective, there was no evidence that such action was deliberately undertaken by the state in order to gain a tactical advantage over Juvenile, or to harass him. ¶ 12 Moreover, although Juvenile correctly states that the juvenile court was not required to utter the magic words “in the interests of justice” in dismissing this matter with prejudice (see State v. Granados, 172 Ariz. 405, 407 , 837 P.2d 1140, 1142 (App. 1991)), it was required to make a reas

2003Although the state’s attempt to bring felony charges against Juvenile in this case by seeking to amend the traffic citation may not have been effective, there was no evidence that such action was deliberately undertaken by the state in order to gain a tactical advantage over Juvenile, or to harass him. ¶ 12 Moreover, although Juvenile correctly states that the juvenile court was not required to utter the magic words “in the interests of justice” in dismissing this matter with prejudice (see State v. Granados, 172 Ariz. 405, 407 , 837 P.2d 1140, 1142 (App. 1991)), it was required to make a reas

2003Although the state’s attempt to bring felony charges against Juvenile in this case by seeking to amend the traffic citation may not have been effective, there was no evidence that such action was deliberately undertaken by the state in order to gain a tactical advantage over Juvenile, or to harass him. ¶ 12 Moreover, although Juvenile correctly states that the juvenile court was not required to utter the magic words “in the interests of justice” in dismissing this matter with prejudice (see State v. Granados, 172 Ariz. 405, 407 , 837 P.2d 1140, 1142 (App. 1991)), it was required to make a reas