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8 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Derendal v. Griffithgreen2 sentences2014See Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz. 416, 425, ¶¶ 36-37 , 104 P.3d 147, 156 (2005); see also Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 23; Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 24. 2 Under the first prong of the Derendal test, a defendant has a constitutional right to trial by jury if “a statutory offense has a common law antecedent that guaranteed a right to trial by jury at the time of Arizona statehood.” Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 425, ¶ 36 , 104 P.3d at 156 (citing Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 23). 2014See Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz. 416, 425, ¶¶ 36-37 , 104 P.3d 147, 156 (2005); see also Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 23; Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 24. 2 Under the first prong of the Derendal test, a defendant has a constitutional right to trial by jury if “a statutory offense has a common law antecedent that guaranteed a right to trial by jury at the time of Arizona statehood.” Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 425, ¶ 36 , 104 P.3d at 156 (citing Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 23). | 4 | 6 |
Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Klausnergreen2 sentences2006See Newkirk v. Nothwehr, 210 Ariz. 601, 604, ¶ 12 , 115 P.3d 1264, 1267 (App.2005); see also Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office v. Klausner, 211 Ariz. 177, 180, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 1141, 1144 (App.2005) (“[J]ury trial rights provided by the territorial penal code prior to statehood were not preserved by the Arizona Constitution.”); Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490 , 494 n. 6, ¶ 14, 113 P.3d 1247 , 1251 n. 6 (App.2005) (finding that appellant’s citation to a territorial statute in support of his claim that a jury trial was required was “inapposite” and failed to satisfy the common law Derendal prong, 2006See Newkirk v. Nothwehr, 210 Ariz. 601, 604, ¶ 12 , 115 P.3d 1264, 1267 (App.2005); see also Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office v. Klausner, 211 Ariz. 177, 180, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 1141, 1144 (App.2005) (“[J]ury trial rights provided by the territorial penal code prior to statehood were not preserved by the Arizona Constitution.”); Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490 , 494 n. 6, ¶ 14, 113 P.3d 1247 , 1251 n. 6 (App.2005) (finding that appellant’s citation to a territorial statute in support of his claim that a jury trial was required was “inapposite” and failed to satisfy the common law Derendal prong, | 2 | 2 |
Ottaway v. Smithgreen2 sentences2007Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 425, ¶ 37 , 104 P.3d at 156 . “[T]his element of the Derendal analysis is concerned with only those consequences that would apply to all defendants based on the statute’s language.” Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490, 495, ¶ 16 , 113 P.3d 1247, 1252 (App.2005). 2007Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 425, ¶ 37 , 104 P.3d at 156 . “[T]his element of the Derendal analysis is concerned with only those consequences that would apply to all defendants based on the statute’s language.” Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490, 495, ¶ 16 , 113 P.3d 1247, 1252 (App.2005). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Smyersgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314 , 318 n. 4, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d 370 , 374 n. 4 (2004) ("The courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [the Arizona Supreme Court] and do not have the authority to modify or disregard [that] court's rulings.”). 3 . 2014See State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314 , 318 n. 4, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d 370 , 374 n. 4 (2004) ("The courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [the Arizona Supreme Court] and do not have the authority to modify or disregard [that] court's rulings.”). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR CTY. OF PIMAgreen2 sentences2014If this first prong is not satisfied, under the second prong “the court must analyze the seriousness of the offense under Article 2, Section 24.” Id. at ¶ 37. ¶ 5 In Sulavka v. State, this court examined misdemeanor shoplifting by concealment under the first prong of the Derendal test, and determined “the common law crime of larceny is an antecedent of shoplifting by concealment” because the elements of each crime are “sufficiently comparable.” 223 Ariz. 208, 212, ¶¶ 13-18 , 221 P.3d 1022, 1026 (App.2009); see also State v. Superior Court (“Espinosa”), 121 Ariz. 174, 176 , 589 P.2d 48, 50 (App 2014If this first prong is not satisfied, under the second prong “the court must analyze the seriousness of the offense under Article 2, Section 24.” Id. at ¶ 37. ¶ 5 In Sulavka v. State, this court examined misdemeanor shoplifting by concealment under the first prong of the Derendal test, and determined “the common law crime of larceny is an antecedent of shoplifting by concealment” because the elements of each crime are “sufficiently comparable.” 223 Ariz. 208, 212, ¶¶ 13-18 , 221 P.3d 1022, 1026 (App.2009); see also State v. Superior Court (“Espinosa”), 121 Ariz. 174, 176 , 589 P.2d 48, 50 (App | 1 | 1 |
SULAVKA v. Stategreen2 sentences2014If this first prong is not satisfied, under the second prong “the court must analyze the seriousness of the offense under Article 2, Section 24.” Id. at ¶ 37. ¶ 5 In Sulavka v. State, this court examined misdemeanor shoplifting by concealment under the first prong of the Derendal test, and determined “the common law crime of larceny is an antecedent of shoplifting by concealment” because the elements of each crime are “sufficiently comparable.” 223 Ariz. 208, 212, ¶¶ 13-18 , 221 P.3d 1022, 1026 (App.2009); see also State v. Superior Court (“Espinosa”), 121 Ariz. 174, 176 , 589 P.2d 48, 50 (App 2014If this first prong is not satisfied, under the second prong “the court must analyze the seriousness of the offense under Article 2, Section 24.” Id. at ¶ 37. ¶ 5 In Sulavka v. State, this court examined misdemeanor shoplifting by concealment under the first prong of the Derendal test, and determined “the common law crime of larceny is an antecedent of shoplifting by concealment” because the elements of each crime are “sufficiently comparable.” 223 Ariz. 208, 212, ¶¶ 13-18 , 221 P.3d 1022, 1026 (App.2009); see also State v. Superior Court (“Espinosa”), 121 Ariz. 174, 176 , 589 P.2d 48, 50 (App | 1 | 1 |
Bruce v. Stategreen2 sentences2007The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a misdemeanor assault is “the equivalent of a simple battery at common law, which was not a crime requiring a jury trial.” Bruce v. State, 126 Ariz. 271, 273 , 614 P.2d 813, 815 (1980); accord Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office v. Klausner, 211 Ariz. 177, 179, ¶¶ 6-8 , 118 P.3d 1141, 1143 (App. 2005). 2007The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a misdemeanor assault is “the equivalent of a simple battery at common law, which was not a crime requiring a jury trial.” Bruce v. State, 126 Ariz. 271, 273 , 614 P.2d 813, 815 (1980); accord Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office v. Klausner, 211 Ariz. 177, 179, ¶¶ 6-8 , 118 P.3d 1141, 1143 (App. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Newkirk v. Nothwehrgreen2 sentences2006See Newkirk v. Nothwehr, 210 Ariz. 601, 604, ¶ 12 , 115 P.3d 1264, 1267 (App.2005); see also Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office v. Klausner, 211 Ariz. 177, 180, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 1141, 1144 (App.2005) (“[J]ury trial rights provided by the territorial penal code prior to statehood were not preserved by the Arizona Constitution.”); Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490 , 494 n. 6, ¶ 14, 113 P.3d 1247 , 1251 n. 6 (App.2005) (finding that appellant’s citation to a territorial statute in support of his claim that a jury trial was required was “inapposite” and failed to satisfy the common law Derendal prong, 2006See Newkirk v. Nothwehr, 210 Ariz. 601, 604, ¶ 12 , 115 P.3d 1264, 1267 (App.2005); see also Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office v. Klausner, 211 Ariz. 177, 180, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 1141, 1144 (App.2005) (“[J]ury trial rights provided by the territorial penal code prior to statehood were not preserved by the Arizona Constitution.”); Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490 , 494 n. 6, ¶ 14, 113 P.3d 1247 , 1251 n. 6 (App.2005) (finding that appellant’s citation to a territorial statute in support of his claim that a jury trial was required was “inapposite” and failed to satisfy the common law Derendal prong, | 1 | 1 |
Goldman v. Kautzgreen2 sentences2005In Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 432 , 531 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1975), a defendant sought a trial by jury after being charged with assault and battery in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-241(B). 2005In Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 432 , 531 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1975), a defendant sought a trial by jury after being charged with assault and battery in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-241(B). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas
green
2 sentences2005The Derendal test is a modified version of the bright-line test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 , 109 S.Ct. 1289 , 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989), which states that any criminal offense for which the maximum statutory penalty is six months or less incarceration is presumptively a petty offense to which the right of trial by jury does not attach. ¶ 6 Derendal did not change established precedent in Arizona that jury trials are not required in misdemeanor assault cases. 2005The Derendal test is a modified version of the bright-line test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 , 109 S.Ct. 1289 , 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989), which states that any criminal offense for which the maximum statutory penalty is six months or less incarceration is presumptively a petty offense to which the right of trial by jury does not attach. ¶ 6 Derendal did not change established precedent in Arizona that jury trials are not required in misdemeanor assault cases. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima County
green
2 sentences2006Stoudamire is correct that the supreme court held in Dolny : “[U]nder Rothweiler [v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37 , 410 P.2d 479 (1966),] a misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana is sufficiently serious to warrant a jury trial, primarily because of the potentially grave consequences, together with the potential direct punishment, resulting from a conviction.” 161 Ariz. at 301 , 778 P.2d at 1197 . 2006Stoudamire is correct that the supreme court held in Dolny : “[U]nder Rothweiler [v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37 , 410 P.2d 479 (1966),] a misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana is sufficiently serious to warrant a jury trial, primarily because of the potentially grave consequences, together with the potential direct punishment, resulting from a conviction.” 161 Ariz. at 301 , 778 P.2d at 1197 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State Ex Rel. Dean v. Dolny
green
2 sentences2006Stoudamire is correct that the supreme court held in Dolny : “[U]nder Rothweiler [v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37 , 410 P.2d 479 (1966),] a misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana is sufficiently serious to warrant a jury trial, primarily because of the potentially grave consequences, together with the potential direct punishment, resulting from a conviction.” 161 Ariz. at 301 , 778 P.2d at 1197 . 2006Stoudamire is correct that the supreme court held in Dolny : “[U]nder Rothweiler [v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37 , 410 P.2d 479 (1966),] a misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana is sufficiently serious to warrant a jury trial, primarily because of the potentially grave consequences, together with the potential direct punishment, resulting from a conviction.” 161 Ariz. at 301 , 778 P.2d at 1197 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.