8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stangvik v. Shiley Inc.green2 sentences2021(See Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [trial court’s reliance on choice of forum and defendant’s residence in that forum without weighing other factors resulted in “‘giving undue emphasis to any one element’”]; see also Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 753, fn. 4 [“An undue emphasis on a single factor is especially threatening to a balanced analysis because some of the matters to be weighed will by their nature point to a grant or denial of the motion. 2021(See Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [trial court’s reliance on choice of forum and defendant’s residence in that forum without weighing other factors resulted in “‘giving undue emphasis to any one element’”]; see also Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 753, fn. 4 [“An undue emphasis on a single factor is especially threatening to a balanced analysis because some of the matters to be weighed will by their nature point to a grant or denial of the motion. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Sherman M.green2 sentences1992We must undertake a balanced analysis of the parent's rights, recognizing that the interest sought to be protected by the dependency law is the welfare of the child. ( In re Sherman M. (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 40, 44 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 847 ].) There can be no question that at some point the minor acquires a fundamental right which precludes further governmental involvement in the administration of the minor's dependency. 1992We must undertake a balanced analysis of the parent's rights, recognizing that the interest sought to be protected by the dependency law is the welfare of the child. ( In re Sherman M. (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 40, 44 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 847 ].) There can be no question that at some point the minor acquires a fundamental right which precludes further governmental involvement in the administration of the minor's dependency. | 2 | 2 |
Shiley Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2021(See Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [trial court’s reliance on choice of forum and defendant’s residence in that forum without weighing other factors resulted in “‘giving undue emphasis to any one element’”]; see also Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 753, fn. 4 [“An undue emphasis on a single factor is especially threatening to a balanced analysis because some of the matters to be weighed will by their nature point to a grant or denial of the motion. | 1 | 1 |
United Farm Workers Organizing Committee v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1975Even if some form of restraining order is warranted, the fact that only the party seeking to circumscribe First Amendment activity is present to assist in the drafting of the order may result in an injunction which sweeps more broadly than necessary and violates First Amendment liberties. 7 When enjoining activities in the sensitive area of First Amendment freedoms, courts must draft temporary restraining orders “couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” (Carroll, at p. 183 of 1975Even if some form of restraining order is warranted, the fact that only the party seeking to circumscribe First Amendment activity is present to assist in the drafting of the order may result in an injunction which sweeps more broadly than necessary and violates First Amendment liberties. 7 When enjoining activities in the sensitive area of First Amendment freedoms, courts must draft temporary restraining orders “couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” (Carroll, at p. 183 of | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Annegreen2 sentences1975In the absence of evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their participation in the formulation of value judgments, there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication.” (Fns. omitted; 393 U.S. atp. 183 [ 21 L.Ed.2d atp. 332 ].) The second major defect which often inheres in the ex parte issuance of a restraining order affecting First Amendment rights relates to the framing of such orders. 1975In the absence of evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their participation in the formulation of value judgments, there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication.” (Fns. omitted; 393 U.S. atp. 183 [ 21 L.Ed.2d atp. 332 ].) The second major defect which often inheres in the ex parte issuance of a restraining order affecting First Amendment rights relates to the framing of such orders. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. William H. Nichols, United States of America v. Lea Ricard
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Roy Lee Clark
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
John B. Sanders, Jr. v. United States
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
cluster 783840
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Kenzie Hylton
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Kevin Boone
green
2 sentences2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363, 365-366 ; State v. M.L. 2012(See, e.g., U.S. v. Boone (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 321, 331 ; U.S. v. Hylton (4th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 781, 788 ; U.S. v. Wills (4th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 476 , 494-495; U.S. v. Clark (6th Cir. 1993) 988 F.2d 1459, 1468-1469 ; U.S. v. Nichols (1st Cir. 1987) 820 F.2d 508, 511-512 ; Sanders v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1969) 415 F.2d 621, 630-631 ; Miller v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) 645 So.2d 363 , 365–366; State v. M.L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Stanson v. Mott
green
2 sentences2009The complaint objected that the materials in question "d[id] not provide a balanced analysis of the arguments in favor of and against Measure O." In advancing their claim, plaintiffs relied upon Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206 , arguing that the *23 City's communications, taking into account their "style, tenor and timing," properly should be characterized as campaign, rather than informational, materials or activities. 2009The complaint objected that the materials in question “d[id] not provide a balanced analysis of the arguments in favor of and against Measure O.” In advancing their claim, plaintiffs relied upon Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206 , arguing that the City’s communications, taking into account their “style, tenor and timing,” properly should be characterized as campaign, rather than informational, materials or activities. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Amanda B.
green
1 sentence1992Exactly when and in what circumstances the minor acquires a constitutional right to a settled life is an issue which we need not decide in this case. [6] Nonetheless in *242 our well-motivated efforts to protect the parent's constitutional right we cannot lose sight that the objective of effective and efficient judicial administration here is the rights of the child. (3e) At the outset we must reaffirm the black letter law established by section 366.26, subdivision (k) and our recent cases (such as In re Amanda B., supra, 3 Cal. App.4th 935 ) that error in hearings which result in a referral t | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Williams
red
1 sentence1986However, the Williams court stated the power to strike ‘enables the punishment to fit the crime as well as the perpetrator. ’ ( 30 Cal.3d at p. 489 ; emphasis added.) It is clear that a balanced analysis of culpability was the focus of Williams , and thus it was not necessary to consider the post-sentencing evidence. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
In re Berry
green
2 sentences1975Even if some form of restraining order is warranted, the fact that only the party seeking to circumscribe First Amendment activity is present to assist in the drafting of the order may result in an injunction which sweeps more broadly than necessary and violates First Amendment liberties. 7 When enjoining activities in the sensitive area of First Amendment freedoms, courts must draft temporary restraining orders “couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” (Carroll, at p. 183 of 1975Even if some form of restraining order is warranted, the fact that only the party seeking to circumscribe First Amendment activity is present to assist in the drafting of the order may result in an injunction which sweeps more broadly than necessary and violates First Amendment liberties. [7] When enjoining activities in the sensitive area of First Amendment freedoms, courts must draft temporary restraining orders "couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order." ( Carroll, at p. 183 | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.