balanced instruction in New York

2013Turning to the required showing of good cause as to why the structure could not be preserved, petitioners argue that the DRC improperly found that Boff established good cause based upon the economic unfeasibility of renovation. 6 In this regard, the DRC noted that the structure was one of hundreds of contributing buildings in the Historic District and weighed the “value of possible future restoration of the structure, particularly in light of significant structural and financial obstacles, 7 with the possibility of damage to property or personal injury or death.” Considering the DRC’s balanced

2013Turning to the required showing of good cause as to why the structure could not be preserved, petitioners argue that the DRC improperly found that Boff established good cause based upon the economic unfeasibility of renovation. 6 In this regard, the DRC noted that the structure was one of hundreds of contributing buildings in the Historic District and weighed the “value of possible future restoration of the structure, particularly in light of significant structural and financial obstacles, 7 with the possibility of damage to property or personal injury or death.” Considering the DRC’s balanced

2013Turning to the required showing of good cause as to why the structure could not be preserved, petitioners argue that the DRC improperly found that Boff established good cause based upon the economic unfeasibility of renovation. 6 In this regard, the DRC noted that the structure was one of hundreds of contributing buildings in the Historic District and weighed the “value of possible future restoration of the structure, particularly in light of significant structural and financial obstacles, 7 with the possibility of damage to property or personal injury or death.” Considering the DRC’s balanced

2013Turning to the required showing of good cause as to why the structure could not be preserved, petitioners argue that the DRC improperly found that Boff established good cause based upon the economic unfeasibility of renovation. 6 In this regard, the DRC noted that the structure was one of hundreds of contributing buildings in the Historic District and weighed the “value of possible future restoration of the structure, particularly in light of significant structural and financial obstacles, 7 with the possibility of damage to property or personal injury or death.” Considering the DRC’s balanced

1995While it was proper for the trial court to ask the jury to make another effort to reach a verdict (see, People v Pagan, 45 NY2d 725 ), it failed to deliver a balanced instruction stressing the jurors’ duty to impartially consider the evidence and try to reach an agreement without surrendering their individual views (see, People v Ali, 47 NY2d 920 ; see also, People v Johnson, 193 AD2d 695 ).

1993Although it was proper for the court to ask the jury to make another effort to reach a verdict (see, People v Pagan, 45 NY2d 725 ), it failed to deliver a balanced instruction stressing the jurors’ duty to impartially consider the evidence and to try to reach an agreement without surrendering their individual views (see, 1 CJI[NY] 42.60, at 1019; see also, People v Ali, 47 NY2d 920 , affg 65 AD2d 513 ).

1994The court also balanced the factors in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) in determining interim maintenance, especially the fact that plaintiff had not worked during the marriage but remained home to care for the children (see, Kay v Kay, 37 NY2d 632, 637-638 ), and properly imputed to defendant monies received from his parents (see, Warshaw v Warshaw, 169 AD2d 408, 409 ).

1994The court also balanced the factors in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) in determining interim maintenance, especially the fact that plaintiff had not worked during the marriage but remained home to care for the children (see, Kay v Kay, 37 NY2d 632, 637-638 ), and properly imputed to defendant monies received from his parents (see, Warshaw v Warshaw, 169 AD2d 408, 409 ).

1993It was inappropriate to emphasize the expense of a retrial (see, e.g., People v Huarotte, 134 AD2d 166 ; People v Hudson, 104 AD2d 157 ; People v Demery, 60 AD2d 606 ).

1993It was inappropriate to emphasize the expense of a retrial (see, e.g., People v Huarotte, 134 AD2d 166 ; People v Hudson, 104 AD2d 157 ; People v Demery, 60 AD2d 606 ).

1993It was inappropriate to emphasize the expense of a retrial (see, e.g., People v Huarotte, 134 AD2d 166 ; People v Hudson, 104 AD2d 157 ; People v Demery, 60 AD2d 606 ).

1993The instant case moves light years away from the limited holdings and facts of Nallan and Miller v State of New York ( 62 NY2d 506 ).

1993In that context, the Appellate Division’s balanced test seems more faithful to the limited rationale of Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. ( 50 NY2d 507 , supra), the case which inaugurated this kind of liability in New York against commercial owners.