constitutional separation of powers doctrine in California

2010But after Proposition 218 passed, an assessment’s validity, including the substantive requirements, is now a constitutional question. ‘There is a clear limitation . . . upon the power of the Legislature to regulate the exercise of a constitutional right.’ [Citation.]” (Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 448.) The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that “[w]hile the specific holding of Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th 431 , is not directly relevant to this appeal, the court’s analysis provides a template for ours.

2009Silicon Valley Changes the Landscape In Silicon Valley , the California Supreme Court held that the passage of Proposition 218 undermined the legislative-function rationale for the deferential standard of review on the substantive requirements for assessments. ( Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 450-451.) "Before Proposition 218 became law, special assessment laws were generally statutory, and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine served as a foundation for a more deferential standard of review by the courts.

2020(People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 996-997 [“[a] probation officer cannot issue directives that are not reasonable in light of the authority granted to the officer by the court”; “[t]he condition does not grant a probation officer the power to issue arbitrary or capricious directives that the court itself could not order”].) Accordingly, appellant’s claim of a violation of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine based on an improper delegation of judicial authority fails.

2008(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] [power of appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support conclusions below]; Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ] [reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor].) The majority’s choice of the deferential substantial evidence standard comport

2008(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] [power of appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support conclusions below]; Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ] [reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor].) The majority’s choice of the deferential substantial evidence standard comport

2008For this, it cites Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 36 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ] (Strumsky). 5 And also via negative implication, it argues that subdivision (b)(6), which provides that Proposition 59 does not alter confidentiality protections for the Legislature or the scope of discovery regarding deliberations of the Legislature, does not negate Proposition 59’s elimination of the mental processes principle because (1) the subdivision’s language is limited to the state level, and (2) the subdivision’s language does not trump Code of Civil

2008For this, it cites Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 36 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ] (Strumsky). 5 And also via negative implication, it argues that subdivision (b)(6), which provides that Proposition 59 does not alter confidentiality protections for the Legislature or the scope of discovery regarding deliberations of the Legislature, does not negate Proposition 59’s elimination of the mental processes principle because (1) the subdivision’s language is limited to the state level, and (2) the subdivision’s language does not trump Code of Civil

2008(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] [power of appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support conclusions below]; Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ] [reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor].) The majority’s choice of the deferential substantial evidence standard comport

2008(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] [power of appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support conclusions below]; Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ] [reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor].) The majority’s choice of the deferential substantial evidence standard comport

2003(Keller v. State Bar of California (1990) 496 U.S. 1, 5 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2228 ] (Keller II).) 2 It performs various functions such as “ ‘examining applicants for admission, formulating rules of professional conduct, disciplining members for misconduct, preventing unlawful practice of the law, and engaging in study and recommendation of changes in procedural law and improvement of the administration of justice.’ ” (Keller II, at p. 5.) Although the State Bar has been described as having a large measure of self-government (Keller I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1159), in keeping with the co

2003(Keller v. State Bar of California (1990) 496 U.S. 1, 5 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2228 ] (Keller II).) 2 It performs various functions such as “ ‘examining applicants for admission, formulating rules of professional conduct, disciplining members for misconduct, preventing unlawful practice of the law, and engaging in study and recommendation of changes in procedural law and improvement of the administration of justice.’ ” (Keller II, at p. 5.) Although the State Bar has been described as having a large measure of self-government (Keller I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1159), in keeping with the co

2003Thus the bar’s examining committee is authorized to *636 examine applicants for admission to practice law in California, administer the bar exam and other requirements for admission and certify to the Supreme Court those applicants who fulfill the statutory requirements, but it is the Supreme Court that grants or denies admission to the bar. (§§ 6046, 6060, 6062, 6064.) Similarly, while the Board, through the State Bar Court, conducts disciplinary hearings and makes disciplinary and disbarment recommendations to the Supreme Court, the high court can control any disciplinary proceeding at any s

2003Thus the bar’s examining committee is authorized to *636 examine applicants for admission to practice law in California, administer the bar exam and other requirements for admission and certify to the Supreme Court those applicants who fulfill the statutory requirements, but it is the Supreme Court that grants or denies admission to the bar. (§§ 6046, 6060, 6062, 6064.) Similarly, while the Board, through the State Bar Court, conducts disciplinary hearings and makes disciplinary and disbarment recommendations to the Supreme Court, the high court can control any disciplinary proceeding at any s

1988(See generally Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977) 433 U.S. 425, 443 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 891 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 ] [rejecting "`archaic view of the separation-of-powers as requiring three airtight departments of government'"].) Accordingly, we conclude that section 1001.2, subdivision (b) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the district attorney.

1988(See generally Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977) 433 U.S. 425, 443 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 891 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 ] [rejecting "`archaic view of the separation-of-powers as requiring three airtight departments of government'"].) Accordingly, we conclude that section 1001.2, subdivision (b) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the district attorney.