8 California opinions name it 1 courts 1937–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gaggero v. Yuragreen2 sentences2006(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891-892 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ].) Although the court awarded Syngenta and Dow declaratory relief based on former Food and Agricultural Code section 12811.5, it denied a prohibitory injunction based on the statute and granted summary adjudication in favor of the Department and Gustafson on the count alleging violation of the statute. 2006(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891-892 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ].) Although the court awarded Syngenta and Dow declaratory relief based on former Food and Agricultural Code section 12811.5, it denied a prohibitory injunction based on the statute and granted summary adjudication in favor of the Department and Gustafson on the count alleging violation of the statute. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tilburygreen2 sentences2003Section 246 . . . and who in the commission of that felony intentionally and personally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury . . . shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” 71 Sections 193 and 664. 72 Section 245, subdivision (a)(1). 73 Section 246. 74 The People contend an enhancement was adequately pled under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) because the count alleging the violation of section 246 alleged Riva “did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously discharge a firearm at an occupied motor 2003Section 246 . . . and who in the commission of that felony intentionally and personally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury . . . shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” 71 Sections 193 and 664. 72 Section 245, subdivision (a)(1). 73 Section 246. 74 The People contend an enhancement was adequately pled under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) because the count alleging the violation of section 246 alleged Riva “did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously discharge a firearm at an occupied motor | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2025(Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 248 .) “[I]f an accusatory pleading is improper (i.e., a count alleging violation of section 288.5 is joined, and not — as subdivision (c) requires — charged alternatively, with one or more counts alleging specific sexual offenses), then the multiple convictions predicated thereon cannot stand, and either the continuous abuse conviction or the convictions on the specific offenses must be vacated.” (Id. at p. 245.) We are bound by Johnson’s interpretation of section 288.5. 2024(Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 248 .) “[I]f an accusatory pleading is improper (i.e., a count alleging violation of section 288.5 is joined, and not—as subdivision (c) requires—charged alternatively, with one or more counts alleging specific sexual offenses), then the multiple convictions predicated thereon cannot stand, and either the continuous abuse conviction or the convictions on the specific offenses must be vacated.” (Id., at p. 245.) We are bound by Johnson’s interpretation of section 288.5. | 5 | 2014–2025 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) Logically, if section 288.5 prohibits multiple convictions predicated on an operative pleading in violation of section 288.5, subdivision (c), then a defendant cannot forfeit a challenge to those convictions by failing to demur to the underlying pleading. 2024(Auto Equity, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 .) Logically, if section 288.5 prohibits multiple convictions predicated on an operative pleading in violation of section 288.5, subdivision (c), then a defendant cannot forfeit a challenge to those convictions by failing to demur to the underlying pleading. | 2 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Torres
green
1 sentence2014(Id. at p. 248.) Four months after Johnson was decided, the Court of Appeal held it was "appropriate, in deciding which convictions to vacate as the remedy for a violation of the proscription against multiple convictions set forth in section 288.5, subdivision (c), that we leave appellant standing convicted of the alternative offenses that are most commensurate with his culpability." (People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1059 .) Sometimes that will require vacating the conviction under section 288.5 (id. at pp. 1059-1061), and other times it will require vacating the convictions of th | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Bautista
green
1 sentence2014(Id. at p. 248.) Four months after Johnson was decided, the Court of Appeal held it was "appropriate, in deciding which convictions to vacate as the remedy for a violation of the proscription against multiple convictions set forth in section 288.5, subdivision (c), that we leave appellant standing convicted of the alternative offenses that are most commensurate with his culpability." (People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1059 .) Sometimes that will require vacating the conviction under section 288.5 (id. at pp. 1059-1061), and other times it will require vacating the convictions of th | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lockyer v. Andrade
green
2 sentences2003We need not address that question here. 86 Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63 [ 123 S.Ct. 1166 , 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ]. 2003We need not address that question here. 86 Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63 [ 123 S.Ct. 1166 , 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ]. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Mancebo
green
2 sentences2003Section 246 . . . and who in the commission of that felony intentionally and personally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury . . . shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” 71 Sections 193 and 664. 72 Section 245, subdivision (a)(1). 73 Section 246. 74 The People contend an enhancement was adequately pled under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) because the count alleging the violation of section 246 alleged Riva “did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously discharge a firearm at an occupied motor 2003Section 246 . . . and who in the commission of that felony intentionally and personally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury . . . shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” 71 Sections 193 and 664. 72 Section 245, subdivision (a)(1). 73 Section 246. 74 The People contend an enhancement was adequately pled under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) because the count alleging the violation of section 246 alleged Riva “did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously discharge a firearm at an occupied motor | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Howard v. Jackson
neutral
1 sentence1937(People v. Helbing, 61 Cal. 620 .) ’” The offense charged in the count alleging violation of the Juvenile Court Law is not the same in law and not necessarily in fact with that charged in the count alleging violation of *291 section 288 of the Penal Code. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.