first line defense in California

2014The issue is not forfeited The People’s first line of defense to this argument is that Hostia forfeited this claim by not objecting below, citing People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 (McCullough).2 We disagree.

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2003A rule making employers liable even for those damages that an employee could have avoided with reasonable effort and without undue risk, expense, or humiliation would significantly weaken the incentive for employers to establish effective workplace remedies against sexual harassment.” (State Department of Health Services, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1034 .) Similar to the purpose served by the doctrine of avoidable consequences, the rule requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies makes employers, and in the case of public entity employers, their civil service commissions, the first l

2003A rule making employers liable even for those damages that an employee could have avoided with reasonable effort and without undue risk, expense, or humiliation would significantly weaken the incentive for employers to establish effective workplace remedies against sexual harassment.” (State Department of Health Services, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1034 .) Similar to the purpose served by the doctrine of avoidable consequences, the rule requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies makes employers, and in the case of public entity employers, their civil service commissions, the first l

2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether.

2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether.

2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether.

2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether.

1989Co., supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 456, 462 .) 1 Arguing that the undisputed facts bring this case within these vague and controversial standards, Blue Cross adopts as a first line of defense a drastic oversimplification of existing case law: “[U]nder Donovan and its progeny,” it maintains, “ERISA is broadly construed to regulate group health insurance arrangements provided as a benefit of employment where the employer pays all or a portion of the policy premiums.” Alternatively, Blue Cross argues that the present record reveals sufficient employer involvement in the administration of the group health

1974The 1972 Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the California Courts, quoted in In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d 72, 84 , footnote 12, states sanguinely: “The required advice and transcripts will serve to rebut any future claim of ignorance by defendants.” 4 While this report was undoubtedly correct in predicting the effect of compliance with rule 250, it does not tell us anything about the Judicial Council’s intent with respect to the case where ignorance is claimed and cannot be rebutted by pointing to compliance with rule 250. 5 The People’s first line of defense to this application i