road warning (California) · Go Syfert
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road warning in California

8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.green
ca1 · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009According to Paduano, the display in the vehicle indicated that the vehicle had attained only 37.8 mpg during the road test. [5] Honda did not amend its answer for more than a year after the complaint was filed. [6] Another section of the United States Code requires that the label be "affix[ed] to the windshield, or side window" of each new vehicle. (15 U.S.C. ง 1232.) That provision also requires disclosure of additional information, including the final assembly point, the suggested retail price, and the suggested retail prices for accessories and optional equipment. ( Ibid. ) This label has

2009According to Paduano, the display in the vehicle indicated that the vehicle had attained only 37.8 mpg during the road test. [5] Honda did not amend its answer for more than a year after the complaint was filed. [6] Another section of the United States Code requires that the label be "affix[ed] to the windshield, or side window" of each new vehicle. (15 U.S.C. ง 1232.) That provision also requires disclosure of additional information, including the final assembly point, the suggested retail price, and the suggested retail prices for accessories and optional equipment. ( Ibid. ) This label has

11
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980As the court stated in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, “Rather than conversing while standing exposed to moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.” ( 434 U.S. at p. 111 [ 54 L.Ed.2d at p. 337 ].) The contraband was discovered in this case because of real party’s precipitous behavior in disposing of it, and not because the officer acted unreasonably or in an overbearing fashion.

1980As the court stated in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, “Rather than conversing while standing exposed to moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.” ( 434 U.S. at p. 111 [ 54 L.Ed.2d at p. 337 ].) The contraband was discovered in this case because of real party’s precipitous behavior in disposing of it, and not because the officer acted unreasonably or in an overbearing fashion.

11
Raynor v. City of Arcatagreen
cal · 1938 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1948–1948
2 sentences

1948But if his ‘due regard’ for the safety of others means that he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended.” And while the statute does not “protect [the] driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges” there granted, “an arbitrary exercise” of them “cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where a warning has been given. ’ ’ (Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 117 [ 77 P.2d 1054 ].) “In such cases speed, ri

1948But if his ‘due regard’ for the safety of others means that he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended.” And while the statute does not “protect [the] driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges” there granted, “an arbitrary exercise” of them “cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where a warning has been given. ’ ’ (Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 117 [ 77 P.2d 1054 ].) “In such cases speed, ri

11
Russell v. Smithgreen
calctapp · 1936 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1948–1948
1 sentence

1948But if his ‘due regard’ for the safety of others means that he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended.” And while the statute does not “protect [the] driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges” there granted, “an arbitrary exercise” of them “cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where a warning has been given. ’ ’ (Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 117 [ 77 P.2d 1054 ].) “In such cases speed, ri

11
Stone v. City and County of San Franciscogreen
calctapp · 1938 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1948–1948
2 sentences

1948But if his ‘due regard’ for the safety of others means that he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended.” And while the statute does not “protect [the] driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges” there granted, “an arbitrary exercise” of them “cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where a warning has been given. ’ ’ (Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 117 [ 77 P.2d 1054 ].) “In such cases speed, ri

1948But if his ‘due regard’ for the safety of others means that he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended.” And while the statute does not “protect [the] driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges” there granted, “an arbitrary exercise” of them “cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where a warning has been given. ’ ’ (Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 117 [ 77 P.2d 1054 ].) “In such cases speed, ri

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc. green
texapp · 2002
1 sentence

2015These leases “shall provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease” and “shall further provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall assume complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease.” ( 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (c)(1) (2014).) *657 The reason for these requirements has been described as follows: “ ‘During the first half of the twentieth century, interstate motor carriers attempted to immunize themselves from liability for negligent drivers by leasing trucks a

12015–2015
Grant v. Ratliff green
calctapp · 2008
2 sentences

2013According to Sevra, the vehicles on the road included "automobiles, pickup trucks, stock trailers, [and] horse trailers." Grant v. Ratliff, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1304 , is distinguishable.

2013According to Sevra, the vehicles on the road included "automobiles, pickup trucks, stock trailers, [and] horse trailers." Grant v. Ratliff, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1304 , is distinguishable.

12013–2013
Applegate v. Ota green
calctapp · 1983
1 sentence

2013"That [the Campbells'] use of the road was under claim of right is substantiated by the 4 evidence since [the Campbells] testified they believed they had a . . . right to use the road, they never asked permission, . . . used the road openly, and were never given permission [to use the road]." (Applegate v. Ota (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 702, 710 .) Furthermore, Virginia Sevra, a prior owner of Veley's property from about 1977 to November 2000, testified that the Campbells and their "renters" had used the disputed road, but they had never asked her for permission.

12013–2013
August Storck K.G. And Storck Usa, L.P. v. Nabisco, Inc. green
ca7 · 1995
2 sentences

2009According to Paduano, the display in the vehicle indicated that the vehicle had attained only 37.8 mpg during the road test. [5] Honda did not amend its answer for more than a year after the complaint was filed. [6] Another section of the United States Code requires that the label be "affix[ed] to the windshield, or side window" of each new vehicle. (15 U.S.C. ง 1232.) That provision also requires disclosure of additional information, including the final assembly point, the suggested retail price, and the suggested retail prices for accessories and optional equipment. ( Ibid. ) This label has

2009According to Paduano, the display in the vehicle indicated that the vehicle had attained only 37.8 mpg during the road test. [5] Honda did not amend its answer for more than a year after the complaint was filed. [6] Another section of the United States Code requires that the label be "affix[ed] to the windshield, or side window" of each new vehicle. (15 U.S.C. ง 1232.) That provision also requires disclosure of additional information, including the final assembly point, the suggested retail price, and the suggested retail prices for accessories and optional equipment. ( Ibid. ) This label has

12009–2009
People v. Lopez green
calctapp · 1993
1 sentence

1995It cannot penetrate when something is taking its place, [^fl To convince someone of what is true, it is not enough to state it; we must find the road from error to truth.” (Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (Rhees ed. 1979) p. le.) 5 In light of the fact that Stonewall F. never addressed the question of scienter in terms of specific or general intent it is odd that People v. Lopez, supra, characterizes “any discussion” of those terms as “an archetypical example of dicta.” ( 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1845 , fn. omitted.) Given that the mental state required for arson was squarely posed

11995–1995
Wells v. Dias green
calctapp · 1922
2 sentences

1937It was held in Wells v. Dias, 57 Cal. App. 670 [ 207 Pac. 913 ], that where the use is continuous it creates a presumptive knowdedge in the owner that the person using the land is doing so under a claim of right, and whether the use of the road is under a claim of right or a matter of neighborly accommodation is for the court to determine as a fact in the light of the relation between the parties and all the surrounding circumstances.

1937It was held in Wells v. Dias, 57 Cal. App. 670 [ 207 Pac. 913 ], that where the use is continuous it creates a presumptive knowdedge in the owner that the person using the land is doing so under a claim of right, and whether the use of the road is under a claim of right or a matter of neighborly accommodation is for the court to determine as a fact in the light of the relation between the parties and all the surrounding circumstances.

11937–1937
Brett v. S. H. Frank & Co. green
cal · 1908
2 sentences

1919(Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267 , [ 94 Pac. 1051 ]; McGraw v. Friend etc. Co., 120 Cal. 574 , [52 Pac. 1004]; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal. App. 154 , [ 178 Pac. 318 ].) The latest of these cases is claimed by the defendants to have been decided on facts identical with those in this case, but upon comparison it proves, like so many of the “all-fours” cases of negligence, to have three or more of the fours missing.

1919(Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267 , [ 94 Pac. 1051 ]; McGraw v. Friend etc. Co., 120 Cal. 574 , [52 Pac. 1004]; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal. App. 154 , [ 178 Pac. 318 ].) The latest of these cases is claimed by the defendants to have been decided on facts identical with those in this case, but upon comparison it proves, like so many of the “all-fours” cases of negligence, to have three or more of the fours missing.

11919–1919
McGraw v. Friend & Terry Lumber Co. green
cal · 1898
2 sentences

1919(Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267 , [ 94 Pac. 1051 ]; McGraw v. Friend etc. Co., 120 Cal. 574 , [52 Pac. 1004]; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal. App. 154 , [ 178 Pac. 318 ].) The latest of these cases is claimed by the defendants to have been decided on facts identical with those in this case, but upon comparison it proves, like so many of the “all-fours” cases of negligence, to have three or more of the fours missing.

1919(Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267 , [ 94 Pac. 1051 ]; McGraw v. Friend etc. Co., 120 Cal. 574 , [52 Pac. 1004]; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal. App. 154 , [ 178 Pac. 318 ].) The latest of these cases is claimed by the defendants to have been decided on facts identical with those in this case, but upon comparison it proves, like so many of the “all-fours” cases of negligence, to have three or more of the fours missing.

11919–1919
Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co. green
calctapp · 1918
2 sentences

1919(Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267 , [ 94 Pac. 1051 ]; McGraw v. Friend etc. Co., 120 Cal. 574 , [52 Pac. 1004]; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal. App. 154 , [ 178 Pac. 318 ].) The latest of these cases is claimed by the defendants to have been decided on facts identical with those in this case, but upon comparison it proves, like so many of the “all-fours” cases of negligence, to have three or more of the fours missing.

1919(Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267 , [ 94 Pac. 1051 ]; McGraw v. Friend etc. Co., 120 Cal. 574 , [52 Pac. 1004]; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal. App. 154 , [ 178 Pac. 318 ].) The latest of these cases is claimed by the defendants to have been decided on facts identical with those in this case, but upon comparison it proves, like so many of the “all-fours” cases of negligence, to have three or more of the fours missing.

11919–1919

Where else courts name it

NY 18 (1914–2023) PA 16 (1982–2021) TX 14 (1948–2019) OR 13 (1947–2025) CO 10 (1984–2005) CA 8 (1919–2015) MO 7 (1922–2020) IL 7 (1932–2025) MA 6 (1918–1998) KS 6 (1908–2014) WI 6 (1922–2020) NC 5 (1960–2017) ME 5 (1897–2019) MD 4 (1927–1995) LA 4 (1960–2007) OK 4 (1952–2007) OH 4 (1972–2020) MT 4 (1933–1997) WA 4 (1891–2024) IN 4 (1882–2003) MN 4 (1939–1994) GA 4 (1941–2013) ND 3 (1936–2014) AK 3 (1981–2019) CT 3 (1908–1934) SD 3 (1968–2002) FL 3 (2004–2017) DE 2 (1952–2008) WY 2 (2006–2021) NH 2 (1844–2020) ID 2 (1990–2018) TN 2 (1964–2007) NM 2 (1967–2023) KY 2 (1967–2022) SC 2 (1960–2016) VA 2 (1965–1984)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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