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14 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1948–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Transportation v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2015“It is well established that both road design and the failure to equip a road with warning devices or traffic signals, either at the time of the original construction or at a later time are discretionary decisions, and governmental units are immune from liability and suit for such claims unless the unit was required by law to take or refrain from a certain action.” Cantu, at 811, citing Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002). 2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 2 | 2 |
McQuarters v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See State v. Alderete, 314 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. ref’d) (finding the record showed the officers could have formed reasonable suspicion to stop defendant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and trial court’s focus on sole issue of weaving within the lane was error); McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (State is not required to prove defendant violated a traffic law when record shows sufficient facts to justify a stop on reasonable suspicion of defendant’s intoxication); Gajewski v. State, 944 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.—Ho | 1 | 1 |
Gajewski v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See State v. Alderete, 314 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. ref’d) (finding the record showed the officers could have formed reasonable suspicion to stop defendant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and trial court’s focus on sole issue of weaving within the lane was error); McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (State is not required to prove defendant violated a traffic law when record shows sufficient facts to justify a stop on reasonable suspicion of defendant’s intoxication); Gajewski v. State, 944 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.—Ho | 1 | 1 |
State v. Alderetegreen1 sentence2018See State v. Alderete, 314 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. ref’d) (finding the record showed the officers could have formed reasonable suspicion to stop defendant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and trial court’s focus on sole issue of weaving within the lane was error); McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (State is not required to prove defendant violated a traffic law when record shows sufficient facts to justify a stop on reasonable suspicion of defendant’s intoxication); Gajewski v. State, 944 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.—Ho | 1 | 1 |
Derichsweiler v. Stategreen1 sentence2018A “police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914-15 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Cannongreen1 sentence2012See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Siders v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
Maxwell v. Texas Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Miguelgreen1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. City of Benbrookgreen1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rodriguezred1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
Mogayzel v. Texas Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
City of El Paso v. Ayoubgreen1 sentence2002See id. (holding that decisions about highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy decisions and finding no cognizable claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for complaint as to type of marker or safety device used); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (stating that governmental agency may not be sued for the design of public work such as a roadway or for the failure to install safety features such as barriers and guard rails as such are discretionary duties for which immunity is retained and finding that plea of | 1 | 1 |
Gehrke v. Stategreen1 sentence1989See also Gehrke v. State, 507 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), where a conviction for failure to keep a vehicle in a marked lane did not bar a subsequent prosecution for DWI. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell
green
2 sentences1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. 1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson
neutral
2 sentences1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. 1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Cunningham v. Suggs
green
2 sentences1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. 1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Taber v. Smith
green
2 sentences1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. 1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Killen v. Stanford
neutral
2 sentences1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. 1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Hicks v. Morgan
neutral
2 sentences1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. 1971Cunningham v. Suggs, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 369 ; Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 251 S.W.2d 892 ; Killen v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 792 ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 436, 438 ; Taber v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 722, 725 ; Hicks v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 263 ; Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, 67. | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Robison v. Whaley Farm Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1962In Dortch v. Sherman County, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 1018 , we find this statement of the Rule: “In order to prove prescription it is sufficient to establish that the general public used the road under a claim of right, and not by mere permission of the owner of the land, without interruption or any substantial changes for at least ten years.” (Citing Robison v. Whaley Farm Corporation, 120 Tex. 633 , 37 S.W.2d 714 , 40 S.W.2d 52 , opinion adopted). 1948Robinson v. Whaley Farm Corporation, 120 Tex. 633 , 37 S.W.2d 714 , rehearing-denied with additional opinion 120 Tex. 633 , 40 S.W.2d 52 . | 2 | 1948–1962 |
Robison v. Whaley Farm Corporation
green
2 sentences1962In Dortch v. Sherman County, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 1018 , we find this statement of the Rule: “In order to prove prescription it is sufficient to establish that the general public used the road under a claim of right, and not by mere permission of the owner of the land, without interruption or any substantial changes for at least ten years.” (Citing Robison v. Whaley Farm Corporation, 120 Tex. 633 , 37 S.W.2d 714 , 40 S.W.2d 52 , opinion adopted). 1962In Dortch v. Sherman County, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 1018 , we find this statement of the Rule: “In order to prove prescription it is sufficient to establish that the general public used the road under a claim of right, and not by mere permission of the owner of the land, without interruption or any substantial changes for at least ten years.” (Citing Robison v. Whaley Farm Corporation, 120 Tex. 633 , 37 S.W.2d 714 , 40 S.W.2d 52 , opinion adopted). | 2 | 1948–1962 |
Joy Worsdale, Individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Scott Worsdale v. the City of Killeen, Texas
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 68 . 7 Here, we believe the connection was made between the City’s alleged ownership and control of the road and the factors identified as contributing to Mr. Lopez’s death. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
County of Galveston v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2000In County of Galveston v. Morgan, 882 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), the court held that a county employee who was directing the movements of a truck owned and driven by a private party on a road construction job was "using or operating" the truck for purposes under the Act. 2000In County of Galveston v. Morgan, 882 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), the court held that a county employee who was directing the movements of a truck owned and driven by a private party on a road construction job was “using or operating” the truck for purposes under the Act. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Naquin v. State
neutral
1 sentence1989In Naquin v. State, 725 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1987, no pet.), this court held that a conviction for driving on the wrong side of the road did not bar a prosecution for DWI. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Moughon v. Wolf
green
1 sentence1982Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.1978); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 612 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1981, no writ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle
green
1 sentence1982Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.1978); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 612 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1981, no writ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Dortch v. Sherman County
green
1 sentence1962In Dortch v. Sherman County, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 1018 , we find this statement of the Rule: “In order to prove prescription it is sufficient to establish that the general public used the road under a claim of right, and not by mere permission of the owner of the land, without interruption or any substantial changes for at least ten years.” (Citing Robison v. Whaley Farm Corporation, 120 Tex. 633 , 37 S.W.2d 714 , 40 S.W.2d 52 , opinion adopted). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Grant v. Chicago Etc. Ry. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1952Co., 78 Mont. 97 , 252 P. 382, 385 , citing Commonwealth v. Crowninshield, 187 Mass. 221 , 72 N.E. 963 , 68 L.R.A. 245 .) Appellee argues that this driving on the left-hand side of the road in violation of the penal code was excusable in that its driver “attempted to make such application of his-brakes as he could under the circumstances and otherwise attempted to control the movement of the vehicle,” but was unable to do so through no negligence on his part because of a suddenly deflated tire. 1952Co., 78 Mont. 97 , 252 P. 382, 385 , citing Commonwealth v. Crowninshield, 187 Mass. 221 , 72 N.E. 963 , 68 L.R.A. 245 .) Appellee argues that this driving on the left-hand side of the road in violation of the penal code was excusable in that its driver “attempted to make such application of his-brakes as he could under the circumstances and otherwise attempted to control the movement of the vehicle,” but was unable to do so through no negligence on his part because of a suddenly deflated tire. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Commonwealth v. Crowninshield
green
2 sentences1952Co., 78 Mont. 97 , 252 P. 382, 385 , citing Commonwealth v. Crowninshield, 187 Mass. 221 , 72 N.E. 963 , 68 L.R.A. 245 .) Appellee argues that this driving on the left-hand side of the road in violation of the penal code was excusable in that its driver “attempted to make such application of his-brakes as he could under the circumstances and otherwise attempted to control the movement of the vehicle,” but was unable to do so through no negligence on his part because of a suddenly deflated tire. 1952Co., 78 Mont. 97 , 252 P. 382, 385 , citing Commonwealth v. Crowninshield, 187 Mass. 221 , 72 N.E. 963 , 68 L.R.A. 245 .) Appellee argues that this driving on the left-hand side of the road in violation of the penal code was excusable in that its driver “attempted to make such application of his-brakes as he could under the circumstances and otherwise attempted to control the movement of the vehicle,” but was unable to do so through no negligence on his part because of a suddenly deflated tire. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Straus-Bodenheimer Co. v. Marshall neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.