failure to present claim in California

1971(Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 423 P.2d 818 ]; Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468, 475 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Thus, section 946.6 expressly provides that a petitioner shall be relieved from the requirement of filing a claim at all if the court finds that a previous application to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time (not to exceed one year) after the cause of action accrued, and thereafter denied, and that the failure to present such claim sooner was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, unless

1971(Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 423 P.2d 818 ]; Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468, 475 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Thus, section 946.6 expressly provides that a petitioner shall be relieved from the requirement of filing a claim at all if the court finds that a previous application to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time (not to exceed one year) after the cause of action accrued, and thereafter denied, and that the failure to present such claim sooner was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, unless

1971(Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 423 P.2d 818 ]; Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468, 475 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Thus, section 946.6 expressly provides that a petitioner shall be relieved from the requirement of filing a claim at all if the court finds that a previous application to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time (not to exceed one year) after the cause of action accrued, and thereafter denied, and that the failure to present such claim sooner was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, unless

1971(Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 423 P.2d 818 ]; Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468, 475 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Thus, section 946.6 expressly provides that a petitioner shall be relieved from the requirement of filing a claim at all if the court finds that a previous application to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time (not to exceed one year) after the cause of action accrued, and thereafter denied, and that the failure to present such claim sooner was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, unless

2004(See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 881 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations which remain applicable to federal actions”].) Consistent with Williams , we have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phi

2004(See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 881 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations which remain applicable to federal actions”].) Consistent with Williams , we have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phi

2004(See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 881 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations which remain applicable to federal actions”].) Consistent with Williams , we have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phi

2004(See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 881 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations which remain applicable to federal actions”].) Consistent with Williams , we have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phi

2025(See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 (DiCampli-Mintz); Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209 ; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234 , 1244 (Bodde); Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 839-841 (Williams).) We observe that the California Supreme Court’s characterization of the claim presentation requirement as an element of a cause of action has been in the context of explaining that the claim presentation requirement “ ‘ “is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.” ’

2025(See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 (DiCampli-Mintz); Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209 ; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234 , 1244 (Bodde); Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 839-841 (Williams).) We observe that the California Supreme Court’s characterization of the claim presentation requirement as an element of a cause of action has been in the context of explaining that the claim presentation requirement “ ‘ “is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.” ’

2025(See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 (DiCampli-Mintz); Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209 ; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234 , 1244 (Bodde); Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 839-841 (Williams).) We observe that the California Supreme Court’s characterization of the claim presentation requirement as an element of a cause of action has been in the context of explaining that the claim presentation requirement “ ‘ “is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.” ’

2025(See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 (DiCampli-Mintz); Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209 ; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234 , 1244 (Bodde); Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 839-841 (Williams).) We observe that the California Supreme Court’s characterization of the claim presentation requirement as an element of a cause of action has been in the context of explaining that the claim presentation requirement “ ‘ “is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.” ’

2015(See Lineaweaver v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 738, 741 (Lineaweaver) [holding the six-month limitation period during which a person may petition the superior court after the board’s denial of an application to present a late claim is mandatory]; Todd v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 661, 665 [minor’s action was time-barred when the complaint failed to comply with section 946.6, subdivision (f) because it was filed more than 30 days after the superior court granted minor’s petition for relief].) Section 946.6, subdivision (c) (section 946(c)) pro

2015(See Lineaweaver v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 738, 741 (Lineaweaver) [holding the six-month limitation period during which a person may petition the superior court after the board’s denial of an application to present a late claim is mandatory]; Todd v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 661, 665 [minor’s action was time-barred when the complaint failed to comply with section 946.6, subdivision (f) because it was filed more than 30 days after the superior court granted minor’s petition for relief].) Section 946.6, subdivision (c) (section 946(c)) pro

2015(See Lineaweaver v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 738, 741 (Lineaweaver) [holding the six-month limitation period during which a person may petition the superior court after the board’s denial of an application to present a late claim is mandatory]; Todd v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 661, 665 [minor’s action was time-barred when the complaint failed to comply with section 946.6, subdivision (f) because it was filed more than 30 days after the superior court granted minor’s petition for relief].) Section 946.6, subdivision (c) (section 946(c)) pro

2015(See Lineaweaver v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 738, 741 (Lineaweaver) [holding the six-month limitation period during which a person may petition the superior court after the board’s denial of an application to present a late claim is mandatory]; Todd v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 661, 665 [minor’s action was time-barred when the complaint failed to comply with section 946.6, subdivision (f) because it was filed more than 30 days after the superior court granted minor’s petition for relief].) Section 946.6, subdivision (c) (section 946(c)) pro

2011(See, e.g., Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479-180 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ]; Whitfield v. Roth [(1974)] 10 Cal.3d 874, 883-884 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 540 , 519 P.2d 588 ]; Frost v. State of California (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 378, 386-387 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 652 ]; Hom v. Chico Unified Sch.

2011(See, e.g., Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479-180 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ]; Whitfield v. Roth [(1974)] 10 Cal.3d 874, 883-884 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 540 , 519 P.2d 588 ]; Frost v. State of California (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 378, 386-387 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 652 ]; Hom v. Chico Unified Sch.

2004(See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 881 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations which remain applicable to federal actions”].) Consistent with Williams , we have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phi

2004(See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 881 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations which remain applicable to federal actions”].) Consistent with Williams , we have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phi

2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo

2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo

2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo

2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo

1990Code, § 946.6, subd. (a).) Subdivision (c) of section 946.6 requires the court to grant relief if it “finds that the application . . . was made within a reasonable time . . . and that one or more of the following is applicable: [¶] (1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner . . . [¶] (3) The person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the ti

1990Code, § 946.6, subd. (a).) Subdivision (c) of section 946.6 requires the court to grant relief if it “finds that the application . . . was made within a reasonable time . . . and that one or more of the following is applicable: [¶] (1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner . . . [¶] (3) The person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the ti

1983See, e.g., Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 509 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 720 ] (relief granted on the basis of excusable neglect where plaintiff's counsel, retained on the 93d day after the accrual of the cause of action, incorrectly computed the 100-day period and filed the claim on the 101st day); Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 976 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 20 ] (relief granted where plaintiff's counsel incorrectly calendared the date of the 100th day); Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] (relief

1983See, e.g., Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 509 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 720 ] (relief granted on the basis of excusable neglect where plaintiff's counsel, retained on the 93d day after the accrual of the cause of action, incorrectly computed the 100-day period and filed the claim on the 101st day); Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 976 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 20 ] (relief granted where plaintiff's counsel incorrectly calendared the date of the 100th day); Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] (relief

1980(Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) The ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect’ concept is expressly directed to the 100-day period of section 911.2 and not to the ‘reasonable time not to exceed [one year]’ period of sections 911.4 and 946.6. ‘The showing required of a petitioner seeking relief under the authority of Government Code, section 946.6 on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is the same as required under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure for relieving a party from a def

1980(Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) The ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect’ concept is expressly directed to the 100-day period of section 911.2 and not to the ‘reasonable time not to exceed [one year]’ period of sections 911.4 and 946.6. ‘The showing required of a petitioner seeking relief under the authority of Government Code, section 946.6 on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is the same as required under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure for relieving a party from a def

1980And if the public entity denies such an application, section 946.6, subdivision (c)(1), authorizes a petition to the superior court for relief from the filing requirement, such relief to be granted ‘if the court finds that the application. ..under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed [one year after the accrual of the cause of action].. .and that.. .the failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect....’ (Italics added.) Correlatively, section 911.4, subdivision (b), requires that ‘[t]he application shall be presented to t

1980And if the public entity denies such an application, section 946.6, subdivision (c)(1), authorizes a petition to the superior court for relief from the filing requirement, such relief to be granted ‘if the court finds that the application. ..under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed [one year after the accrual of the cause of action].. .and that.. .the failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect....’ (Italics added.) Correlatively, section 911.4, subdivision (b), requires that ‘[t]he application shall be presented to t

1953On appeal this court said: “Section 707 Probate Code states in unequivocal terms that ‘any claim not so filed or presented is barred forever.’ It is appellant’s position that despite this clear language the administratrix may waive the failure to present the claim in the time and manner provided by the Probate Code and the probate judge must concur in her waiver. ‘ ‘ This argument overlooks the facts that the administratrix occupies a fiduciary duty to the heirs to protect their legal rights in the estate (Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645, 650 [ 134 P.2d 265 ]; 11A Cal.Jur., Executors and Admi

1953On appeal this court said: “Section 707 Probate Code states in unequivocal terms that ‘any claim not so filed or presented is barred forever.’ It is appellant’s position that despite this clear language the administratrix may waive the failure to present the claim in the time and manner provided by the Probate Code and the probate judge must concur in her waiver. ‘ ‘ This argument overlooks the facts that the administratrix occupies a fiduciary duty to the heirs to protect their legal rights in the estate (Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645, 650 [ 134 P.2d 265 ]; 11A Cal.Jur., Executors and Admi

2016“After six months from entry of default, a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 .) Courts have applied a three-part test to determine whether equitable relief may be granted; first, the party seeking relief must show a meritorious defense; second, that party must identify an excuse which the court finds to be satisfactory for the failure to present the defense; and, finally, that party must have acted diligently to set aside the default once discovered.

2014Although the County continues to assert that the arrears in this matter are res judicata, its letter concludes by not opposing a remand for the trial court to determine whether this case presents “exceptional circumstances” requiring equitable relief to set aside the retroactive child support, citing Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982 (to set aside a default judgment based upon extrinsic mistake, a defaulted party must demonstrate merit, excuse the failure to present the defense to the original action, and show diligence in seeking to set aside the default once discovered).

2024Abuse of discretion is shown where uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of the plaintiff establish adequate cause for relief.” (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1778 .) As set forth above, plaintiffs rely on the following two provisions in section 946.6 to excuse their failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement: (1) “The person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss died before the expiration of the time specified in Section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim” (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(6)); and (2) “The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence,

2016(Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1777 .) “The court shall relieve the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4 if the court finds that the application to the board under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed [one year after the accrual of the cause of action] . . . and that . . . : [¶] (1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4.” (§

2011(See, e.g., Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479-180 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ]; Whitfield v. Roth [(1974)] 10 Cal.3d 874, 883-884 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 540 , 519 P.2d 588 ]; Frost v. State of California (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 378, 386-387 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 652 ]; Hom v. Chico Unified Sch.

2011(See, e.g., Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479-180 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ]; Whitfield v. Roth [(1974)] 10 Cal.3d 874, 883-884 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 540 , 519 P.2d 588 ]; Frost v. State of California (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 378, 386-387 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 652 ]; Hom v. Chico Unified Sch.

1987The two requirements pertinent here are that (1) the failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes it would be prejudiced if relief were granted (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1)) or (2) the person who sustained the alleged injury was physically or mentally incapacitated during the entire 100 days and by reason of such disability failed to present a claim during such time. (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(3).) “The determination of the trial court in granting or denying a petition for relief under section 946.6 will not be disturbed

1987The two requirements pertinent here are that (1) the failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes it would be prejudiced if relief were granted (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1)) or (2) the person who sustained the alleged injury was physically or mentally incapacitated during the entire 100 days and by reason of such disability failed to present a claim during such time. (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(3).) “The determination of the trial court in granting or denying a petition for relief under section 946.6 will not be disturbed

1983The proper court for filing the petition is a court which would be a competent court for the trial of an action on the cause of action to which the claim relates.... "(c) The court shall relieve the petitioner from the provisions of Section 945.4 if the court finds that the application to the board under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed that specified in subdivision (b) of Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied pursuant to Section 911.6 and that: "(1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect unless the

1983The proper court for filing the petition is a court which would be a competent court for the trial of an action on the cause of action to which the claim relates.... "(c) The court shall relieve the petitioner from the provisions of Section 945.4 if the court finds that the application to the board under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed that specified in subdivision (b) of Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied pursuant to Section 911.6 and that: "(1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect unless the

1983See, e.g., Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 509 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 720 ] (relief granted on the basis of excusable neglect where plaintiff's counsel, retained on the 93d day after the accrual of the cause of action, incorrectly computed the 100-day period and filed the claim on the 101st day); Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 976 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 20 ] (relief granted where plaintiff's counsel incorrectly calendared the date of the 100th day); Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] (relief

1983See, e.g., Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 509 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 720 ] (relief granted on the basis of excusable neglect where plaintiff's counsel, retained on the 93d day after the accrual of the cause of action, incorrectly computed the 100-day period and filed the claim on the 101st day); Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 976 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 20 ] (relief granted where plaintiff's counsel incorrectly calendared the date of the 100th day); Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] (relief

1970(People v. McDowell, supra, 69 Cal.2d 737, 749 .) Where, from the record, it is a matter of conjecture or surmise whether the failure to present a defense was the product of deliberate judgment or a lack of judgment, denial of the constitutional right to effective counsel or of due process of law has not been shown.

1970Ed. 309, 319 , 68 S.Ct. 316 ]; In re Williams (1969) 1 Cal.3d 168, 174-176 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 784 , 460 P.2d 984 ]; People v. McDowell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 737 , 746 and 748-749 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 447 P.2d 97 ]; In re Hawley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 824, 827-828 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]; People v. Gayton (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 891 ]; People v. Cline (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 989, 998 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 246 ]; Peo *328 ple v. Welborn (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 513, 518-519 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 8 ]; People v. Pineda (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 443, 465-473 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 144 ] cert. den. 390 U.S. 984 [ 19