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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2026Rather, “[a]n affirmative defense essentially admits the defendant’s commission of the elements of the charged act but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 20 ); see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775 , 784 n.12 (Colo. 2005) (“While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, ‘[p]roof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.’” (quoting Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2000))). 2026See People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 784 (Colo. 2005) (Colorado law dictates that once a defendant has met the burden of proof to present an affirmative defense for jury consideration, “the prosecution has the burden of disproving the claimed affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). | 3 | 4 |
Gorman v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2026Rather, “[a]n affirmative defense essentially admits the defendant’s commission of the elements of the charged act but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 20 ); see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775 , 784 n.12 (Colo. 2005) (“While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, ‘[p]roof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.’” (quoting Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2000))). 2005While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, "[pjroof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.” Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2000). .For cases not necessarily involving affirmative defense errors but involving reversible error because the prosecution's burden of proof was improperly lowered, see, for example, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (improper definition of "reasonable doubt”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Zukowskigreen1 sentence2014People v. Zukowski, 260 P.3d 339, 347 (Colo.App.2010). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reedgreen1 sentence2012P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2000))); Reed, 932 P.2d at 844 ("[An affirmative defense is distinguished from an element of the offense because it must be disproved by the prosecution only if the evidence gives rise to an issue with respect to its existence."); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 , 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (rejecting the suggestion that "whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that cireumstance as an element of the crime," because a "State may want to assume the burden of dispro | 1 | 1 |
Engle v. Isaacgreen2 sentences2012P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2000))); Reed, 932 P.2d at 844 ("[An affirmative defense is distinguished from an element of the offense because it must be disproved by the prosecution only if the evidence gives rise to an issue with respect to its existence."); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 , 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (rejecting the suggestion that "whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that cireumstance as an element of the crime," because a "State may want to assume the burden of dispro 2012P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2000))); Reed, 932 P.2d at 844 ("[An affirmative defense is distinguished from an element of the offense because it must be disproved by the prosecution only if the evidence gives rise to an issue with respect to its existence."); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 , 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (rejecting the suggestion that "whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that cireumstance as an element of the crime," because a "State may want to assume the burden of dispro | 1 | 1 |
People v. Saavedra-Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2008A defendant must present "some credible evidence" supporting the claimed affirmative defense to have the defense submitted to the jury. § 18-1-407(1), C.R.S.2007; People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Vega v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2005The prosecution bears this burden because a defendant’s constitutional right to due process requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts concerning all of the elements of the offense, 11 and a properly raised affirmative defense is treated as though it were another element of that offense. 12 Hill, 934 P.2d at 826; Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107, 111 (Colo.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Lybarger v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2005While the defendant bears the burden of going forward, Colorado law dictates that once that burden has been met, the prosecution has the burden of disproving the claimed affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. § 18-1-407(2), C.R.S. (2004); 10 Hill, 934 P.2d at 826; Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 579 (Colo.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. People
green
1 sentence2026Rather, “[a]n affirmative defense essentially admits the defendant’s commission of the elements of the charged act but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 20 ); see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775 , 784 n.12 (Colo. 2005) (“While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, ‘[p]roof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.’” (quoting Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2000))). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Thomas Pearson v. The People of the State of Colorado.
green
1 sentence2026Pearson v. People, 2022 CO 4, ¶ 16 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
The People of the State of Colorado v. Kenneth Alfonso Gallegos
green
1 sentence2026Rather, “[a]n affirmative defense essentially admits the defendant’s commission of the elements of the charged act but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 20 ); see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775 , 784 n.12 (Colo. 2005) (“While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, ‘[p]roof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.’” (quoting Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2000))). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2005While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, "[pjroof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.” Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2000). .For cases not necessarily involving affirmative defense errors but involving reversible error because the prosecution's burden of proof was improperly lowered, see, for example, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (improper definition of "reasonable doubt”). 2005While a claimed affirmative defense is treated like an element of the offense, "[pjroof of an affirmative defense is separate and distinct from proof of the elements of [that] offense.” Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2000). .For cases not necessarily involving affirmative defense errors but involving reversible error because the prosecution's burden of proof was improperly lowered, see, for example, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (improper definition of "reasonable doubt”). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.