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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carrillo v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2015See Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999); People v. Chavez, 313 P.3d 594, 596 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 11 A court must sustain a challenge for cause when “[t]he juror is a compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency or a public defender’s office.” § 16-10-103(l)(k); see also Crim. 2014(Pifer's counsel used a peremptory challenge to excuse the prospective juror from service.) We review for an abuse of discretion, see Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485 (Colo.1999), and find none. 120 A court must sustain a challenge for cause if the juror has "a state of mind ... evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state," but not if "the court is satisfied ... that [the juror] will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial." § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S.20183; accord Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Wainwright v. Wittgreen1 sentence2025However, a potential juror need not be dismissed “if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that [the juror] will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.” Id. ¶6 It is the defendant’s burden during voir dire to “demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lack[s] impartiality.” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 263 (Colo. 1996) (quoting 2 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2025However, a potential juror need not be dismissed “if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that [the juror] will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.” Id. ¶6 It is the defendant’s burden during voir dire to “demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lack[s] impartiality.” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 263 (Colo. 1996) (quoting 2 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2025To protect this right, the court must sustain a challenge for cause to a juror who has “a state of mind . . . evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state.” § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2025; see Marko v. People, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 20 . | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen1 sentence2020I’m just joking.” The trial judge replied, “You’re a walking provocation.” 4Richardson further contends that Juror 25 should have been dismissed for cause under section 16-10-103(1)(b), C.R.S. (2019), which provides that a court must sustain a challenge for cause to a prospective juror if there is a “[r]elationship 12 But “even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether the deprivation thereof would otherwise constitute structural error.” Stackhouse, ¶ 8, 386 P.3d at 443 ; see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 , 1911–12 (2017); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 9 | 1 | 1 |
Peretz v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020I’m just joking.” The trial judge replied, “You’re a walking provocation.” 4Richardson further contends that Juror 25 should have been dismissed for cause under section 16-10-103(1)(b), C.R.S. (2019), which provides that a court must sustain a challenge for cause to a prospective juror if there is a “[r]elationship 12 But “even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether the deprivation thereof would otherwise constitute structural error.” Stackhouse, ¶ 8, 386 P.3d at 443 ; see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 , 1911–12 (2017); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 9 | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2020I’m just joking.” The trial judge replied, “You’re a walking provocation.” 4Richardson further contends that Juror 25 should have been dismissed for cause under section 16-10-103(1)(b), C.R.S. (2019), which provides that a court must sustain a challenge for cause to a prospective juror if there is a “[r]elationship 12 But “even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether the deprivation thereof would otherwise constitute structural error.” Stackhouse, ¶ 8, 386 P.3d at 443 ; see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 , 1911–12 (2017); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 9 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chavezgreen1 sentence2015See Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999); People v. Chavez, 313 P.3d 594, 596 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 11 A court must sustain a challenge for cause when “[t]he juror is a compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency or a public defender’s office.” § 16-10-103(l)(k); see also Crim. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Russogreen1 sentence1991See People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356 (Colo.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrison v. People
green
1 sentence2026“A defendant’s right to an impartial jury is violated if the trial court fails to remove a juror biased against the defendant.” Morrison, 19 P.3d at 672 ; see Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 14. ¶ 15 As relevant here, a court must sustain a challenge for cause when there exists “a state of mind in a juror manifesting a bias for or against the defendant, or for or against the prosecution, or the acknowledgement of a previously formed or expressed opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Crim. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Stackhouse v. People
green
1 sentence2020I’m just joking.” The trial judge replied, “You’re a walking provocation.” 4Richardson further contends that Juror 25 should have been dismissed for cause under section 16-10-103(1)(b), C.R.S. (2019), which provides that a court must sustain a challenge for cause to a prospective juror if there is a “[r]elationship 12 But “even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether the deprivation thereof would otherwise constitute structural error.” Stackhouse, ¶ 8, 386 P.3d at 443 ; see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 , 1911–12 (2017); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 9 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Strean
green
1 sentence2006Under § 16-10-103(1)©, C.R.S.2005, a court must sustain a challenge for cause if there is [t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state; however, no person summoned as a juror shall be disqualified by reason of a previously formed or expressed opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that he will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial[.] But “the court is not require | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.