willful and wanton exception in Illinois

2011Partnership, 181 Ill.2d 335, 347 , 230 Ill.Dec. 11 , 692 N.E.2d 1177 (1998) ("Even willful and wanton conduct, however, cannot deprive a municipality of an immunity granted by section 2-201 of the Act [citation].").

2011Partnership, 181 Ill.2d 335, 347 , 230 Ill.Dec. 11 , 692 N.E.2d 1177 (1998) ("Even willful and wanton conduct, however, cannot deprive a municipality of an immunity granted by section 2-201 of the Act [citation].").

2019The court further rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994), recognized a willful and wanton exception to section 4-102.

2018The court further rejected the plaintiff's argument that Doe v. Calumet City , 161 Ill. 2d 374 , 204 Ill.Dec. 274 , 641 N.E.2d 498 (1994), recognized a willful and wanton exception to section 4-102.

2021However, our supreme court has characterized the definition of willful and wanton in the Tort Immunity Act as “entirely consistent with this court’s long-standing case law.” Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 41 ; see also Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213, 242 (2007) (rejecting defendants’ arguments that the 1986 amendments to the Tort Immunity Act—when section 1-210 was enacted—imposed a heightened willful and wanton standard, which we note was decided after Floyd).

2017Dec. 2, 1998) (amending 745 ILCS 10/1-210). ¶ 49 Plaintiff argues the legislature’s amendment did not impose a heightened willful and wanton standard, citing to Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007), and Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525 .

2020See Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 450 (“[T]here is a qualitative difference between negligence and willful and wanton conduct.”). ¶ 72 We recognize that Murphy relies on Buford to demonstrate that the Park District had constructive notice of a dangerous condition.

2019See Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 450 (“[T]here is a qualitative difference between negligence and willful and wanton conduct.”). ¶ 72 We recognize that Murphy relies on Buford to demonstrate that the Park District had constructive notice of a dangerous condition.

2021However, to reach that decision, the court relied on Doe v. Calumet City’s recognition of a willful and wanton exception (id. at 556) and employed the same elements from DeSmet (id. at 559) that we have found inapposite. - 12 - No. 1-20-1269 Therefore, Keener does not support Rodriguez’s argument against application of section 4-102 either. ¶ 30 Keener also relied on two cases that Rodriguez cites for support: Fatigato v. Village of Olympia Fields, 281 Ill.

2021Fatigato 281 Ill.

2017App. 3d 544, 548 , 352 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1976) (city was liable because section 3-105 of the Act expressly excluded physical damage or deterioration of streets from immunity); Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213, 234 , 864 N.E.2d 176, 188-89 (2007) (youth center was liable because, although immunity was afforded under section 3-109(a) of the Act for the hazardous recreational activity at issue, the willful and wanton exception under section 3-109(c) of the Act applied); Hascall, 2013 IL App (4th) 121131, ¶ 32 , 996 N.E.2d 1168 (summarizing the holding in Murray).

2017App 3d 544, 548, 352 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1976) (city was liable because section 3-105 of the Act expressly excluded physical damage or deterioration of streets from immunity); Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213, 234 , 864 N.E.2d 176, 188-89 (2007) (youth center was liable because, although immunity was afforded under section 3-109(a) of the Act for the hazardous recreational activity at issue, the willful and wanton exception under section 3-109(c) of the Act applied); Hascall, 2013 IL App (4th) 121131, ¶ 32 , 996 N.E.2d 1168 (summarizing the holding in Murray).

2016See, e.g., Colburn v. Mario Tricoci Hair Salon & Day Spas, Inc., 2012 IL App (2d) 110624, ¶ 36 (in a negligence case, the standard of care required of a defendant is to act as an ordinary careful person would in like circumstances).

2016See, e.g., Colburn v. Mario Tricoci Hair Salon & Day Spas, Inc., 2012 IL App (2d) 110624, ¶ 36 (in a negligence case, the standard of care required of a defendant is to act as an ordinary careful person would in like circumstances).

2012See, e.g., Williams v. City of Evanston, 378 Ill.App.3d 590, 601 , 318 Ill.Dec. 251 , 883 N.E.2d 85, 94 (2007) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the defendant firefighter engaged in willful and wanton conduct because there was no evidence he was traveling at a high rate of speed when he drove through the intersection); Shuttlesworth v. City of Chicago, 377 Ill.App.3d 360, 367 , 316 Ill.Dec. 581 , 879 N.E.2d 969, 975-76 (2007) (affirming summary judgment for police officers and the city on a willful and wanton claim where the police pursuit that led to the collision was done in little tr

2012See, e.g., Williams v. City of Evanston, 378 Ill.App.3d 590, 601 , 318 Ill.Dec. 251 , 883 N.E.2d 85, 94 (2007) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the defendant firefighter engaged in willful and wanton conduct because there was no evidence he was traveling at a high rate of speed when he drove through the intersection); Shuttlesworth v. City of Chicago, 377 Ill.App.3d 360, 367 , 316 Ill.Dec. 581 , 879 N.E.2d 969, 975-76 (2007) (affirming summary judgment for police officers and the city on a willful and wanton claim where the police pursuit that led to the collision was done in little tr

2011That common law punitive damages may be recovered where a plaintiff has established a willful and wanton violation of the Act was reiterated by this court most recently in Eads v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc., 204 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2003).

2011That common law punitive damages may be recovered where a plaintiff has established a willful and wanton violation of the Act was reiterated by this court most recently in Eads v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc., 204 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2003).

1999My conviction that this court reads a willful and wanton exception into an enactment where none exists remains as strong today as when I stated it in Barnett, and later stated it in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 213 (1997) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.

1999My conviction that this court reads a willful and wanton exception into an enactment where none exists remains as strong today as when I stated it in Barnett , and later stated it in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill.2d 179, 213 , 223 Ill.Dec. 532 , 680 N.E.2d 265 (1997) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.

2013DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 514; see also Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205 , 227- 28 (2011) (section 2-202 does not provide a willful and wanton exception to any of the other sections of the Tort Immunity Act).

2012Section 2-202’s exception for willful and wanton -16- conduct prevailed over the blanket immunities of sections 4-102 and 4-107. ¶ 73 In Ries, we noted that while “Doe held section 2-202 provided a general willful and wanton exception to the immunities provided by the Act and rejected those decisions that held that blanket immunities provided by individual sections of the Act prevail over section 2-202,” subsequent cases “held that if a section of the Tort Immunity Act [did] not provide for a willful and wanton exception, then none exist[ed].” Ries, 242 Ill. 2d at 226-27 .

1997See Leone, 156 Ill. 2d at 39 , 619 N.E.2d at 122 ("[i]ncorporating a willful and wanton requirement into the special duty doctrine would therefore yield the anomalous result of making recovery more difficult under the doctrine than it already is under the statute”).

1997See Leone, 156 Ill. 2d at 39 , 619 N.E.2d at 122 ("[i]ncorporating a willful and wanton requirement into the special duty doctrine would therefore yield the anomalous result of making recovery more difficult under the doctrine than it already is under the statute”).

2007Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 391 , 712 N.E.2d at 304 .

2007Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 391 , 712 N.E.2d at 304 .

2013DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 514; see also Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205 , 227- 28 (2011) (section 2-202 does not provide a willful and wanton exception to any of the other sections of the Tort Immunity Act).

2011DeSmet, 219 Ill.2d at 515 , 302 Ill.Dec. 466 , 848 N.E.2d 1030 ; see also Anthony v. City of Chicago, 382 Ill.App.3d 983, 989 , 321 Ill.Dec. 202 , 888 N.E.2d 721 (2008). ¶ 15 The DeSmet court, however, left open the slight possibility that section 2-202 of the Act provided a willful and wanton exception to section 4-102 as evidenced by Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374 , 204 Ill.Dec. 274 , 641 N.E.2d 498 (1994).

2009This motion was based on res judicata pursuant to the recent decision in Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 , 889 N.E.2d 210, 213 (2008) (holding that involuntary dismissal of the plaintiffs negligence claim and the plaintiffs subsequent voluntary dismissal of the remaining willful and wanton claim barred refiling of the willful and wanton claim under the doctrine of res judicata).

2009This motion was based on res judicata pursuant to the recent decision in Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 , 889 N.E.2d 210, 213 (2008) (holding that involuntary dismissal of the plaintiffs negligence claim and the plaintiffs subsequent voluntary dismissal of the remaining willful and wanton claim barred refiling of the willful and wanton claim under the doctrine of res judicata).

2011Dec. 848 , 752 N.E.2d 1090 (2001) (reviewing cases holding that when an immunity does not contain a willful and wanton exception, none exists); Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.

2011See, e.g., Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, 196 Ill. 2d 484, 491-94 (2001) (reviewing cases holding that when an immunity does not contain a willful and wanton exception, none exists); Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.

2024See Cress v. Recreation Services, Inc., 341 Ill.

2024See id. at 179 .

2024To the extent this is an issue concerning the denial of a motion in limine, we review for an abuse of discretion See Alm v. Loyola University Medical Center, 373 Ill.