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8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marcel Hair Goods Corp. v. National Savings & Trust Co.green2 sentences2015See Marcel Hair Goods Corp. v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 410 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1979) ("To hold a party accountable for fail- . ihg to interject a [Rule 50(b) ] motion when the trial court conducts a post-verdict hearing on a reserved [Rule 50(a) ] motion would be irrational. 2008See, e.g., Marcel Hair Goods Corp. v. National Sav. & Trust Co., 410 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C.1979) (“To hold a party accountable for failing to interject a rule 50(b) motion when the trial court conducts a post-verdict hearing on a reserved rule 50(a) motion would be irrational.”). 3 Nevertheless, the defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the counts of sexual harassment/hostile work environment and retaliation must be rejected. | 2 | 2 |
Jose Martinez Moll v. Levitt & Sons of Puerto Rico, Inc.green1 sentence2022Iron Vine and Second Factor respond that though they did not explicitly invoke Rule 50 in any written post-trial motion or at the post-verdict hearing, it was clear at the post-verdict hearing that they were seeking to renew all of the sufficiency arguments they had made during the trial, but the judge refused to 16 Martinez Moll v. Levitt & Sons of P.R., Inc., 583 F.2d 565, 569 (1st Cir. 1978). 17 Super. | 1 | 1 |
Khaalis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005See Khaalis, 408 A.2d at 359 (citing Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 981-82 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Sellars v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005See Khaalis, 408 A.2d at 359 (citing Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 981-82 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. MacDonaldgreen2 sentences1982Accord, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 859 , 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 , 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). 6 . 1982Accord, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 859 , 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 , 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bethea v. United States
green
2 sentences1982As we noted in Bethea, supra, a post-verdict hearing on a speedy trial claim provides “the most useful perspective and basis for determining whether delay has been prejudicial.” Id. at 793 . 1982As we noted in Bethea, supra, a post-verdict hearing on a speedy trial claim provides “the most useful perspective and basis for determining whether delay has been prejudicial.” Id. at 793 . | 2 | 1979–1982 |
United States v. Patrick Bacon
green
1 sentence2026This is hardly the gatekeeping role the Court envisioned in Daubert and its progeny.”), overruled by Bacon, 979 F.3d at 770 . 25 was a civil case that had not gone to a jury trial; we reversed a grant of summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration of the summary judgment motion under the correct burden of proof for the claim at issue and also for “further analysis and explanation” of the court’s exclusion of expert testimony. 340 A.3d at 10-12. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Baxter v. United States
green
1 sentence2022In the post-verdict hearing, Iron Vine and Second Factor argued that (1) the conspiracy claim was derivative of the tortious interference claim, and the conspiracy (compensatory) damages award therefore could not exceed the tortious interference damages award; and (2) the compensatory damages awarded for tortious interference were duplicative because they compensated Cygnacom for the same harm as the damages awarded on the other claims, namely lost profits on the 45 Baxter v. United States, 640 A.2d 714 , 717–18 (D.C. 1994). 29 Vanguard Subcontract. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Belk, Incorporated v. Meyer Corporation, U.S.
green
2 sentences2022There is no “futility” exception in Rule 50. 22 Even if the judge had made it very clear he would deny any Rule 50(b) motion 20 Belk, 679 F.3d at 159 . 21 See id. (refusing to consider appellant’s sufficiency challenges where counsel’s post-verdict colloquy with the trial judge focused on different issues). 22 See, e.g., Image Tech. 2022There is no “futility” exception in Rule 50. 22 Even if the judge had made it very clear he would deny any Rule 50(b) motion 20 Belk, 679 F.3d at 159 . 21 See id. (refusing to consider appellant’s sufficiency challenges where counsel’s post-verdict colloquy with the trial judge focused on different issues). 22 See, e.g., Image Tech. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Boyd v. United States
green
1 sentence1998This is not to say, however, that notwithstanding his silence, he may not make a post-verdict challenge to the validity of the waiver. 9 For the very reason that a defendant might subsequently challenge the validity under Johnson v. Zerbst of his apparent waiver by not testifying, Boyd stated that it “behooves the trial court to make ... an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks.” 586 A.2d at 678 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.