predicate claim in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
District of Columbia Insurance Guaranty v. Algernon Blair, Inc.green dc · 1989 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021Ass’n v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 68 565 A.2d 564, 568 (D.C. 1989)). 35 rejected efforts to read the phrase so expansively as to effect an implausible enlargement of a statutory cause of action. 69 Generally speaking, “where a claim is said to ‘arise from’ some predicate, . . . there [must] be a ‘substantial connection’ or nexus between the predicate and the claim.” 70 Under the Anti-SLAPP Act, therefore, a party filing a special motion to dismiss a claim must show the claim has a substantial connection or nexus to a protected act.	1	1
Ileto v. Glock, Inc.green cacd · 2006 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 1 sentence 2008See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1289 (C.D.Cal.2006) (“[T]he clear purpose of the PLCAA was to shield firearms manufacturers and dealers from liability for injuries caused by third parties using non-defective, legally obtained firearms.”). 6 *172 Shoehorning, as it were, into the predicate exception a strict liability cause of action that, at bottom, simply shifts the cost of injuries resulting from the discharge of lawfully manufactured and distributed firearms would, in our view, “frustrate Congress’s clear intention,” Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 , 115 S.Ct. 1754	1	1
Hubbard v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1995 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1289 (C.D.Cal.2006) (“[T]he clear purpose of the PLCAA was to shield firearms manufacturers and dealers from liability for injuries caused by third parties using non-defective, legally obtained firearms.”). 6 172 Shoehorning, as it were, into the predicate exception a strict liability cause of action that, at bottom, simply shifts the cost of injuries resulting from the discharge of lawfully manufactured and distributed firearms would, in our view, “frustrate Congress’s clear intention,” Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 , 115 S.Ct. 1754 2008See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1289 (C.D.Cal.2006) (“[T]he clear purpose of the PLCAA was to shield firearms manufacturers and dealers from liability for injuries caused by third parties using non-defective, legally obtained firearms.”). 6 172 Shoehorning, as it were, into the predicate exception a strict liability cause of action that, at bottom, simply shifts the cost of injuries resulting from the discharge of lawfully manufactured and distributed firearms would, in our view, “frustrate Congress’s clear intention,” Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 , 115 S.Ct. 1754	1	1
Chamberlain v. American Honda Finance Corp.green dc · 2007 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 1 sentence 2008See Chamberlain v. American Honda Finance Corp., 931 A.2d 1018, 1022-23 (D.C.2007).	1	1
Foster v. Hillgreen ca10 · 1999 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003If Client asserts an act of production privilege on remand, and the government contests it, it will be up to the motions judge to perform the “fact-intensive” analysis necessary to determine whether producing the statements called for by the grand jury subpoena would be incriminating. 17 See In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1270 (10th Cir.1999) (remanding for factual findings on the applicability of the act of production privilege where the bankruptcy court faded to create “a record or fact-specific analysis” bearing on the claim).	1	1
Rease v. United Statesgreen dc · 1979 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 1 sentence 1997A lesser-included offense instruction is warranted when “(1) all elements of the lesser offense are included within the offense charged, and (2) there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the lesser charge.” Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 328 (D.C.1979) (citations omitted).	1	1
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen scotus · 1986 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
Smith v. United States green dc · 1990 2 sentences 2020Based on our decision in King, Crowley’s testimony, if qualified for admission in evidence, would come in as a lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, exempted from the hearsay rule by the public record exception, as explained in Goldsberry. 28 We therefore turn to appellant’s next contention: that Crowley’s lay opinion was nonetheless inadmissible under Rule 701 because her opinion failed to meet the predicate requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 406, as understood from our Smith decision. 29 A. Federal Rule of Evidence 406 28 See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text. 29 Smi 2020Based on our decision in King, Crowley’s testimony, if qualified for admission in evidence, would come in as a lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, exempted from the hearsay rule by the public record exception, as explained in Goldsberry. 28 We therefore turn to appellant’s next contention: that Crowley’s lay opinion was nonetheless inadmissible under Rule 701 because her opinion failed to meet the predicate requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 406, as understood from our Smith decision. 29 A. Federal Rule of Evidence 406 28 See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text. 29 Smi	2	2020–2020
In Re Cater green dc · 2005 2 sentences 2009Accordingly, as we recognized in Cater , while the “evidence that establishes the predicate violation of professional norms is usually much the same evidence that evokes doubts about the respondent’s future fitness to adhere to those norms,” nevertheless, “proof of a violation of the Rules that merits even a substantial period of suspension is not necessarily sufficient to justify a fitness requirement.” Id. 2009What may “tip[] the balance in favor of’ a fitness requirement is “evidence of circumstances surrounding and contributing to the misconduct.” Id.	1	2009–2009
Landgraf v. USI Film Products green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 2008But, as the Court observed in Landgraf, supra, the “Takings Clause prevents the Legislature ... from depriving private persons of vested property rights” without just compensation, 511 U.S. at 266 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 (emphasis added), and so the determination of when that right in the form of a cause of action “vests” for due process purposes plainly has bearing on whether the plaintiffs’ SLA action has been “taken” for constitutional purposes. 2008But, as the Court observed in Landgraf, supra, the “Takings Clause prevents the Legislature ... from depriving private persons of vested property rights” without just compensation, 511 U.S. at 266 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 (emphasis added), and so the determination of when that right in the form of a cause of action “vests” for due process purposes plainly has bearing on whether the plaintiffs’ SLA action has been “taken” for constitutional purposes.	1	2008–2008
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2008The plaintiffs argue that taking “has begun” here because (a) they concededly possessed a protectible “property” interest in their cause of action, one that “presumably can be surrendered for value,” Logan, 455 U.S. at 431 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , and (b) Congress has flatly eliminated that cause of action if, as we have held, it does not fit within the predicate exception. 2008The plaintiffs argue that taking “has begun” here because (a) they concededly possessed a protectible “property” interest in their cause of action, one that “presumably can be surrendered for value,” Logan, 455 U.S. at 431 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , and (b) Congress has flatly eliminated that cause of action if, as we have held, it does not fit within the predicate exception.	1	2008–2008
Watson v. United States green dc · 1987 2 sentences 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).	1	1988–1988
Alexander v. United States green dc · 1979 2 sentences 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).	1	1988–1988
Hockman v. United States green dc · 1986 2 sentences 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).	1	1988–1988
Jones v. Barnes green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).	1	1988–1988
Evitts v. Lucey green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 1988Watson, supra, 536 A.2d at 1069 ; Hockman, supra, 517 A.2d at 51 ; Alexander, supra, 409 A.2d at 620 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).	1	1988–1988

Where else courts name it

TX 76 (1923–2025) CA 76 (1938–2026) NY 52 (1968–2026) NJ 31 (1989–2026) OH 23 (1951–2022) FL 21 (1969–2016) PA 20 (1945–2025) AL 13 (1914–2010) CT 12 (1993–2019) IL 9 (1975–2019) DC 8 (1988–2021) IN 8 (1992–2025) WA 6 (2008–2026) LA 6 (1984–2019) KS 5 (2002–2022) MA 5 (1992–2020) OR 4 (1995–2009) MO 4 (1882–2014) DE 4 (2020–2022) CO 3 (2001–2026) SC 3 (1994–2001) UT 3 (1982–2004) ME 3 (2016–2023) OK 3 (1961–2009) MS 3 (2009–2018) MI 3 (1995–2017) MT 3 (2017–2020) RI 2 (1978–2001) NM 2 (1999–2026) WV 2 (1979–1979) AZ 2 (1946–1995) VT 2 (2015–2025) ND 2 (2012–2012) AR 2 (1991–2010) IA 2 (2002–2020) VA 2 (2016–2018) TN 2 (1905–1996)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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