76 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1923–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nethery v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Id.; Nethery v. State , 29 S.W.3d 178, 188 (Tex. App. -Dallas 2000, pet. ref'd) . 2005Id.; Nethery v. State, 29 S.W.3d 178, 188 (Tex. App. –Dallas 2000, pet. ref’d). | 8 | 8 |
in the Interest of S.L., a Childgreen2 sentences2019See id.; see also In re S.L., 421 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.) (stating that “[a]n unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination”); accord In re J.B., No. 02-18-00034-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5008 , at *4 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “a failure to challenge all the grounds on which a termination is based renders attacks on those grounds that are contested moot”).2 Regarding t 2017See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding that the same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) predicate grounds and the best-interest grounds); In re S.L., 421 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.) (“An unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination.”); see also In re G.S., No. 14-14-00477-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10563 , at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The unchallenge | 5 | 6 |
Reed v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Reed v. State, 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); see also Moses, 814 S.W.2d at 441 ; Brumley v. State, 804 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1991, no pet.). 1992Reed v. State , 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd); see also Moses , 814 S.W.2d at 441 ; Brumley v. State , 804 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, no pet.). | 5 | 5 |
Cuyler v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2008Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 . 2008Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 350 . | 4 | 7 |
Fuller v. Stategreen2 sentences2012For a defendant to have standing on a motion to suppress evidence, it is not sufficient that he "claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else." Jones v. United States , 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); see also Rakas , 439 U.S. at 132-33, 136-37 (rejecting "target" theory of standing); Fuller , 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person). 2012For a defendant to have standing on a motion to suppress evidence, it is not sufficient that he “claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132-33, 136-37 (rejecting “target” theory of standing); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person). | 4 | 4 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2012For a defendant to have standing on a motion to suppress evidence, it is not sufficient that he "claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else." Jones v. United States , 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); see also Rakas , 439 U.S. at 132-33, 136-37 (rejecting "target" theory of standing); Fuller , 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person). 2012For a defendant to have standing on a motion to suppress evidence, it is not sufficient that he “claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132-33, 136-37 (rejecting “target” theory of standing); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person). | 4 | 4 |
In Re Perrittgreen2 sentences2024This doctrine leaves room for –2– exceptions, and the supreme court has recognized one, explaining that “on rare occasions” the predicate requirement may be relaxed “when the circumstances confirmed that ‘the request would have been futile and the refusal little more than a formality.’” In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 723 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)). 2024But, the court continued, this doctrine leaves room for exceptions, and the Texas Supreme Court has recognized one, explaining that, on “rare occasions,” the predicate requirement may be relaxed “when the circumstances confirmed that ‘the request would have been futile and the refusal little more than a formality.’” Id. at 446 (quoting Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 723 (Tex. 1991) (plurality op.) (orig. proceeding)). | 3 | 4 |
Jones v. United Statesred2 sentences2012For a defendant to have standing on a motion to suppress evidence, it is not sufficient that he "claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else." Jones v. United States , 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); see also Rakas , 439 U.S. at 132-33, 136-37 (rejecting "target" theory of standing); Fuller , 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person). 2012For a defendant to have standing on a motion to suppress evidence, it is not sufficient that he “claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132-33, 136-37 (rejecting “target” theory of standing); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person). | 3 | 4 |
Swate v. Swategreen2 sentences2013Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (West Supp.2012); Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). 2012Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (West Supp. 2011); Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). | 3 | 3 |
Terrazas v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2024This doctrine leaves room for –2– exceptions, and the supreme court has recognized one, explaining that “on rare occasions” the predicate requirement may be relaxed “when the circumstances confirmed that ‘the request would have been futile and the refusal little more than a formality.’” In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 723 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)). 2024But, the court continued, this doctrine leaves room for exceptions, and the Texas Supreme Court has recognized one, explaining that, on “rare occasions,” the predicate requirement may be relaxed “when the circumstances confirmed that ‘the request would have been futile and the refusal little more than a formality.’” Id. at 446 (quoting Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 723 (Tex. 1991) (plurality op.) (orig. proceeding)). | 2 | 2 |
In Re CHgreen2 sentences2017See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding that the same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) predicate grounds and the best-interest grounds); In re S.L., 421 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.) (“An unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination.”); see also In re G.S., No. 14-14-00477-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10563 , at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The unchallenge 2013In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency). | 2 | 2 |
In Re DSgreen2 sentences2014See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also In re S.L., No. 10-13-00091-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11465, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 5, 2013, no pet.) (“An unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the In the Interest of M.G., M.G., and K.G., Children Page 2 termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination.”). 2013See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also In re S.L., No. 10-13-00091-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11465, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 5, 2013, no pet.) (“An In the Interest of T.N.J., D.E.J., J.N.C., and N.J., Children Page 8 unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination.”) (citing In re D.L.S., No. 10-11-00033-CV, 2011 Tex | 2 | 2 |
In Re LMgreen2 sentences2014See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also In re S.L., No. 10-13-00091-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11465, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 5, 2013, no pet.) (“An unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the In the Interest of M.G., M.G., and K.G., Children Page 2 termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination.”). 2013See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also In re S.L., No. 10-13-00091-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11465, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 5, 2013, no pet.) (“An In the Interest of T.N.J., D.E.J., J.N.C., and N.J., Children Page 8 unchallenged finding of a predicate violation is binding and will support the trial court’s judgment, and we may affirm the termination on that finding and need not address the other grounds for termination.”) (citing In re D.L.S., No. 10-11-00033-CV, 2011 Tex | 2 | 2 |
In Re KASgreen2 sentences2005See K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 225 ; Salas v. Texas Dep’t Prot. & Reg. Servs., 71 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Tex.R.App. 2005See K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 225 ; Salas v. Texas Dep't Prot. & Reg. Servs., 71 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); TEX.R.APP. | 2 | 2 |
Salas v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Servicesgreen2 sentences2005See K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 225 ; Salas v. Texas Dep’t Prot. & Reg. Servs., 71 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Tex.R.App. 2005See K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 225 ; Salas v. Texas Dep't Prot. & Reg. Servs., 71 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); TEX.R.APP. | 2 | 2 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The court of criminal appeals abrogated the Helms rule in Young v. State , 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-67 (Tex. Crim. 2001The court of criminal appeals abrogated the Helms rule in Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-67 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), and held that "whether entered with or without an agreed recommendation of punishment by the State, a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere 'waives' or forfeits the right to appeal a claim of error only when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.” Here, if appellant’s plea was involuntary, as he claims, the judgment of guilt could not have been rendered independent of the error. 3 . | 2 | 2 |
Cantu v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The Helms waiver rule is based on the predicate requirement that the plea was "voluntarily and understandingly made." Id.; Cantu v. State , 993 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). 2001The Helms waiver rule is based on the predicate requirement that the plea was "voluntarily and understanding^ made.” Id.; Cantu v. State, 993 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Brumley v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Reed v. State, 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); see also Moses, 814 S.W.2d at 441 ; Brumley v. State, 804 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1991, no pet.). 1992Reed v. State , 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd); see also Moses , 814 S.W.2d at 441 ; Brumley v. State , 804 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Moses v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Reed v. State, 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); see also Moses, 814 S.W.2d at 441 ; Brumley v. State, 804 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1991, no pet.). 1992Reed v. State , 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd); see also Moses , 814 S.W.2d at 441 ; Brumley v. State , 804 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearingsgreen2 sentences2017Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 707 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, no pet,) (explaining that "the Texas Supreme Court’s .,. decisions recognizing limitations on the use of the UDJA to recover attorney’s fees where the predicate claim for declaratory relief is redundant of or incidental to a claim for relief under another statute” (citing Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 300-01 ; MBM Fin. 2013See Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 300-01 ; MBM, 292 S.W.3d at 669-70 . | 1 | 2 |
MBM Financial Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co.green2 sentences2017Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669-70 (Tex. 2009))). 2013See Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 300-01 ; MBM, 292 S.W.3d at 669-70 . | 1 | 2 |
Spakes v. Stategreen1 sentence2025App. 1996)). 73 See Spakes, supra at 598 (rejecting application of factors developed in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975), for use of necessity defense to the offense of escape). 74 Id. at 597 (“The State’s petition was granted to determine whether a predicate to the defense of necessity, as applicable to the offense of escape, includes an attempt to surrender once the immediate threat justifying the escape has ceased.”). 75 See id. at 598; TEX. | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Vending Commission v. Headquarters Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
City of Garland v. Byrdgreen1 sentence2021See City of Garland v. Byrd, 97 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“To resolve this issue, we must first determine whether the power granted to the private hearing examiner under section 143.057 is legislative in nature.”); Texas Vending Comm’n v. Headquarters Corp., 505 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. App.— Austin 1974, writ refused n.r.e.) (“The problem thus posed by this appeal is the old and gray- headed one of determining whether the function conferred by the statute . . . is legislative . . . .”). 14 “Defining what legislative power is or when it has been delegated is no easy ta | 1 | 1 |
| in Re Interest of N.G., a Childgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners v. Gene Giggleman, DVMgreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 11169green | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 658615green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re JFCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Read v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McCormickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Linesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. McKinneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shallhorn v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Soto v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKnight v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith and Evans v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Owen v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Valenzuela v. Aquino
green
2 sentences2011Hanson urges that the district court misapplied the law by granting a permanent injunction in the absence of either jury findings or conclusive evidence establishing an underlying cause of action for nuisance. (2) While acknowledging that a permanent injunction is an equitable remedy whose issuance is ultimately left to the trial court's discretion, Hanson emphasizes the predicate requirement that "[n]o final relief, including a permanent injunction, can be granted in a contested case without a determination of legal liability." See Valenzuela v. Aquino , 853 S.W.2d 512 , 514 n.2 (Tex. 1993). 2011Hanson urges that the district court misapplied the law by granting a permanent injunction in the absence of either jury findings or conclusive evidence establishing an underlying cause of action for nuisance. 2 While acknowledging that a permanent injunction is an equitable remedy whose issuance is ultimately left to the trial court’s discretion, Hanson emphasizes the predicate requirement that “[n]o final relief, including a permanent injunction, can be granted in a contested case without a determination of legal liability.” See Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 , 514 n. 2 (Tex.1993). | 5 | 2011–2011 |
Newsome v. State
green
2 sentences2009Id. 2009Id. | 3 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Lovercamp
green
2 sentences2025App. 1996)). 73 See Spakes, supra at 598 (rejecting application of factors developed in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975), for use of necessity defense to the offense of escape). 74 Id. at 597 (“The State’s petition was granted to determine whether a predicate to the defense of necessity, as applicable to the offense of escape, includes an attempt to surrender once the immediate threat justifying the escape has ceased.”). 75 See id. at 598; TEX. 2025App. 1996)). 73 See Spakes, supra at 598 (rejecting application of factors developed in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975), for use of necessity defense to the offense of escape). 74 Id. at 597 (“The State’s petition was granted to determine whether a predicate to the defense of necessity, as applicable to the offense of escape, includes an attempt to surrender once the immediate threat justifying the escape has ceased.”). 75 See id. at 598; TEX. | 2 | 1996–2025 |
Jason v. Baptist Hospital
green
2 sentences2000In support of that argument, it solely relies upon Jason v. Baptist Hospital, 872 F.Supp. 1575 (E.D.Tex.1994). 2000In support of that argument, it solely relies upon Jason v. Baptist Hospital , 872 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Vasquez v. State
green
1 sentence2025PENAL CODE, passim (West 1992). 76 See Bowen, 162 S.W.3d at 228-29 . 77 830 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bowen v. State
green
1 sentence2025PENAL CODE, passim (West 1992). 76 See Bowen, 162 S.W.3d at 228-29 . 77 830 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin
green
1 sentence2021See City of Garland v. Byrd, 97 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“To resolve this issue, we must first determine whether the power granted to the private hearing examiner under section 143.057 is legislative in nature.”); Texas Vending Comm’n v. Headquarters Corp., 505 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. App.— Austin 1974, writ refused n.r.e.) (“The problem thus posed by this appeal is the old and gray- headed one of determining whether the function conferred by the statute . . . is legislative . . . .”). 14 “Defining what legislative power is or when it has been delegated is no easy ta | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| in the Interest of S.M.R., G.J.R. and C.N.R., Children green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Jackson National Life Insurance Company v. Merrill Lynch & Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Abell v. Potomac Insurance Company green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| May v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Flowers v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Murray v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Sanchez-Montoya v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Elam v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Fain v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Mathis v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gardner v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Carroll v. State neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Lawrence John Stokes v. Raymond K. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Hidalgo v. Surety Savings and Loan Association green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Owen v. King green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Baker v. Sands neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Acker v. Thompson neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Whitfield v. Traders & General Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Hinkley v. State neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Mabry v. Little neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Bumpus v. Fisher neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Reich v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Hand v. Errington green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.