predicate exception in Connecticut

2019Colo. 2015) (concluding in case arising from movie theater mass shooting that plaintiffs had not pleaded facts against ammunition sellers indicating knowledge of shooter’s conduct and mental condition before shootings, and had not claimed that firearms sellers engaged in ‘‘noncompliance with the regulatory requirements applicable to [over the counter] sales,’’ or that ‘‘the . . . defendants had any knowledge of the sales made by the others or by the local firearms dealers’’), and Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 42 , 45–46 (D.D.C. 2013) (claims against assault rifle manufactu

2019Colo. 2015) (concluding in case arising from movie theater mass shooting that plaintiffs had not pleaded facts against ammunition sellers indicating knowledge of shooter's conduct and mental condition before shootings, and had not claimed that firearms sellers engaged in "noncompliance with the regulatory requirements applicable to [over the counter] sales," or that "the ... defendants' had any knowledge of the sales made by the others or by the local firearms dealers"), and Jefferies v. District of Columbia , 916 F.Supp.2d 42 , 45-46 (D.D.C. 2013) (claims against assault rifle manufacturer ar

2011We considered the question of whether joinder of the consortium claim with the predicate claim should be required, and found that question to be inextricably linked to the question of whether the settlement of a predicate action would bar the derivative consortium action. [5] Id., at 91 , 735 A.2d 347 .

2011We considered the question of whether joinder of the consortium claim with the predicate claim should be required, and found that question to be inextricably linked to the question of whether the settlement of a predicate action would bar the derivative consortium action. [5] Id., at 91 , 735 A.2d 347 .

2019In the absence of clear direction from Congress to construe the predicate exception differently, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that we should read the arms act narrowly and its predicate exception more broadly.12 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 , 183–84, 113 S. Ct. 1163 , 122 L.

2019In the absence of clear direction from Congress to construe the predicate exception differently, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that we should read the arms act narrowly and its predicate exception more broadly.12 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 , 183–84, 113 S. Ct. 1163 , 122 L.

2019Corp., 940 A.2d 163 , 170–72 (D.C. 2008) (concluding that District of Columbia’s Assault Weapons Manufacturing Strict Liability Act, D.C.

2019Corp. , supra, 940 A.2d at 171 n.6 (court relied on findings in 15 U.S.C. § 7901 [a] [3] and [7], and rejected plaintiffs' reliance on congressional expression of "concern with liability actions 'without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law' and that 'do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law' " as standing for proposition that "Congress was substantially less troubled by the existence of statutory liability actions reflecting judgments 'by the legislatures of the several [s]tates' " because "[n]o such distinction ... is reflected either in the definition of a 'qual

2019V CONCLUSION On the basis of my review of the text, case law, canons of construction, and legislative history, I conclude that predicate statutes under the predicate exception to the arms act, 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii), are limited to those specific to the sale and manufacture of firearms.20 Compare Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1216 , 1219–20, 1224 (D.

2019V CONCLUSION On the basis of my review of the text, case law, canons of construction, and legislative history, I conclude that predicate statutes under the predicate exception to the arms act, 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii), are limited to those specific to the sale and manufacture of firearms. 20 Compare Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, LLC , 84 F.Supp.3d 1216 , 1219-20, 1224 (D.

2019See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., supra, 565 F.3d 1133 (noting distinction between right of action and predicate statute for purposes of arms act); cf. Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 139 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010) (‘‘[a]lthough CUTPA is primarily a statutory cause of action . . . it equally is recognized that CUTPA claims may arise from underlying causes of action, such as contract violations or torts, provided the additional CUTPA elements are pleaded’’ [citation omitted]).

2019See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., supra, 565 F.3d 1133 (noting distinction between right of action and predicate statute for purposes of arms act); cf. Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 139 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010) (‘‘[a]lthough CUTPA is primarily a statutory cause of action . . . it equally is recognized that CUTPA claims may arise from underlying causes of action, such as contract violations or torts, provided the additional CUTPA elements are pleaded’’ [citation omitted]).

2019It is well settled that, ‘‘when a statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [provi- sion].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 , 90–91 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1374 , 197 L.

2019It is well settled that, "when a statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [provision]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC , 826 F.3d 78 , 90-91 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1374 , 197 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017).

2019It is well settled that, ‘‘when a statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [provi- sion].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 , 90–91 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1374 , 197 L.

2019It is well settled that, "when a statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [provision]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC , 826 F.3d 78 , 90-91 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1374 , 197 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017).

2019It is well settled that, ‘‘when a statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [provi- sion].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 , 90–91 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1374 , 197 L.

2019It is well settled that, "when a statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [provision]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC , 826 F.3d 78 , 90-91 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1374 , 197 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017).

2019Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, "an ambiguous term may be given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated." 13 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bilski v. Kappos , supra, 561 U.S. at 604 , 130 S.Ct. 3218 ; see also Yates v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074 , 1085, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) ("we rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis-a word is known by the company it keeps-to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the [a]cts of Congress" [internal q

2019Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, "an ambiguous term may be given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated." 13 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bilski v. Kappos , supra, 561 U.S. at 604 , 130 S.Ct. 3218 ; see also Yates v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074 , 1085, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) ("we rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis-a word is known by the company it keeps-to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the [a]cts of Congress" [internal q

2019Under similar circumstances, when it is clear that examples have been included in a statute for purposes of emphasis or in response to recent, high profile events, rather than to restrict the scope of coverage, both the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have declined to apply canons, including ejusdem generis, to construe a statutory provision overly narrowly. 68 For similar reasons, we conclude that the ejusdem generis canon is not applicable to the predicate exception. c Statutory Exceptions To Be Construed Narrowly Citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Clark , 48

2019Under similar circumstances, when it is clear that examples have been included in a statute for purposes of emphasis or in response to recent, high profile events, rather than to restrict the scope of coverage, both the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have declined to apply canons, including ejusdem generis, to construe a statutory provision overly narrowly. 68 For similar reasons, we conclude that the ejusdem generis canon is not applicable to the predicate exception. c Statutory Exceptions To Be Construed Narrowly Citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Clark , 48

2019Reading the predicate exception to encompass actions brought to remedy illegal and unscrupulous marketing practices under state consumer protection laws is consistent with the approach followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose decisions "carry particularly persuasive weight in the interpretation of federal statutes by Connecticut state courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc. , supra, 327 Conn. at 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 .

2019Reading the predicate exception to encompass actions brought to remedy illegal and unscrupulous marketing practices under state consumer protection laws is consistent with the approach followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose decisions "carry particularly persuasive weight in the interpretation of federal statutes by Connecticut state courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc. , supra, 327 Conn. at 140 , 172 A.3d 1228 .

2019Had Congress intended the predicate exception to broadly encompass any statute capable of application to the manufacture or sale of anything, the inclusion of those firearms-specific examples would be superfluous. 14 See Yates v. United States , supra, 135 S.Ct. at 1087 ("Had Congress intended 'tangible object' in [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1519 to be interpreted so generically as to capture physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had no reason to refer specifically to 'record' or 'document.' The Government's unbounded reading of 'tangible object' would render those words

2019Had Congress intended the predicate exception to broadly encompass any statute capable of application to the manufacture or sale of anything, the inclusion of those firearms-specific examples would be superfluous. 14 See Yates v. United States , supra, 135 S.Ct. at 1087 ("Had Congress intended 'tangible object' in [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1519 to be interpreted so generically as to capture physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had no reason to refer specifically to 'record' or 'document.' The Government's unbounded reading of 'tangible object' would render those words

2019Had Congress intended the predicate exception to broadly encompass any statute capable of application to the manufacture or sale of anything, the inclusion of those firearms-specific examples would be superfluous. 14 See Yates v. United States , supra, 135 S.Ct. at 1087 ("Had Congress intended 'tangible object' in [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1519 to be interpreted so generically as to capture physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had no reason to refer specifically to 'record' or 'document.' The Government's unbounded reading of 'tangible object' would render those words

2019Had Congress intended the predicate exception to broadly encompass any statute capable of application to the manufacture or sale of anything, the inclusion of those firearms-specific examples would be superfluous. 14 See Yates v. United States , supra, 135 S.Ct. at 1087 ("Had Congress intended 'tangible object' in [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1519 to be interpreted so generically as to capture physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had no reason to refer specifically to 'record' or 'document.' The Government's unbounded reading of 'tangible object' would render those words

2014Mary’s Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. 496 ; see also Voris v. Molinaro, 302 Conn. 791, 797 , 31 A.3d 363 (2011) (‘‘settlement of the predicate claim extin- guishes the derivative claim for loss of consortium’’); Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 , 10–11, 707 A.2d 725 (1998) (judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application are presumed to apply retro- actively to pending cases).

2014Mary’s Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. 496 ; see also Voris v. Molinaro, 302 Conn. 791, 797 , 31 A.3d 363 (2011) (‘‘settlement of the predicate claim extin- guishes the derivative claim for loss of consortium’’); Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 , 10–11, 707 A.2d 725 (1998) (judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application are presumed to apply retro- actively to pending cases).