Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstromgreen2 sentences2013Second, during its discussion of the torts and contracts category the Court again “emphasize[s] that the criteria and factors utilized in [tort and contract] cases must be consistent with the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule.” Id. at 834 (emphasis supplied). 2003"We emphasize that the criteria and factors utilized in these cases must be consistent with the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule." Id. at 834 . | 2 | 6 |
Bell v. USB Acquisition Co., Inc.green2 sentences2017Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834 ; see also [Bell, 734 So. 2d at 408-09 ]. 2017Quanstrom, 655 So.2d at 834; see also [Bell, 734 So.2d at 408-09 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. Headgreen1 sentence1999We next discussed contingency multipliers in Lane v. Head, 566 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla.1990), where we found that even when a fee arrangement is partially contingent, the court has discretion to apply a multiplier, reduced by the percentage of the fee that was guaranteed by the fee arrangement. | 1 | 1 |
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowegreen1 sentence1995See Quanstrom, 555 So.2d at 834 ("We emphasize that the criteria and factors utilized [in considering use of a contingency multiplier] in these [contract and tort] cases must be consistent with the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule." (emphasis added)); Rowe, 472 So.2d at 1151 ("When the prevailing party's counsel is employed on a contingent fee basis, the trial court must consider a contingency risk factor when awarding a statutorily-directed reasonable attorney fee." (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2017A few years after Bell, in 2003, this Court decided, in Sarkis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 863 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2003), that the use of a multiplier is not appropriate in determining attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002)—the offer of judgment statute.3 Sarkis held that the fees authorized by section 768.79 are sanctions that attach to the rejection of a reasonable offer, not to the underlying cause of action, and went on to note as follows: [T]he use of a multiplier must be consistent with the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule. 2017A few years after Bell, in 2003, this Court, decided, in Sarkis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 863 So.2d 210 (Fla. 2003), that the use of a multiplier is not appropriate in determining attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002)—the offer of judgment statute. 3 Sarkis held that the fees authorized by section 768.79 are sanctions that attach to the rejection of a reasonable offer, not to the underlying cause of action, and went on to note as follows: [T]he use of a multiplier must be consistent with the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.