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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McNair v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See McNair, 293 Ga. at 283 (noting that the rule of lenity provides that statutory ambiguity is “resolved in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment”); see also Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 185 ( 144 SCt 718 , 218 LE2d 77) (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the rule of lenity “enforces weighty constitutional values,” and that “[c]ourts construe ambiguous penal laws with lenity because a free nation operates against a background presumption of individual liberty.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 31 (3) ( 608 SE2d 631 ) (2005) (holding that when “a crime is penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code are not applicable”). 6 Turning to the statutes at issue, in July 2017, when Marquez sexually abused A. M., OCGA § 16-6-4(a)(1) provided that “[a] person commits the offense of child molestation when such person . . . [d]oes an immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person[.]” And OCGA § 16-6-22.1 ( 2026See Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 31 (3) ( 608 SE2d 631 ) (2005) (holding that when “a crime is penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code are not applicable”). 6 Turning to the statutes at issue, in July 2017, when Marquez sexually abused A. M., OCGA § 16-6-4(a)(1) provided that “[a] person commits the offense of child molestation when such person . . . [d]oes an immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person[.]” And OCGA § 16-6-22.1 ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nankervisgreen2 sentences2026See McNair, 293 Ga. at 283 (noting that the rule of lenity provides that statutory ambiguity is “resolved in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment”); see also Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 185 ( 144 SCt 718 , 218 LE2d 77) (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the rule of lenity “enforces weighty constitutional values,” and that “[c]ourts construe ambiguous penal laws with lenity because a free nation operates against a background presumption of individual liberty.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT 2026See McNair, 293 Ga. at 283 (noting that the rule of lenity provides that statutory ambiguity is “resolved in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment”); see also Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 185 ( 144 SCt 718 , 218 LE2d 77) (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the rule of lenity “enforces weighty constitutional values,” and that “[c]ourts construe ambiguous penal laws with lenity because a free nation operates against a background presumption of individual liberty.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT | 1 | 1 |
Pulsifer v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026See McNair, 293 Ga. at 283 (noting that the rule of lenity provides that statutory ambiguity is “resolved in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment”); see also Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 185 ( 144 SCt 718 , 218 LE2d 77) (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the rule of lenity “enforces weighty constitutional values,” and that “[c]ourts construe ambiguous penal laws with lenity because a free nation operates against a background presumption of individual liberty.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grimesgreen2 sentences2021See id. 2021Id. at 880 (citing Grimes, 194 Ga. App. at 736-737 ).5 According to Banks, in determining whether an order dismissing a criminal case for want of prosecution is a dismissal with prejudice, which is not permitted, an appellate court should not be guided by the text of the dismissal order as informed by the background rule against dismissals with prejudice for want of prosecution. | 1 | 1 |
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.green2 sentences2020(Citations and footnotes omitted.) United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517 U. S. 544, 557 (III) (C) ( 116 SCt 1529 , 134 LE2d 758) (1996) (noting common-law concept of the next friend as well as federal statutory provisions for representational standing). 2020(Citations and footnotes omitted.) United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517 U. S. 544, 557 (III) (C) ( 116 SCt 1529 , 134 LE2d 758) (1996) (noting common-law concept of the next friend as well as federal statutory provisions for representational standing). | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Warendhgreen1 sentence2019Colquitt stands for the proposition that after a landlord has relinquished possession and control of the premises, the landlord cannot be held liable Based on the foregoing, the Mattas ultimately must show that the injuries the Thorntons’ dogs inflicted on Matta-Troncoso were a reasonably foreseeable result of Tyner’s failure to repair the gate latch — and to defeat summary judgment, they must show that there exists a genuine issue of material fact on this point.9 Important to that analysis is the background principle that Georgia law “does not presume that dogs are vicious or dangerous.” Stea | 1 | 1 |
Staples v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (103 SC 1855, 75 LE2d 903) (1983) (“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”). 1 *521 To avoid such due process problems, courts may apply “the background rule of the common law favoring mens rea.” Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619 (114 SC 1793, 128 LE2d 608) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen1 sentence2011See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (103 SC 1855, 75 LE2d 903) (1983) (“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”). 1 *521 To avoid such due process problems, courts may apply “the background rule of the common law favoring mens rea.” Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619 (114 SC 1793, 128 LE2d 608) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Steagald v. Eason
green
1 sentence2019Colquitt stands for the proposition that after a landlord has relinquished possession and control of the premises, the landlord cannot be held liable Based on the foregoing, the Mattas ultimately must show that the injuries the Thorntons’ dogs inflicted on Matta-Troncoso were a reasonably foreseeable result of Tyner’s failure to repair the gate latch — and to defeat summary judgment, they must show that there exists a genuine issue of material fact on this point.9 Important to that analysis is the background principle that Georgia law “does not presume that dogs are vicious or dangerous.” Stea | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Traders Insurance v. Mann
green
2 sentences2010The Court discussed the bad faith exception to the background rule, explaining that while costs and interest are awarded to the prevailing party, "it has long been the policy of Georgia not to require the defendant to pay the expense of obtaining a judgment against himself." Id. at 386 , 45 S.E. 426 . 2010The Court discussed the bad faith exception to the background rule, explaining that while costs and interest are awarded to the prevailing party, "it has long been the policy of Georgia not to require the defendant to pay the expense of obtaining a judgment against himself." Id. at 386 , 45 S.E. 426 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1994In reaching the conclusion that the statute is constitutional, the majority opinion has failed to consider a myriad of problems that will be created by the allowance of the victim impact statement: (1) To what extent will the victim's background be the subject of inquiry by the defendant? (2) Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), what must the state disclose regarding the background of the victim or other witnesses who furnish information for the victim impact statement? (3) Will failure to investigate, pursue and present information about the victim's backgro 1994In reaching the conclusion that the statute is constitutional, the majority opinion has failed to consider a myriad of problems that will be created by the allowance of the victim impact statement: (1) To what extent will the victim’s background be the subject of inquiry by the defendant? (2) Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), what must the state disclose regarding the background of the victim or other witnesses who furnish information for the victim impact statement? (3) Will failure to investigate, pursue and present information about the victim’s backgro | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ivey v. State
green
2 sentences1983Rather, Frady’s testimony comes within the provisions of OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) (Code Ann. § 38-1806): “If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.” For the background of this rule see Ivey v. State, 23 Ga. 576 (1857), and Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 63 (1877). 1983Rather, Frady's testimony comes within the provisions of OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) (Code Ann. § 38-1806): "If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence." For the background of this rule see Ivey v. State, 23 Ga. 576 (1857), and Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 63 (1877). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Skipper v. State
green
2 sentences1983Rather, Frady’s testimony comes within the provisions of OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) (Code Ann. § 38-1806): “If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.” For the background of this rule see Ivey v. State, 23 Ga. 576 (1857), and Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 63 (1877). 1983Rather, Frady's testimony comes within the provisions of OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) (Code Ann. § 38-1806): "If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence." For the background of this rule see Ivey v. State, 23 Ga. 576 (1857), and Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 63 (1877). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.