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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MIKE’S FURNITURE BARN, INC. Et Al. v. SMITHgreen2 sentences2023And such a provision also may, under certain circumstances, “constitute an affirmative statement of a perpetual or indefinite security interest that would create the 20-year reversionary period.” Mike’s Furniture Barn v. Smith, 342 Ga. App. 558, 561 (2) ( 803 SE2d 800 ) (2017). 6 It is true, as Freeport urges, that “the existence of an open-end clause in conjunction with a fixed maturity date, by itself, does not constitute an affirmative statement of a perpetual or indefinite security interest that would dictate the Code’s 20-year reversion period.” Bell, 355 Ga. App. at 100 (2) (b). 2023And such a provision also may, under certain circumstances, “constitute an affirmative statement of a perpetual or indefinite security interest that would create the 20-year reversionary period.” Mike’s Furniture Barn v. Smith, 342 Ga. App. 558, 561 (2) ( 803 SE2d 800 ) (2017). 6 It is true, as Freeport urges, that “the existence of an open-end clause in conjunction with a fixed maturity date, by itself, does not constitute an affirmative statement of a perpetual or indefinite security interest that would dictate the Code’s 20-year reversion period.” Bell, 355 Ga. App. at 100 (2) (b). | 3 | 3 |
Stearns Bank, N.A. v. Mullinsgreen2 sentences2022Miller, however, argues that the open-end clause in this case did constitute such an affirmative statement of intent because it is akin to the revolving line of credit that we held demonstrated the parties’ intent to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest in Stearns Bank v. Mullins, 333 Ga. App. 369 ( 776 SE2d 485 ) (2015). 2022Miller, however, argues that the open-end clause in this case did constitute such an affirmative statement of intent because it is akin to the revolving line of credit that we held demonstrated the parties’ intent to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest in Stearns Bank v. Mullins, 333 Ga. App. 369 ( 776 SE2d 485 ) (2015). | 1 | 2 |
Cordele Banking Co. v. Powersgreen2 sentences2015See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 ( 127 SE2d 909 ) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) ( 124 SE2d 275 ) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. 2015See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 ( 127 SE2d 909 ) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) ( 124 SE2d 275 ) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. | 1 | 2 |
Hill v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2015See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 ( 127 SE2d 909 ) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) ( 124 SE2d 275 ) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. 2015See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 ( 127 SE2d 909 ) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) ( 124 SE2d 275 ) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
Bowles v. Bowlesgreen2 sentences1972Code §20-1006; Mercer v. Tift, 79 Ga. 174 ; Bowles v. Bowles, 101 Ga. 837, 839 ( 29 SE 35 ). 1972Code §20-1006; Mercer v. Tift, 79 Ga. 174 ; Bowles v. Bowles, 101 Ga. 837, 839 ( 29 SE 35 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Fairburn Banking Co.
green
1 sentence2017(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. 7 In some cases, this Court has held that an open-end clause may constitute an affirmative statement of a perpetual or indefinite security interest that would create the 20-year reversionary period under OCGA § 44-14-80. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re Felker
green
1 sentence2015See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 ( 127 SE2d 909 ) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) ( 124 SE2d 275 ) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mercer v. N. & A. F. Tift
neutral
1 sentence1972Code §20-1006; Mercer v. Tift, 79 Ga. 174 ; Bowles v. Bowles, 101 Ga. 837, 839 ( 29 SE 35 ). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Heath v. Clark
green
1 sentence1966Coursey v. Coursey, 141 Ga. 65 ( 80 SE 462 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Coursey v. Coursey
neutral
1 sentence1966Coursey v. Coursey, 141 Ga. 65 ( 80 SE 462 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.