Parrish claim in Georgia

2024In denying Parrish’s motion for new trial, the court concluded that Parrish “did not prove the requisite meeting of the minds or the intent to accept the plea knowing he would be subject to be called by the State to testify.” 50 (b) In making this argument that the trial court erred by “allowing the State to modify its plea offer after it was accepted,” Parrish relies heavily on Syms v. State, 331 Ga. App. 225 (770 SE2d 305) (2015), in which the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by denying the appellant’s motion to enforce a plea agreement.

2024In denying Parrish’s motion for new trial, the court concluded that Parrish “did not prove the requisite meeting of the minds or the intent to accept the plea knowing he would be subject to be called by the State to testify.” 50 (b) In making this argument that the trial court erred by “allowing the State to modify its plea offer after it was accepted,” Parrish relies heavily on Syms v. State, 331 Ga. App. 225 (770 SE2d 305) (2015), in which the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by denying the appellant’s motion to enforce a plea agreement.

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022See generally Williams v. State, 328 Ga. App. 876, 880 (1) ( 763 SE2d 261 ) (2014) (a proper application of abuse-of-discretion review recognizes that there is a 12 “range of possible conclusions the trial judge may reach” and that this Court often will affirm a trial court ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard “even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call”) (citation and punctuation omitted); McDonald v. Garden Svcs., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 851, 852-853 ( 295 SE2d 551 ) (1982) (absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute its judgment for the trial cou

2022See generally Williams v. State, 328 Ga. App. 876, 880 (1) ( 763 SE2d 261 ) (2014) (a proper application of abuse-of-discretion review recognizes that there is a 12 “range of possible conclusions the trial judge may reach” and that this Court often will affirm a trial court ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard “even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call”) (citation and punctuation omitted); McDonald v. Garden Svcs., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 851, 852-853 ( 295 SE2d 551 ) (1982) (absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute its judgment for the trial cou

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022To evaluate Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”12 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”13 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Parrish argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by drafting the statement regarding the shooting without his input, specifically claiming that, in whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016). 16 Id. 17 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014); accord Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 139 (3) (796 SE2d 757) (2017); see Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014) (holding that

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022Needless to say, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel’s 18 Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) (2007); accord Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347 (6) (676 SE2d 215) (2009). 19 Bryant, 282 Ga. at 636 (4); accord Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-70 (3) (611 SE2d 3) (2005). 18 testimony,20 and the evidence shows that the statement was intended to be conveyed to third parties and, therefore, was not privileged.21 As a result, the trial court did not err in denying Parrish’s claim of ineffective assistance i

2022See generally Williams v. State, 328 Ga. App. 876, 880 (1) ( 763 SE2d 261 ) (2014) (a proper application of abuse-of-discretion review recognizes that there is a 12 “range of possible conclusions the trial judge may reach” and that this Court often will affirm a trial court ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard “even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call”) (citation and punctuation omitted); McDonald v. Garden Svcs., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 851, 852-853 ( 295 SE2d 551 ) (1982) (absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute its judgment for the trial cou

2022See generally Williams v. State, 328 Ga. App. 876, 880 (1) ( 763 SE2d 261 ) (2014) (a proper application of abuse-of-discretion review recognizes that there is a 12 “range of possible conclusions the trial judge may reach” and that this Court often will affirm a trial court ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard “even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call”) (citation and punctuation omitted); McDonald v. Garden Svcs., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 851, 852-853 ( 295 SE2d 551 ) (1982) (absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute its judgment for the trial cou

2018In its brief on appeal, the State asserts that the portions of the statement it seeks to admit “only contain statements that [Smith] bought a gun from Jarod or Rod Parrish, a person he doesn’t know well, in March of 2013.” Our analysis here is therefore limited to only those portions of Smith’s statement which the State asserts it will seek to admit. 3 (Citation omitted.) Williams v. Illinois, 567 U. S. 50, 64-65 (II) (A) ( 132 SCt 2221 , 183 LE2d 89) (2012) (plurality opinion).

2018In its brief on appeal, the State asserts that the portions of the statement it seeks to admit “only contain statements that [Smith] bought a gun from Jarod or Rod Parrish, a person he doesn’t know well, in March of 2013.” Our analysis here is therefore limited to only those portions of Smith’s statement which the State asserts it will seek to admit. 3 (Citation omitted.) Williams v. Illinois, 567 U. S. 50, 64-65 (II) (A) ( 132 SCt 2221 , 183 LE2d 89) (2012) (plurality opinion).

2015Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 802-803 (3) (b) (2) ( 750 SE2d 148 ) (2013); Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010).

2015Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 802-803 (3) (b) (2) ( 750 SE2d 148 ) (2013); Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010).

2006Dyer, 252 Ga. App. at 738 (2) (“The cause of action for civil conspiracy lies not in the conspiracy itself, but in the underlying tort committed against the plaintiff and the resulting damage.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

1999In questioning Dr. Nagleberg, the State asked Dr. Nagleberg whether the victim’s failure to “make an outcry” made “any sense.” Dr. Nagleberg responded that “even people who have been kidnapped and are exposed to public situations will frequently not ask for help.” Dr. Nagleberg also testified about the characteristics of an abuser, stating that abusers “typically grow up in a home that has some sort of physical violence” and that “these men frequently have been in trouble with the police in past occasions.” According to Dr. Nagleberg, “[firequently, there is a history of alcohol or drug abuse”

1999In questioning Dr. Nagleberg, the State asked Dr. Nagleberg whether the victim’s failure to “make an outcry” made “any sense.” Dr. Nagleberg responded that “even people who have been kidnapped and are exposed to public situations will frequently not ask for help.” Dr. Nagleberg also testified about the characteristics of an abuser, stating that abusers “typically grow up in a home that has some sort of physical violence” and that “these men frequently have been in trouble with the police in past occasions.” According to Dr. Nagleberg, “[firequently, there is a history of alcohol or drug abuse”

1998“The doctrine of official immunity . . . provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority. [Cits.]” Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752 (6) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994).

1998“The doctrine of official immunity . . . provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority. [Cits.]” Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752 (6) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994).