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8 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ashby v. W. COUNCIL, LUMBER PRODUCTIONgreen2 sentences2008“The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one ‘aggravating’ factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant.” 1 Id. (quoting Ashby, 117 Idaho at 686-87 , 791 P.2d at 436-37 ). 2002Workers, 117 Idaho 684 , 791 P.2d 434 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court enumerated factors that must be expressly considered by the trial court in deciding whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted: The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one “aggravating” factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant. | 2 | 6 |
State Insurance Fund v. Jarolimekgreen2 sentences2016Fund v. Jarolimek, 139 Idaho 137, 139 , 75 P.3d 191, 193 (2003)). 2008“The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one ‘aggravating’ factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant.” 1 Id. (quoting Ashby, 117 Idaho at 686-87 , 791 P.2d at 436-37 ). | 1 | 2 |
Sam ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KROGER COMPANY, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence1990Rogers v. Kroger, 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.1982); Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.1984); Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. Nickerson
green
1 sentence2016“The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one ‘aggravating’ factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting State Ins. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Astorquia
green
2 sentences2000Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 531 , 746 P.2d at 990 ; Fish Haven Resort, supra. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has established certain factors that a trial court must consider before imposing the most severe sanctions: “The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one ‘aggravating’ factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant.” Ashby, 117 Idaho at 686-87 , 791 P.2d at 436-37 (citations omitted). 2000Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 531 , 746 P.2d at 990 ; Fish Haven Resort, supra. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has established certain factors that a trial court must consider before imposing the most severe sanctions: “The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one ‘aggravating’ factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant.” Ashby, 117 Idaho at 686-87 , 791 P.2d at 436-37 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Sidney Morris v. Ocean Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Rogers v. Kroger, 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.1982); Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.1984); Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.