injustice resulting doctrine in Illinois

1983While we recently observed that stare decisis “must not be allowed to obscure the changing needs of society or to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24 ), we must also keep in mind that here we are concerned with a prior judicial construction of a statute as distinguished from a judicial pronouncement of a common law doctrine as in Alvis and in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11 .

1981(Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 .) Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed to obscure the changing needs of society or to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation.

1987The court insists on enslaving itself to stare decisis in upholding death sentences even though it has acknowledged in areas of less pressing concern that “[t]he tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. [Citation.] Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed *** to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24 .) Last year in People v. Kohrig (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 384 , this court upheld a mandatory seat-belt law against a due process challenge, even thoug

1987The court insists on enslaving itself to stare decisis in upholding death sentences even though it has acknowledged in areas of less pressing concern that "[t]he tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. [Citation.] Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed * * * to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation." ( Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, 24 .) Last year in People v. Kohrig (1986), 113 Ill.2d 384 , this court upheld a mandatory seat-belt law against a due process challenge, even thou

1987The court insists on enslaving itself to stare decisis in upholding death sentences even though it has acknowledged in areas of less pressing concern that “[t]he tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. [Citation.] Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed *** to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24 .) Last year in People v. Kohrig (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 384 , this court upheld a mandatory seat-belt law against a due process challenge, even thoug

1987The court insists on enslaving itself to stare decisis in upholding death sentences even though it has acknowledged in areas of less pressing concern that "[t]he tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. [Citation.] Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed * * * to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation." ( Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, 24 .) Last year in People v. Kohrig (1986), 113 Ill.2d 384 , this court upheld a mandatory seat-belt law against a due process challenge, even thou

1981Rev. 735 , 746 (1949).) “[T]he mere fact that an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeating it, much less perpetuating it.” (Hart v. Burnett (1860), 15 Cal. 530, 600 .) We have recently said: “The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. *** Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed *** to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24 .) Recently and prior to Alvis, in People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 383, 392 , this court ex

1981Rev. 735 , 746 (1949).) "[T]he mere fact that an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeating it, much less perpetuating it." ( Hart v. Burnett (1860), 15 Cal. 530, 600 .) We have recently said: "The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. * * * Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed * * * to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation." ( Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, 24 .) Recently and prior to Alvis, in People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill.2d 383, 392 , this cour

1981Rev. 735 , 746 (1949).) “[T]he mere fact that an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeating it, much less perpetuating it.” (Hart v. Burnett (1860), 15 Cal. 530, 600 .) We have recently said: “The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. *** Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed *** to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24 .) Recently and prior to Alvis, in People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 383, 392 , this court ex

1981Rev. 735 , 746 (1949).) "[T]he mere fact that an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeating it, much less perpetuating it." ( Hart v. Burnett (1860), 15 Cal. 530, 600 .) We have recently said: "The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. * * * Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed * * * to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation." ( Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, 24 .) Recently and prior to Alvis, in People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill.2d 383, 392 , this cour

1981Rev. 735 , 746 (1949).) “[T]he mere fact that an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeating it, much less perpetuating it.” (Hart v. Burnett (1860), 15 Cal. 530, 600 .) We have recently said: “The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. *** Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed *** to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24 .) Recently and prior to Alvis, in People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 383, 392 , this court ex

1981Rev. 735 , 746 (1949).) "[T]he mere fact that an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeating it, much less perpetuating it." ( Hart v. Burnett (1860), 15 Cal. 530, 600 .) We have recently said: "The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to develop the law. * * * Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed * * * to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation." ( Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, 24 .) Recently and prior to Alvis, in People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill.2d 383, 392 , this cour