juror error in Illinois

1942Crim. 340 , 285 Pac. 985 , the court said (p. 986): ‘As a general rule a verdict will not be set aside for reasons that would be sufficient to disqualify a juror on a challenge for cause which existed before the juror was sworn, but which was unknown to accused until after the verdict, unless it appears from the whole case that the accused suffered injustice from the fact that the juror served in the case.’ To the same effect are the other cases above cited, but we think it would serve no useful purpose to discuss them.

1937Crim. 340 , 285 Pac. 985 , the court said (p. 986): “As a general rule a verdict will not be set aside for reasons that would be sufficient to disqualify a juror on a challenge for cause which existed before the juror was sworn, but which was unknown to accused until after the verdict, unless it appears from the • whole case that the accused suffered injustice from the fact that the juror served in the case.” To the same effect are the other cases above cited, but we think it would serve no useful purpose to discuss them.

2022Kakos, 2016 IL 120377, ¶¶ 26-27 ; People - 11 - ex rel.

2022Id. ¶ 40 For example, we have observed that common-law qualifications of jurors, such as the sex of a juror or a requirement that they be “freeholders,” are not essential elements of the right of trial by jury.

1986In Smith v. Phillips , the Supreme Court found that determinations of juror bias can properly be made at a hearing "`with all interested parties permitted to participate.'" (See 455 U.S. 209, 216 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 85 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 945 , quoting Remmer v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 227, 230 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 .) The correct procedure, allowing defense interrogation of a potentially biased juror, has been employed by the trial courts of this State in similar cases.

1986In Smith v. Phillips , the Supreme Court found that determinations of juror bias can properly be made at a hearing "`with all interested parties permitted to participate.'" (See 455 U.S. 209, 216 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 85 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 945 , quoting Remmer v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 227, 230 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 .) The correct procedure, allowing defense interrogation of a potentially biased juror, has been employed by the trial courts of this State in similar cases.

1986In Smith v. Phillips, the Supreme Court found that determinations of juror bias can properly be made at a hearing “ ‘with all interested parties permitted to participate.’ ” (See 455 U.S. 209, 216 , 71 L.

1986In Smith v. Phillips, the Supreme Court found that determinations of juror bias can properly be made at a hearing “ ‘with all interested parties permitted to participate.’ ” (See 455 U.S. 209, 216 , 71 L.

1984The facts here are readily distinguished from those in the case cited by the defendant, Marcin v. Kipfer (1983), 117 Ill.

1971(People v. Harris, 38 Ill.2d 552 .) The determining issue is whether the juror will be unbiased and open minded in his consideration of the case.

1946The ordinary juror hearing such evidence would be most likely to consider it as substantive evidence of the guilt of the defendants.” In People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. 469 , where a person was called as a court’s witness, the State’s Attorney was permitted to ask if such witness had not in the presence of four persons made a certain statement, which she denied.

1935The judgment was affirmed in 236 Ill. 19 .