juror defense in Texas

2013Franklin v. State, 23 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000), aff'd, 138 S.W.3d 351 .

2013Franklin v. State, 23 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000), aff’d, 138 S.W.3d 3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Franklin again after this Court issued its opinion on remand and, at that time, re-characterized the error as a failure to grant Franklin a mistrial.

2006See Clark , 500 S.W.2d at 109 ("Evidently they did not consider that the judge was abusing his discretion, else an issue could have been made and evidence heard, from which this Court might determine whether abuse of discretion existed.").

2006See Clark, 500 S.W.2d at 109 (“Evidently they did not consider that the judge was abusing his discretion, else an issue could have been made and evidence heard, from which this Court might determine whether abuse of discretion existed.”).

2013The trial court denied both motions, stating that Wiest did not say anything that would disqualify him as a juror and that defense counsel already had the opportunity to question the potential jurors individually.3 “The conduct of voir dire rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 687 (Tex. Crim.

1993Appellant further argues that such impermissible instruction denies appellant a “reliable and fair sentencing procedure under those amendments to the Constitution.” The State responds to this argument by saying that the jury instruction given was proper under the statute and was constitutional under Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).

2018See Easly, 163 S.W.3d at 842 ; see also Jordan, 883 S.W.2d at 665 (trial court’s refusal to conduct hearing on motion for new trial is not an abuse of discretion if affidavit or affidavits underlying motion are conclusory in nature).

2018See Easly, 163 S.W.3d at 842 ; see also Jordan, 883 S.W.2d at 665 (trial court’s refusal to conduct hearing on motion for new trial is not an abuse of discretion if affidavit or affidavits underlying motion are conclusory in nature).

2015He lost the benefit of the fact that “different jurors may have found a reasonable doubt as to [his] guilt.” Montez v. State, 824 S.W2d 308, 310 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1992, no pet.); see also Knight v. State, 839 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1992, no pet.).

2015He lost the benefit of the fact that “different jurors may have found a reasonable doubt as to [his] guilt.” Montez v. State, 824 S.W2d 308, 310 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1992, no pet.); see also Knight v. State, 839 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1992, no pet.).

2008The sole issue raised in this accelerated appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Hunter's pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus based on his contention that the State's continued prosecution of the underlying case violates his federal and state constitutional protections against being twice tried for the same crime. [5] Concluding that we are constrained by the precedent of Ex parte Fierro, 79 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), we hold that, because the trial court's sua sponte dismissal of the juror was error, that event cannot supply manifest necessity for a mistrial.

1994Cortez v. State, 685 S.W.2d 467, 470-471 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref'd).

1993We have held that Art. 35.17 "does not in any way purport to restrict the discretion of the trial judge in conducting voir dire." Williams v. State, 668 S.W.2d 692, 701 (Tex. Cr.App.1983).

1993We have held that Art. 35.17 “does not in any way purport to restrict the discretion of the trial judge in conducting voir dire.” Williams v. State, 668 S.W.2d 692, 701 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).

1993Day v. State, 784 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, no pet.).

1992In Lewis v. State, 779 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, pet. ref'd), the prosecutor said he struck an African-American juror who wore a mustache.

1992In Lewis v. State, 779 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, pet. refd), the prosecutor said he struck an African-American juror who wore a mustache.

1972The Constitution provides: “No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the Courts of this State on account of his religious opinions, or for the want of any religious belief, but all oaths or affirmations shall be administered in the mode most binding upon the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains and penalties of perjury.” (Emphasis added.) 5 In construing this Article, this court has previously held that it is constitutionally permissible that jurors be allowed to affirm instead of being sworn. “[T]here is nothing in the context, with reference to administering

1972The Constitution provides: “No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the Courts of this State on account of his religious opinions, or for the want of any religious belief, but all oaths or affirmations shall be administered in the mode most binding upon the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains and penalties of perjury.” (Emphasis added.) 5 In construing this Article, this court has previously held that it is constitutionally permissible that jurors be allowed to affirm instead of being sworn. “[T]here is nothing in the context, with reference to administering