8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waller v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2020On the first day of jury selection and prior to the start of voir dire (the preliminary questioning of prospective jurors), the trial court sua sponte decided to close the courtroom to all members of the public except for “two individuals from the victim’s family and two individuals from the defendant’s family.” During the two days of jury selection, the trial court failed to make any finding that (1) closure was justified by an overriding interest, (2) closure was no broader than necessary to protect that interest, and (3) the court considered reasonable alternatives to closure pursuant to Wa 2020On the first day of jury selection and prior to the start of voir dire (the preliminary questioning of prospective jurors), the trial court sua sponte decided to close the courtroom to all members of the public except for “two individuals from the victim’s family and two individuals from the defendant’s family.” During the two days of jury selection, the trial court failed to make any finding that (1) closure was justified by an overriding interest, (2) closure was no broader than necessary to protect that interest, and (3) the court considered reasonable alternatives to closure pursuant to Wa | 2 | 3 |
Presley v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2020In fact, - 11 - it has been held that, “[g]iven the seriousness of the potential harm, each trial judge must be alert and proactive in managing his or her courtroom to prevent violations of this core constitutional right [(the right to a public trial)], regardless of whether the attorneys assist in the process.” People v. Evans, 2016 IL App (1st) 142190, ¶ 14 , 69 N.E.3d 322 ; Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (per curiam) (stating a trial court is required to consider reasonable alternatives to closure, one of the required Waller factors, even when not offered by the parties). ¶ 50 2019In fact, it has been held that, “[g]iven the seriousness of the potential harm, each trial judge must be alert and proactive in managing his or her courtroom to prevent violations of this core constitutional right [(the right to a public trial)], regardless of whether the attorneys assist in the process.” People v. Evans, 2016 IL App (1st) 142190, ¶ 14 , 69 N.E.3d 322 ; Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (per curiam) (stating a trial court is required to consider reasonable alternatives - 21 - to closure, one of the required Waller factors, even when not offered by the parties). ¶ 50 | 2 | 3 |
Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickumgreen2 sentences2017See Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 484 (1994) (finding that the failure to specifically label a motion is not fatal unless prejudice results to the nonmovant). ¶ 13 Waller's motion to dismiss was based on a matter not appearing in the complaint. 2017See Illinois Graphics Co., 159 Ill. 2d at 484 (finding that the failure to specifically label a motion is not fatal unless prejudice results to the nonmovant). ¶ 13 Waller’s motion to dismiss was based on a matter not appearing in the complaint. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Radfordgreen1 sentence2023Radford, 2020 IL 123975, ¶ 27 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 47-48 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holveckgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220, 225-28 (1996); People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 100-03 (1990). ¶ 132 I observe that the majority cites Falaster and Holveck in upholding the trial court’s erroneous exclusion order. 2020See, e.g., People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220, 225-28 (1996); People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 100-03 (1990). ¶ 132 I observe that the majority cites Falaster and Holveck in upholding the trial court’s erroneous exclusion order. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Falastergreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220, 225-28 (1996); People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 100-03 (1990). ¶ 132 I observe that the majority cites Falaster and Holveck in upholding the trial court’s erroneous exclusion order. 2020See, e.g., People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220, 225-28 (1996); People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 100-03 (1990). ¶ 132 I observe that the majority cites Falaster and Holveck in upholding the trial court’s erroneous exclusion order. | 1 | 1 |
Alonzo Woods v. Robert Kuhlmann, Superintendent of Sullivan Correctional Facility Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2020Accordingly, these courts “modify the Waller test so that the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is replaced by requiring a showing of a ‘substantial reason’ for a partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same.” Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 ; see Woods, 977 F.2d at 77-78 (applying remaining three Waller factors). ¶ 130 However, several state courts have applied the Waller overriding interest test to partial closures of trials. 2020Accordingly, these courts “modify the Waller test so that the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is replaced by requiring a showing of a ‘substantial reason’ for a partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same.” Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 ; see Woods, 977 F.2d at 77-78 (applying remaining three Waller factors). ¶ 130 However, several state courts have applied the Waller overriding interest test to partial closures of trials. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Turriettagreen2 sentences2020“Therefore, if a reviewing court is already contemplating a partial closure, something less than a full closure, that analysis seems to already align with - 33 - the Waller standard’s requirement that the closure be no broader than necessary.” Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036 , ¶ 19. ¶ 131 Illinois courts have applied the Waller overriding interest test to partial closure situations. 2020“Therefore, if a reviewing court is already contemplating a partial closure, something less than a full closure, that analysis seems to already align with - 33 - the Waller standard’s requirement that the closure be no broader than necessary.” Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036 , ¶ 19. ¶ 131 Illinois courts have applied the Waller overriding interest test to partial closure situations. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cohengreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036, ¶ 19 ; Commonwealth v. Cohen, 921 N.E.2d 906, 921 (Mass. 2010) (collecting cases). 2020See, e.g., Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036, ¶ 19 ; Commonwealth v. Cohen, 921 N.E.2d 906, 921 (Mass. 2010) (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Guptagreen2 sentences2020In United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Peterson as follows: “Whatever the outer boundaries of our ‘triviality standard’ may be (and we see no reason to define these boundaries in the present context), a trial court’s intentional, unjustified closure of a courtroom during the entirety of voir dire cannot be deemed ‘trivial.’ ” The Gupta court explained as follows: “ ‘[T]he value of openness’ that a public trial guarantees ‘lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of - 39 2020In United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Peterson as follows: “Whatever the outer boundaries of our ‘triviality standard’ may be (and we see no reason to define these boundaries in the present context), a trial court’s intentional, unjustified closure of a courtroom during the entirety of voir dire cannot be deemed ‘trivial.’ ” The Gupta court explained as follows: “ ‘[T]he value of openness’ that a public trial guarantees ‘lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of - 39 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Taylorgreen1 sentence1994(See Taylor, 244 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Evans
green
2 sentences2020In fact, - 11 - it has been held that, “[g]iven the seriousness of the potential harm, each trial judge must be alert and proactive in managing his or her courtroom to prevent violations of this core constitutional right [(the right to a public trial)], regardless of whether the attorneys assist in the process.” People v. Evans, 2016 IL App (1st) 142190, ¶ 14 , 69 N.E.3d 322 ; Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (per curiam) (stating a trial court is required to consider reasonable alternatives to closure, one of the required Waller factors, even when not offered by the parties). ¶ 50 2020In fact, - 11 - it has been held that, “[g]iven the seriousness of the potential harm, each trial judge must be alert and proactive in managing his or her courtroom to prevent violations of this core constitutional right [(the right to a public trial)], regardless of whether the attorneys assist in the process.” People v. Evans, 2016 IL App (1st) 142190, ¶ 14 , 69 N.E.3d 322 ; Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (per curiam) (stating a trial court is required to consider reasonable alternatives to closure, one of the required Waller factors, even when not offered by the parties). ¶ 50 | 3 | 2019–2023 |
1010 Lake Shore Association v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
green
2 sentences2017Accordingly, we find Waller's challenge to the Association's legal authority to pursue this action falls under section 2-619. ¶ 14 The Act states that "[t]he association shall have no authority to forbear the payment of assessments by any unit owner" (765 ILCS 605/18(o) (West 2014)), and expressly grants a board the power and duty to collect assessments (765 ILCS 605/18.4(d) (West 2014)). 2 To that end, section 9(g)(1) of the Act (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(1) (West 2014)) creates a lien in favor of a condominium association when a unit owner fails or refuses to pay common expense assessments. 1010 Lak 2017Accordingly, we find Waller’s challenge to the Association’s legal authority to pursue this action falls under section 2-619. ¶ 14 The Act states that “[t]he association shall have no authority to forbear the payment of assessments by any unit owner” (765 ILCS 605/18(o) (West 2014)) and expressly grants a board the power and duty to collect assessments (765 ILCS 605/18.4(d) (West 2014)).2 To that end, section 9(g)(1) of the Act (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(1) (West 2014)) creates a lien in favor of a condominium association when a unit owner fails or refuses to pay common expense assessments. 1010 Lake | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez
green
1 sentence2020A fuller conception of Waller’s test would thus lead to a more unified doctrine, stronger protection of the right and more up-front consideration of countervailing concerns in particular cases.” Id. at 931. ¶ 177 Accordingly, since a violation of a defendant’s right to a public trial is a structural error (Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 ), I would excuse defendant’s procedural default. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People in Interest of G.B
green
1 sentence2020Regardless of whether available courtroom seating “is a compelling interest, only a substantial interest, or something less” (In re G.B., 2018 COA 77, ¶ 31 ), the trial court’s closure did not satisfy the closely connected second and third Waller factors. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Radford
green
1 sentence2020In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the appellate court misapprehended and misapplied these controlling and fundamental principles. ¶ 126 The appellate court erroneously maintained that the overriding interest test for public trial closure “is distinguishable from this case in two ways.” 2018 IL App (3d) 140404 , ¶ 57. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Jason Simmons
green
2 sentences2020Accordingly, these courts “modify the Waller test so that the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is replaced by requiring a showing of a ‘substantial reason’ for a partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same.” Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 ; see Woods, 977 F.2d at 77-78 (applying remaining three Waller factors). ¶ 130 However, several state courts have applied the Waller overriding interest test to partial closures of trials. 2020Accordingly, these courts “modify the Waller test so that the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is replaced by requiring a showing of a ‘substantial reason’ for a partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same.” Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 ; see Woods, 977 F.2d at 77-78 (applying remaining three Waller factors). ¶ 130 However, several state courts have applied the Waller overriding interest test to partial closures of trials. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Easterling
green
2 sentences2020The Waller factors make it unnecessary to adopt a “triviality standard.” ¶ 152 Additionally, “[e]ven if we were to indicate a tolerance for so called ‘trivial closures,’ the closure here could not be placed in that category.” Id. at 831 . 2020The Waller factors make it unnecessary to adopt a “triviality standard.” ¶ 152 Additionally, “[e]ven if we were to indicate a tolerance for so called ‘trivial closures,’ the closure here could not be placed in that category.” Id. at 831 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
green
2 sentences2020The application of the four-factor “Waller test,” also known as the “overriding interest test,” must rebut “the presumption of openness.” See Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510 . ¶ 125 Applying these controlling fundamental principles to the case at bar, I would hold that the trial court committed clear or obvious error. 2020In United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Peterson as follows: “Whatever the outer boundaries of our ‘triviality standard’ may be (and we see no reason to define these boundaries in the present context), a trial court’s intentional, unjustified closure of a courtroom during the entirety of voir dire cannot be deemed ‘trivial.’ ” The Gupta court explained as follows: “ ‘[T]he value of openness’ that a public trial guarantees ‘lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of - 39 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.