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8 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 2010–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waller v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2017In addition, ”[b]efore ordering any closure of a court room, whether full or partial, a judge ‘must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and . .. must make findings adequate to support the closure.’ “ Id. at 748, quoting Waller, supra. ’’Where a closure fails to satisfy these so-called Waller factors, the error is deemed ‘structural’ in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Id. 2017In addition, ”[b]efore ordering any closure of a court room, whether full or partial, a judge ‘must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and . .. must make findings adequate to support the closure.’ “ Id. at 748, quoting Waller, supra. ’’Where a closure fails to satisfy these so-called Waller factors, the error is deemed ‘structural’ in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Id. | 1 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2017Under the First Amendment, the public has the right to attend a pretrial hearing regarding a motion to suppress unless the party seeking closure of the hearing to the public satisfies the four-part strict scrutiny test articulated in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984): “[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2014In contrast, in People v. Jones, 96 N.Y.2d 213, 216, 219 (2001), the New York Court of Appeals held that a procedure whereby, during the testimony of an undercover police officer, a court officer was posted outside the court room who asked all spectators except attorneys and family members “their identity and their interest in coming to court” raised “the same secrecy and fairness concerns that a total closure does.” The court, therefore, required (and found) justification under the Waller factors that apply to a total closure of the court room. 2014In contrast, in People v. Jones, 96 N.Y.2d 213, 216, 219 (2001), the New York Court of Appeals held that a procedure whereby, during the testimony of an undercover police officer, a court officer was posted outside the court room who asked all spectators except attorneys and family members “their identity and their interest in coming to court” raised “the same secrecy and fairness concerns that a total closure does.” The court, therefore, required (and found) justification under the Waller factors that apply to a total closure of the court room. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). 2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wendell Smithgreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). 2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). | 1 | 1 |
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riversidegreen2 sentences2014Second, [we are to consider] whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 5 *314 Even were we to assume that the Sixth Amendment public trial right attached in the circumstances presented and that the partial closure did not satisfy the four-part Waller test, 6 the defendant’s motion for new trial was nonetheless properly denied because he has not shown that the appropriate remedy would be a new trial. 2014Second, [we are to consider] whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 5 *314 Even were we to assume that the Sixth Amendment public trial right attached in the circumstances presented and that the partial closure did not satisfy the four-part Waller test, 6 the defendant’s motion for new trial was nonetheless properly denied because he has not shown that the appropriate remedy would be a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
Presley v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2010In Presley v. Georgia, 130 S.Ct. at 725 , referring only to the third Waller factor and determining that the trial judge had not considered alternatives to closing the proceeding to the public for lack of seating, the United States Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the other Waller factors, and reversed, holding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. 6 The Court held that “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties” and that “[tjrial courts are obligated of all to take every r 2010In Presley v. Georgia, 130 S.Ct. at 725 , referring only to the third Waller factor and determining that the trial judge had not considered alternatives to closing the proceeding to the public for lack of seating, the United States Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the other Waller factors, and reversed, holding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. 6 The Court held that “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties” and that “[tjrial courts are obligated of all to take every r | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen1 sentence2010See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 48-49 (applying Waller factors to partial closure). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2010State v. Ortiz, 91 Haw. 181, 191 (1999). 2010State v. Ortiz, 91 Haw. 181, 191 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2010Waller and the four factors it sets out apply to the exclusion of the public from jury selection proceedings, at least when this occurs over the defendant’s objection. 18 See, e.g., Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 45 (1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993) (“whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest”); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004) (“The Waller analysis applies as well to the closu 2010Waller and the four factors it sets out apply to the exclusion of the public from jury selection proceedings, at least when this occurs over the defendant’s objection. 18 See, e.g., Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 45 (1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993) (“whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest”); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004) (“The Waller analysis applies as well to the closu | 1 | 1 |
Watters v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Waller and the four factors it sets out apply to the exclusion of the public from jury selection proceedings, at least when this occurs over the defendant’s objection. 18 See, e.g., Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 45 (1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993) (“whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest”); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004) (“The Waller analysis applies as well to the closu 2010Waller and the four factors it sets out apply to the exclusion of the public from jury selection proceedings, at least when this occurs over the defendant’s objection. 18 See, e.g., Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 45 (1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993) (“whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest”); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004) (“The Waller analysis applies as well to the closu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Cohen
green
2 sentences2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. 2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. | 3 | 2014–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Maldonado
green
2 sentences2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. 2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Thompson v. Burach
green
2 sentences2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. 2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Del Rio
green
2 sentences2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. 2018If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 466 Mass. 742 , 748, 2 N.E.3d 145 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2312 , 189 L.Ed.2d 192 (2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1) , supra at 118-119, 921 N.E.2d 906 . 10 We proceed by examining each of the Waller factors in turn. *1139 a. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
cluster 731292
green
2 sentences2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). 2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kranyik v. City of West Melbourne
green
2 sentences2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). 2014See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 573-574 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1204 (2006) (requirement that all who seek to enter court house provide photographic identification constituted partial closure but was justified by security concerns); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (identification procedure that required all spectators to show identification and give name, address, and birth date before entering court room was partial closure “if the identification procedure [could] be said to have imposed a closure at all”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
2 sentences2011Thus, closure may occur where four requirements are met: “[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Commonwealth v. Martin, supra, quoting Waller v. Georgia, supra. The essence of the Waller standard is thus that a moving party’s position must be sufficiently compelling to overcome a presumption of openn 2011Thus, closure may occur where four requirements are met: “[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Commonwealth v. Martin, supra, quoting Waller v. Georgia, supra. The essence of the Waller standard is thus that a moving party’s position must be sufficiently compelling to overcome a presumption of openn | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Williams
green
2 sentences2010In claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated, “[t]he burden is clearly on the defendant to demonstrate that the public was excluded from his trial.” Commonwealth *108 v. Williams, 379 Mass. at 875 . 2010In claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated, “[t]he burden is clearly on the defendant to demonstrate that the public was excluded from his trial.” Commonwealth *108 v. Williams, 379 Mass. at 875 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Fiore v. United States
green
2 sentences2010Waller and the four factors it sets out apply to the exclusion of the public from jury selection proceedings, at least when this occurs over the defendant’s objection. 18 See, e.g., Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 45 (1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993) (“whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest”); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004) (“The Waller analysis applies as well to the closu 2010Waller and the four factors it sets out apply to the exclusion of the public from jury selection proceedings, at least when this occurs over the defendant’s objection. 18 See, e.g., Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 45 (1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993) (“whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest”); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004) (“The Waller analysis applies as well to the closu | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.