Waller test in Texas

2022Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 ; see also Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 332–33 (finding, without addressing the other three prongs of the Waller analysis, that courtroom closure was not justified under the Waller test because the findings of fact were inadequate and did not justify closing Lilly’s trial). 14 This is not to say that witness intimidation is not an overriding interest that could justify a closure of the court.

2022Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 ; see also Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 332–33 (finding, without addressing the other three prongs of the Waller analysis, that courtroom closure was not justified under the Waller test because the findings of fact were inadequate and did not justify closing Lilly’s trial). 14 This is not to say that witness intimidation is not an overriding interest that could justify a closure of the court.

2022Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 ; see also Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 332–33 (finding, without addressing the other three prongs of the Waller analysis, that courtroom closure was not justified under the Waller test because the findings of fact were inadequate and did not justify closing Lilly’s trial). 14 This is not to say that witness intimidation is not an overriding interest that could justify a closure of the court.

2022Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 ; see also Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 332–33 (finding, without addressing the other three prongs of the Waller analysis, that courtroom closure was not justified under the Waller test because the findings of fact were inadequate and did not justify closing Lilly’s trial). 14 This is not to say that witness intimidation is not an overriding interest that could justify a closure of the court.

2018See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 ; Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 505 n.19 (citing Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 113 , 921 N.E.2d 906, 922 (2010) for proposition that even in partial closure context remaining Waller factors must be satisfied); Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 329 (“findings by the trial court are the linchpin of the Waller test”).

2018See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 ; Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 505 n.19 (citing Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 113 , 921 N.E.2d 906, 922 (2010) for proposition that even in partial closure context remaining Waller factors must be satisfied); Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 329 (“findings by the trial court are the linchpin of the Waller test”).

2013See Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 725 (all reasonable alternatives); Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 329 (same); Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 509 (sensibly reject); see also Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (Waller test).

2012Steadman — 10 closure.11 With respect to the last requirement, the Court observed that findings that are too “broad and general” will not suffice to justify closure.12 In Presley, decided while the appellant’s direct appeal was pending,13 the Supreme Court expressly applied the Waller standard to hold that exclusion of the defendant’s uncle from the courtroom during jury selection violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.14 While acknowledging that the right to a public trial is not absolute, the Court nevertheless emphasized that, even in the face of weighty interests

2018See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 ; Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 505 n.19 (citing Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 113 , 921 N.E.2d 906, 922 (2010) for proposition that even in partial closure context remaining Waller factors must be satisfied); Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 329 (“findings by the trial court are the linchpin of the Waller test”).

2018See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 ; Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 505 n.19 (citing Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 113 , 921 N.E.2d 906, 922 (2010) for proposition that even in partial closure context remaining Waller factors must be satisfied); Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 329 (“findings by the trial court are the linchpin of the Waller test”).

2022While we have held that the defendant must show that the court was closed before we engage in that analysis, we have not held that a showing of a partial closure is no closure at all. 2 Even when we have acknowledged that other jurisdictions have applied a less stringent Waller test in the context of a “partial” closure, we have still recognized the need for the party seeking the closure to provide some justification for that closure. 3 Indeed, jurisdictions analyzing a “partial” courtroom closure (as opposed to a 2 Cameron v. State, 490 S.W.3d 57, 68-69 (Tex. Crim.

2022While we have held that the defendant must show that the court was closed before we engage in that analysis, we have not held that a showing of a partial closure is no closure at all. 2 Even when we have acknowledged that other jurisdictions have applied a less stringent Waller test in the context of a “partial” closure, we have still recognized the need for the party seeking the closure to provide some justification for that closure. 3 Indeed, jurisdictions analyzing a “partial” courtroom closure (as opposed to a 2 Cameron v. State, 490 S.W.3d 57, 68-69 (Tex. Crim.

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603 , 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013); United Williams - 16 justified, as the Waller test does, courts instead evaluate as a preliminary matter “whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant . . . of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42 ; see also United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022See id. at 414 (noting that in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for situations involving partial closure, a less stringent “substantial reason” test replaces the first Waller factor that ordinarily requires an “overriding interest;” other three Waller factors remain the same); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that First Circuit and others require only a “substantial interest” rather than a “compelling” one in partial closure Williams - 14 cases); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that at least five other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s str

2022See id. at 414 (noting that in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for situations involving partial closure, a less stringent “substantial reason” test replaces the first Waller factor that ordinarily requires an “overriding interest;” other three Waller factors remain the same); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that First Circuit and others require only a “substantial interest” rather than a “compelling” one in partial closure Williams - 14 cases); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that at least five other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s str

2022See id. at 414 (noting that in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for situations involving partial closure, a less stringent “substantial reason” test replaces the first Waller factor that ordinarily requires an “overriding interest;” other three Waller factors remain the same); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that First Circuit and others require only a “substantial interest” rather than a “compelling” one in partial closure Williams - 14 cases); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that at least five other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s str

2022See id. at 414 (noting that in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for situations involving partial closure, a less stringent “substantial reason” test replaces the first Waller factor that ordinarily requires an “overriding interest;” other three Waller factors remain the same); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that First Circuit and others require only a “substantial interest” rather than a “compelling” one in partial closure Williams - 14 cases); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that at least five other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s str

2022See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603 , 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013); United Williams - 16 justified, as the Waller test does, courts instead evaluate as a preliminary matter “whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant . . . of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42 ; see also United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603 , 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013); United Williams - 16 justified, as the Waller test does, courts instead evaluate as a preliminary matter “whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant . . . of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42 ; see also United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.

2022In evaluating triviality, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, States v. Arellano-Garcia, 503 F. App’x 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Izac, 239 F. App’x 1, 4 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 , 890–91 (D.C.

2022In evaluating triviality, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, States v. Arellano-Garcia, 503 F. App’x 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Izac, 239 F. App’x 1, 4 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 , 890–91 (D.C.

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022In evaluating triviality, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, States v. Arellano-Garcia, 503 F. App’x 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Izac, 239 F. App’x 1, 4 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 , 890–91 (D.C.

2022In evaluating triviality, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, States v. Arellano-Garcia, 503 F. App’x 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Izac, 239 F. App’x 1, 4 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 , 890–91 (D.C.

2022In evaluating triviality, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, States v. Arellano-Garcia, 503 F. App’x 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Izac, 239 F. App’x 1, 4 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 , 890–91 (D.C.

2022In evaluating triviality, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, States v. Arellano-Garcia, 503 F. App’x 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Izac, 239 F. App’x 1, 4 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 , 890–91 (D.C.

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022Further, Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) dealt with a situation in which the Waller test was properly applied on direct appeal regarding a state trial court’s exclusion of everyone from the courtroom but the defendant’s immediate family.

2022Further, Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) dealt with a situation in which the Waller test was properly applied on direct appeal regarding a state trial court’s exclusion of everyone from the courtroom but the defendant’s immediate family.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603 , 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013); United Williams - 16 justified, as the Waller test does, courts instead evaluate as a preliminary matter “whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant . . . of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42 ; see also United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603 , 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013); United Williams - 16 justified, as the Waller test does, courts instead evaluate as a preliminary matter “whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant . . . of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42 ; see also United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.

2022App. 2016) (holding that the burden was on defendant to first prove that the trial was closed to the public); see also Cameron v. State, 535 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant carried his burden to prove that the courtroom was closed when record showed that members of the defendant’s family were excluded from the courtroom); Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 328-31 (Tex. Crim.

2022App. 2016) (holding that the burden was on defendant to first prove that the trial was closed to the public); see also Cameron v. State, 535 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant carried his burden to prove that the courtroom was closed when record showed that members of the defendant’s family were excluded from the courtroom); Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 328-31 (Tex. Crim.

2022Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 ; see also Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 .

2022Compare Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414-15 (concluding that Sixth Amendment was violated where trial court excluded three co-defendants from courtroom during testimony of witness to prevent intimidation; the record was insufficient to support closure because the trial court “asked no questions at all” to verify prosecution’s claim of witness 9 A minority of jurisdictions have declined to apply a less rigorous “substantial reason” test for partial closures.

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” the Sixth Amendment); People v. Lujan, 461 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. 2020) (noting that “many jurisdictions have held that some closures are simply so trivial that they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and adopting such approach in Colorado). 11 In those situations, rather than focusing on whether a closure was 10 See also Thompson, 713 F.3d at 396 (applying modified Waller test for partial closures and holding that no Sixth Amend

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2022Indeed, the original purpose of the “trivial” or “de minimis” exception to a defendant’s open trial right was to address rare situations involving “brief and inadvertent” courtroom closures. 7 For example, Peterson v. Williams involved a courtroom closure that was initially justified under a traditional Waller analysis but inadvertently continued 5 Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005). 6 State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007). 7 See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an otherwise justified courtroom closure that inadvertently

2015The Supreme Court has noted, "the Constitution requires that every effort be made to see to it that a defendant in a cri- minal case has not unknowingly relinquished the basic pro~ tections that the Framers thought indispensible to a fair trial.“ Sneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1973).

2014See Presley, 558 U.S. at 215-16 , 130 S.Ct. at 725 (appellant’s right to public trial violated because trial court failed to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure, even assuming trial court had overriding interest in closure); Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 509-10 (appellant’s right to public trial violated where trial court failed to make adequate findings or consider all reasonable alternatives to closure); Turner v. State, 413 S.W.3d 442, 449-50 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (appellant’s right to public trial was violated where only interest articulated to support closure was space

2014However, even if the trial court’s actions only constituted a partial closure that could be justified by a “substantial reason” under Osborne , or even if the statutory “good cause” standard the Texas Family Code hypothetically set the constitutional floor for a juvenile’s constitutional rights, the lack of any fact-findings or some indication of why the trial court chose to close proceedings is fatal. “[T]he trial court must make sufficient findings to allow the reviewing court to determine whether the partial closure was proper” unless “we can glean sufficient support for a partial temporary

2014However, even if the trial court’s actions only constituted a partial closure that could be justified by a “substantial reason” under Osborne , or even if the statutory “good cause” standard the Texas Family Code hypothetically set the constitutional floor for a juvenile’s constitutional rights, the lack of any fact-findings or some indication of why the trial court chose to close proceedings is fatal. “[T]he trial court must make sufficient findings to allow the reviewing court to determine whether the partial closure was proper” unless “we can glean sufficient support for a partial temporary

2014See Presley, 558 U.S. at 215-16 , 130 S.Ct. at 725 (appellant’s right to public trial violated because trial court failed to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure, even assuming trial court had overriding interest in closure); Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 509-10 (appellant’s right to public trial violated where trial court failed to make adequate findings or consider all reasonable alternatives to closure); Turner v. State, 413 S.W.3d 442, 449-50 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (appellant’s right to public trial was violated where only interest articulated to support closure was space

2012Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).

2012Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).