landowner violation in Kansas

2015In rejecting this argument, the court held: “The 1974 legislative amendment allowing any owner of land annexed by the city to ‘challenge the authority of the city to annex such lands and the regularity of the proceedings had in connection therewith’ changes our prior law only to the extent that it is no longer necessary that an action protesting an annexation be brought in the name of the state.” 218 Kan. at 349 . *743 See also City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 228 Kan. 773, 774-77 , 620 P.2d 1153 (1980) (affirming Clarke’s holding that the 1974 legislative amendment allowing a landowner to ch

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009On petition for review of this court's decision affirming the trial court, our Supreme Court identified the dispositive issue before it in Dillard as follows: "[W]hether a landowner who engages an independent contractor, who is covered by workers compensation, may be liable for work-related injuries to employees of the independent contractor under two exceptions to the common-law rule that one who engages an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or the employees. . . . [T]he two exceptions asserted here are direct liability of the landowner for violation of

2009On petition for review of this court's decision affirming the trial court, our Supreme Court identified the dispositive issue before it in Dillard as follows: "[W]hether a landowner who engages an independent contractor, who is covered by workers compensation, may be liable for work-related injuries to employees of the independent contractor under two exceptions to the common-law rule that one who engages an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or the employees. . . . [T]he two exceptions asserted here are direct liability of the landowner for violation of

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

1985Notice was given to the landowner that a hearing would be held before the appraisers on November 19, that the court set the 24th day of November for filing of the appraisers’ award, and that: “[A]ny party dissatisfied with the award may appeal therefrom as by law permitted within thirty (30) days from the date of filing.” 211 Kan. at 706 .

1984Kopp’s Rug Co. v. Talbot, 5 Kan.

1980Cass v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 208 , 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1892 (1976).

1980Cass v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 208 , 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1892 (1976).

1929Plaintiff cites Sample v. Jefferson County, 108 Kan. 498 , 196 Pac. 440 , to sustain his claim, but that case arose under a different statute and where the bridge ordered to be removed furnished the only means of ingress to and egress from the plaintiff’s farm.

1929Plaintiff cites Sample v. Jefferson County, 108 Kan. 498 , 196 Pac. 440 , to sustain his claim, but that case arose under a different statute and where the bridge ordered to be removed furnished the only means of ingress to and egress from the plaintiff’s farm.

1915Co. v. Drake, 26 Kan, 345, the act of 1866 to establish certain state roads was held invalid because the act contained no provision for compensation, but the court said: “If provision had been made in ch. 103, Laws 1866. by which land-owners could obtain compensation, even though such compensation was not to be paid until after the actual appropriation of the right of way, the authorities seem to hold such a law valid.” (p. 348.) In the case of Hughes v. Milligan, 42 Kan. 396 , 22 Pac. 313 , a public highway statute was held by a majority of the court to be void because no tribunal was constit

1915It is not necessary.in a case where the state, or a municipal corporation acting by authority of the state, takes private property, that compensation shall be first paid; it is sufficient if provision Is made for its payment, and an impartial tribunal constituted before whom the owner of the land can go to claim and receive his damages without delay.” (p. 401.) In the case of The State, ex rel., v. Spencer, 53 Kan. 655 , 37 Pac. 174 , a public highway statute which provided a proper tribunal before which landowners might claim damages was held valid although it did not pro.vide that compensati

1915It is not necessary.in a case where the state, or a municipal corporation acting by authority of the state, takes private property, that compensation shall be first paid; it is sufficient if provision Is made for its payment, and an impartial tribunal constituted before whom the owner of the land can go to claim and receive his damages without delay.” (p. 401.) In the case of The State, ex rel., v. Spencer, 53 Kan. 655 , 37 Pac. 174 , a public highway statute which provided a proper tribunal before which landowners might claim damages was held valid although it did not pro.vide that compensati