landowner challenge in California

2020Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321 , aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature of an appurtenance to the land.' " Greeson involved a landowner challenge to the 1932 Contract; the district court rejected it, because there was no present threat to the landowners' interests ( 55 F.2d at p. 325 ); and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

2020Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321 , aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature of an appurtenance to the land.' " Greeson involved a landowner challenge to the 1932 Contract; the district court rejected it, because there was no present threat to the landowners' interests ( 55 F.2d at p. 325 ); and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

2020Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321 , aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature of an appurtenance to the land.' " Greeson involved a landowner challenge to the 1932 Contract; the district court rejected it, because there was no present threat to the landowners' interests ( 55 F.2d at p. 325 ); and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

2020Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321 , aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature of an appurtenance to the land.' " Greeson involved a landowner challenge to the 1932 Contract; the district court rejected it, because there was no present threat to the landowners' interests ( 55 F.2d at p. 325 ); and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

2018Title to the subject property vests in the condemning party on the date of recordation of a final order of condemnation in the county recorder's office. (§ 1268.030.) A litigant who seeks to prevail on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must establish, at a minimum, that the statute is unconstitutional " 'in the generality or great majority of cases.' " ( Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110 , 1126-1127, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 , 202 P.3d 1089 ; italics omitted.) MAC makes no such arguments in its petition.

2018Title to the subject property vests in the condemning party on the date of recordation of a final order of condemnation in the county recorder's office. (§ 1268.030.) A litigant who seeks to prevail on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must establish, at a minimum, that the statute is unconstitutional " 'in the generality or great majority of cases.' " ( Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110 , 1126-1127, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 , 202 P.3d 1089 ; italics omitted.) MAC makes no such arguments in its petition.

2017In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. *477 ( County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505 , 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ( County of Imperial ); Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642 , 654, 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 .) Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings. ( Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.

2017In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. *477 ( County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505 , 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ( County of Imperial ); Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642 , 654, 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 .) Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings. ( Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.

2017In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. *477 ( County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505 , 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ( County of Imperial ); Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642 , 654, 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 .) Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings. ( Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.

2017In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. *477 ( County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505 , 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ( County of Imperial ); Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642 , 654, 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 .) Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings. ( Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.

2017In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. *477 ( County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505 , 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ( County of Imperial ); Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642 , 654, 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 .) Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings. ( Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.

2017In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. *477 ( County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505 , 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ( County of Imperial ); Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642 , 654, 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 .) Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings. ( Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.

2017Both parties characterize PG&E’s interest as a “license,” as they did in the trial court, and so we use that nomenclature here. 5 The consideration exception appears in the statute’s fourth paragraph, which sets forth three “limitations on, or exceptions to, the landowner immunity it has granted.” (Klein, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 78 .) It states: “This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission to enter for the

2017Its application here, where PG&E received no portion of the consideration paid, presents an issue of first impression under California law.6 The principles governing our interpretation of this provision are set forth in Klein, supra, 50 Cal.4th 68 , the Supreme Court’s most recent decision to construe section 846.

1991In distinguishing the Salyer line of cases, the court in Quinn stated: “Whereas it was rational for the States in those cases to limit voting rights to land owners [citations], the ‘constitutionally relevant fact’ there was ‘that all water delivered by [those districts was] distributed according to land ownership.’ [Citations.] The purpose of the board [here], however, is not so directly linked with land ownership.” 491 U.S. at p. 109 [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 90 .] The Quinn court also emphasized “ ‘the peculiarly narrow function of [the] local government body’ ” in Ball and that body’s “ ‘special