Myers motion in Kansas

2006We note that in Haley v. Hershberger, 207 Kan. 459, 463 , 485 P.2d 1321 (1971), this court refused to adopt new, judicially created methods of serving process as substantial compliance with the service requirements established by the legislature in the Code of Civil Procedure.

2006We note that in Haley v. Hershberger, 207 Kan. 459, 463 , 485 P.2d 1321 (1971), this court refused to adopt new, judicially created methods of serving process as substantial compliance with the service requirements established by the legislature in the Code of Civil Procedure.

2020Relying on the identical-to-or-narrower- than rule set out in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 , 412 P.3d 984 (2018), and the categorical approach in State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 , 350 P.3d 1054 (2015) (Dickey I), the district court agreed with Myers' argument and found her prior Missouri DWI convictions were not comparable to Kansas DUI because the elements of the Missouri DWI statute were broader than the Kansas DUI statute.

2020Relying on the identical-to-or-narrower- than rule set out in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 , 412 P.3d 984 (2018), and the categorical approach in State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 , 350 P.3d 1054 (2015) (Dickey I), the district court agreed with Myers' argument and found her prior Missouri DWI convictions were not comparable to Kansas DUI because the elements of the Missouri DWI statute were broader than the Kansas DUI statute.

2020Relying on the identical-to-or-narrower- than rule set out in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 , 412 P.3d 984 (2018), and the categorical approach in State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 , 350 P.3d 1054 (2015) (Dickey I), the district court agreed with Myers' argument and found her prior Missouri DWI convictions were not comparable to Kansas DUI because the elements of the Missouri DWI statute were broader than the Kansas DUI statute.

2020Relying on the identical-to-or-narrower- than rule set out in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 , 412 P.3d 984 (2018), and the categorical approach in State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 , 350 P.3d 1054 (2015) (Dickey I), the district court agreed with Myers' argument and found her prior Missouri DWI convictions were not comparable to Kansas DUI because the elements of the Missouri DWI statute were broader than the Kansas DUI statute.

2016Rather, the Myers court recognized that it had to malee the additional determination of “whether the ‘statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that [legislative] intention.’ United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 65 L.

2016Rather, the Myers court recognized that it had to malee the additional determination of “whether the ‘statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that [legislative] intention.’ United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 65 L.

2013Applying the Myers standard, the panel reiterated all of the ways in which Fisher had failed to follow the statutory directive for mail service at a business address, but it principally relied on the fact that “service was not actually made upon DeCarvalho or his authorized agent,” which the panel declared to be “the most important objective of any method of service of process.” 45 Kan.

2013Applying the Myers standard, the panel reiterated all of the ways in which Fisher had failed to follow the statutory directive for mail service at a business address, but it principally relied on the fact that “service was not actually made upon DeCarvalho or his authorized agent,” which the panel declared to be “the most important objective of any method of service of process.” 45 Kan.

2008In contrast to Hunter , however, in Myers, 233 Kan. 611 , this court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct on compulsion and affirmed the convictions.

1994Cf. Early Detection Center, Inc. v. Wilson, 248 Kan. 869, 874 , 811 P.2d 860 (1991) (legislature’s failure to define or broaden meaning of term “person” in subsequent legislation makes prior judicial construction of the term part of the statute).

1994Cf. Early Detection Center, Inc. v. Wilson, 248 Kan. 869, 874 , 811 P.2d 860 (1991) (legislature’s failure to define or broaden meaning of term “person” in subsequent legislation makes prior judicial construction of the term part of the statute).

1991Owens v. Hodge, 230 Kan. 804 , 641 P.2d 399 (1982), which determined that a district court retains jurisdiction to modify a sentence beyond the 120- *312 day period, provided the defendant has filed a timely motion to modify sentence.

1991Owens v. Hodge, 230 Kan. 804 , 641 P.2d 399 (1982), which determined that a district court retains jurisdiction to modify a sentence beyond the 120- *312 day period, provided the defendant has filed a timely motion to modify sentence.