11 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buschman v. ADS CORP.green2 sentences2012See id. 2012See id. | 2 | 2 |
Shelly M. Phipps v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2023In accordance with Ind. Code § 35-41 - 2-2(b), a person engages in conduct “knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of the high probability that he is doing so.” A defendant’s intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the factfinder can infer intent “from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Lush v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Lush v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1191, 1196-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant inflicted the injuries on the victim when the evidence established that the victim was in the defendant’s exclusive care, and the injuries were recent upon arrival at the hospital). [17] Finally, we reject Myers’s claim that the State failed to show that his conduct was “knowing.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. | 1 | 1 |
Ingram v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“Unfair prejudice addresses the way in which the jury is expected to respond to the evidence; it looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper 11 basis.... ” Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). [80] Nothing in Roell’s testimony was likely to prompt the jury to convict Myers on an improper basis. | 1 | 1 |
Garrison v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Garrison v. State, 589 N.E.2d 1156, 1158 (Ind.1992) (observing that appellant must show substantial injury to constitute reversible error). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2008While Myers challenges the prosecutor’s actions, he does so by referring to the factors listed in White v. State, 257 Ind. 64, 69 , 272 N.E.2d 312, 314-15 (1971). 18 . 2008While Myers challenges the prosecutor’s actions, he does so by referring to the factors listed in White v. State, 257 Ind. 64, 69 , 272 N.E.2d 312, 314-15 (1971). 18 . | 1 | 1 |
Eads v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Eads v. State, 677 N.E.2d 524, 525 (Ind.1997) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of motion for change of venue where three seated jurors indicated they had formed an early opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence but two later indicated they could set aside these opinions and the third indicated after extensive questioning that he could be impartial). | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See id. at 1153-54 . | 1 | 1 |
Miles v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Myers’s claim on this point is therefore waived. 12 See Miles v. State, 764 N.E.2d 237, 239-40 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Larry v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Larry v. State, 716 N.E.2d 79, 81 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Kenner v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 , 278 n. 1 (Ind. 2002). [2] Myers's motion for oral argument is hereby denied. [3] It is also well settled that "smell testing by a trained dog is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Kenner, 703 N.E.2d at 1125 . 2004It is also well settled that "smell testing by a trained dog is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Kenner, 703 N.E.2d at 1125 . | 1 | 1 |
Abel v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 , 278 n. 1 (Ind. 2002). [2] Myers's motion for oral argument is hereby denied. [3] It is also well settled that "smell testing by a trained dog is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Kenner, 703 N.E.2d at 1125 . | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence1999See Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen1 sentence1981See Green v. State, (Ind.1981) 421 N.E.2d 635 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jack Sheets v. David Birky, Interra Credit Union, Curt Bechler, and Venture International, LLC.
green
2 sentences2017Sheets promptly filed a notice of appeal, but, upon Myers’ motion, this court dismissed Sheets’ attempted interlocutory appeal because there was no final judgment as Myers’ counterclaim remained 10 See Sheets v. Birky, 54 N.E.3d 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 2017Sheets promptly filed a notice of appeal, but, upon Myers’ motion, this court dismissed Sheets’ attempted interlocutory appeal because there was no final judgment as Myers’ counterclaim remained 10 See Sheets v. Birky, 54 N.E.3d 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Scruggs v. Allen County/City of Fort Wayne
green
2 sentences2016He states that Scruggs v. Allen Cnty., 829 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh’g denied, through its adoption of the Heck rule in a claim involving false imprisonment and violations of the Indiana Constitution, impliedly overruled other Indiana decisions which establish that the accrual date for a claim of legal malpractice occurs when a conviction is vacated. [22] Graham and Trueblood & Graham maintain that Myers’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, pointing out that the designated evidence shows that Myers was aware of his alleged legal malpractice claim on October 12, 2016He states that Scruggs v. Allen Cnty., 829 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh’g denied, through its adoption of the Heck rule in a claim involving false imprisonment and violations of the Indiana Constitution, impliedly overruled other Indiana decisions which establish that the accrual date for a claim of legal malpractice occurs when a conviction is vacated. [22] Graham and Trueblood & Graham maintain that Myers’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, pointing out that the designated evidence shows that Myers was aware of his alleged legal malpractice claim on October 1 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Majors v. State
green
1 sentence2008Id. (finding no error based upon lack of evidence that alcohol influenced daily deliberations in case where, on evening after third day of deliberations, one juror ordered and drank two beers, and bailiffs were allegedly “running up and down the hall filling [drink] orders.”) In the trial court’s denial of Myers’s motion to correct error based upon the above jury conduct, the court stated the following: There is absolutely no evidence that the jurors consumed alcoholic beverages on October 30, 2006, prior to or at any time during deliberations.... | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences2004Myers acknowledges this axiom in passing, yet he repeatedly mischaracterizes a canine sniff as a "search." See Appellant's Br. at 18, 20, 22, 23. [4] In his dissent in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), Justice Marshall observed, "This `mobility' rationale is something of a misnomer, since the police ordinarily can remove the car's occupants and secure the vehicle on the spot." Id. at 830 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). [5] In light of these precedents, we are unpersuaded by Myers's reliance on Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2 2004Myers acknowledges this axiom in passing, yet he repeatedly mischaracterizes a canine sniff as a "search." See Appellant's Br. at 18, 20, 22, 23. [4] In his dissent in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), Justice Marshall observed, "This `mobility' rationale is something of a misnomer, since the police ordinarily can remove the car's occupants and secure the vehicle on the spot." Id. at 830 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). [5] In light of these precedents, we are unpersuaded by Myers's reliance on Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Scott v. State
green
2 sentences2004Myers acknowledges this axiom in passing, yet he repeatedly mischaracterizes a canine sniff as a "search." See Appellant's Br. at 18, 20, 22, 23. [4] In his dissent in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), Justice Marshall observed, "This `mobility' rationale is something of a misnomer, since the police ordinarily can remove the car's occupants and secure the vehicle on the spot." Id. at 830 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). [5] In light of these precedents, we are unpersuaded by Myers's reliance on Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2 2004Myers acknowledges this axiom in passing, yet he repeatedly mischaracterizes a canine sniff as a "search." See Appellant's Br. at 18, 20, 22, 23. [4] In his dissent in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), Justice Marshall observed, "This `mobility' rationale is something of a misnomer, since the police ordinarily can remove the car's occupants and secure the vehicle on the spot." Id. at 830 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). [5] In light of these precedents, we are unpersuaded by Myers's reliance on Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.