6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fairbank v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995I shall not lengthen this opinion by entering that debate, however, because I believe the Myers rule is supported in any event by the above discussed “great principle” (Fairbank v. United States, supra, 181 U.S. 283, 294 [ 45 L.Ed. 862, 867 ]) that what the Constitution prohibits directly cannot be done indirectly. 1995I shall not lengthen this opinion by entering that debate, however, because I believe the Myers rule is supported in any event by the above discussed “great principle” (Fairbank v. United States, supra, 181 U.S. 283, 294 [ 45 L.Ed. 862, 867 ]) that what the Constitution prohibits directly cannot be done indirectly. | 1 | 1 |
Weekes v. City of Oaklandgreen2 sentences1995In so doing they have overlooked the source of the authority to tax for municipal purposes which, in a charter city, is derived from the home rule provisions of article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) (Weekes v. City of Oakland (1978) 21 Cal.3d 386, 392 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 579 P.2d 449 ]), and has no restriction comparable to the statute on which the Myers court relied. 12 In only one of the cases which cites the Myers rule was a restriction on the initiative power arguably justified and that is because the initiative sought to accomplish the repeal of an ordinance where there would be an imp 1995In so doing they have overlooked the source of the authority to tax for municipal purposes which, in a charter city, is derived from the home rule provisions of article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) (Weekes v. City of Oakland (1978) 21 Cal.3d 386, 392 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 579 P.2d 449 ]), and has no restriction comparable to the statute on which the Myers court relied. 12 In only one of the cases which cites the Myers rule was a restriction on the initiative power arguably justified and that is because the initiative sought to accomplish the repeal of an ordinance where there would be an imp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lo Cicerogreen2 sentences1984(People v. Lo Cicero (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1192 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 913 , 459 P.2d 241 ].) The People concede ordinarily prior felony convictions cannot make a defendant ineligible for probation unless they are first pleaded and proved. (§ 1203.) However, they contend Myers’ plea bargained “Harvey waiver,” expressly agreeing the court could consider “unfiled priors and dismissed count,” eliminated any need to plead and prove them here. 1984(People v. Lo Cicero (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1192 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 913 , 459 P.2d 241 ].) The People concede ordinarily prior felony convictions cannot make a defendant ineligible for probation unless they are first pleaded and proved. (§ 1203.) However, they contend Myers’ plea bargained “Harvey waiver,” expressly agreeing the court could consider “unfiled priors and dismissed count,” eliminated any need to plead and prove them here. | 1 | 1 |
Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Maddengreen2 sentences1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sanders
green
2 sentences2004The parties stipulated Irish’s search of Myers was conducted “without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.” The trial court denied Myers’s motion stating: “The court finds that the rationale of [People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ] (Sanders)] is applicable only to parole situations. 2004The parties stipulated Irish’s search of Myers was conducted “without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.” The trial court denied Myers’s motion stating: “The court finds that the rationale of [People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ] (Sanders)] is applicable only to parole situations. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Jones
green
2 sentences2000The Court of Appeal considered the question carefully in In re Jones (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1032 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 ]. 2000The Court of Appeal considered the question carefully in In re Jones (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1032 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 ]. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gibbs v. City of Napa
green
2 sentences1995The holding, however, was that the initiative was not available to amend the ordinance in question because the Legislature had vested the local legislative body with the power to fix those fees. ( 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 869 .) Gibbs v. City of Napa, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 148 , relied on the Myers rule, but did so in a wholly different context. 1995The holding, however, was that the initiative was not available to amend the ordinance in question because the Legislature had vested the local legislative body with the power to fix those fees. ( 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 869 .) Gibbs v. City of Napa, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 148 , relied on the Myers rule, but did so in a wholly different context. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dare v. Lakeport City Council
green
2 sentences1995The holding, however, was that the initiative was not available to amend the ordinance in question because the Legislature had vested the local legislative body with the power to fix those fees. ( 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 869 .) Gibbs v. City of Napa, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 148 , relied on the Myers rule, but did so in a wholly different context. 1995The holding, however, was that the initiative was not available to amend the ordinance in question because the Legislature had vested the local legislative body with the power to fix those fees. ( 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 869 .) Gibbs v. City of Napa, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 148 , relied on the Myers rule, but did so in a wholly different context. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences1995An alternate ground of decision, moreover, was that in redevelopment matters the council functioned as an administrative arm of the state, and thus its actions were beyond the reach of both the local initiative and the referendum power. ( 59 Cal.App.3d 148, 154 .) Any doubts with respect to the right of the people to adopt legislation governing taxes through the initiative process should have been laid to rest by the decisions of this court in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245 , and of the Court of Appeal in Carlson v. Cory, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 724 . 1995An alternate ground of decision, moreover, was that in redevelopment matters the council functioned as an administrative arm of the state, and thus its actions were beyond the reach of both the local initiative and the referendum power. ( 59 Cal.App.3d 148, 154 .) Any doubts with respect to the right of the people to adopt legislation governing taxes through the initiative process should have been laid to rest by the decisions of this court in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245 , and of the Court of Appeal in Carlson v. Cory, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 724 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Campen v. Greiner
green
2 sentences1995Campen v. Greiner, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 836 , like the instant case, did involve a charter city and an initiative attempt to both repeal a residential utility tax and bar any fiiture imposition of such a tax. 1995Campen v. Greiner, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 836 , like the instant case, did involve a charter city and an initiative attempt to both repeal a residential utility tax and bar any fiiture imposition of such a tax. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Carlson v. Cory
green
1 sentence1995An alternate ground of decision, moreover, was that in redevelopment matters the council functioned as an administrative arm of the state, and thus its actions were beyond the reach of both the local initiative and the referendum power. ( 59 Cal.App.3d 148, 154 .) Any doubts with respect to the right of the people to adopt legislation governing taxes through the initiative process should have been laid to rest by the decisions of this court in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245 , and of the Court of Appeal in Carlson v. Cory, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 724 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. National Labor Relations Board and Ogden W. Fields, Executive Secretary of the National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Solien
green
2 sentences1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Mcclain Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 1981The court declared: “[M]erely raising a constitutional issue in its complaint for declaratory judgment, when full appellate review of the administrative proceedings is available and in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, is *162 insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the subject matter in the face of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company v. Madden, supra, 280 F.2d at p. 209.) (See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 210 ; McClain Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.