Louisiana public records doctrine in Louisiana

2019Louisiana Civil Code Article 3343 defines a third person as "a person who is not a party to or personally bound by an instrument." Simply stated, if a predial servitude is not recorded, it is not effective against third parties pursuant to our public records doctrine, which our supreme court further expounded upon in Cimarex Energy Company v. Mauboules , 09-1170, 09-1180, 09-1194, pp. 18-20 (La. 4/9/10), 40 So.3d 931 , 943-44: The Louisiana Public Records doctrine generally expresses a public policy that interest in real estate must be recorded in order to affect third persons.

2019Louisiana Civil Code Article 3343 defines a third person as "a person who is not a party to or personally bound by an instrument." Simply stated, if a predial servitude is not recorded, it is not effective against third parties pursuant to our public records doctrine, which our supreme court further expounded upon in Cimarex Energy Company v. Mauboules , 09-1170, 09-1180, 09-1194, pp. 18-20 (La. 4/9/10), 40 So.3d 931 , 943-44: The Louisiana Public Records doctrine generally expresses a public policy that interest in real estate must be recorded in order to affect third persons.

2018C.C.P. art. 3752, "effective notice is achieved only upon 'its registry in the mortgage records.' " Id. at 481 .

2018C.C.P. art. 3752, "effective notice is achieved only upon 'its registry in the mortgage records.' " Id. at 481 .

1988Plaintiff contends that defendants cannot rely on Camel's false assertion in the recorded documents, citing First National Bank v. Mercer, 448 So.2d 1369 (La.App.2d Cir.1984); Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Demarest, 354 So.2d 695 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978); and Keller Building Products v. Siegen Development, Inc., 312 So.2d 182 *613 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 314 So.2d 736 (La.1975), which state that recordation does not create rights but instead makes them effective against third parties.

1988Plaintiff contends that defendants cannot rely on Camel's false assertion in the recorded documents, citing First National Bank v. Mercer, 448 So.2d 1369 (La.App.2d Cir.1984); Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Demarest, 354 So.2d 695 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978); and Keller Building Products v. Siegen Development, Inc., 312 So.2d 182 *613 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 314 So.2d 736 (La.1975), which state that recordation does not create rights but instead makes them effective against third parties.

1988Plaintiff contends that defendants cannot rely on Camel's false assertion in the recorded documents, citing First National Bank v. Mercer, 448 So.2d 1369 (La.App.2d Cir.1984); Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Demarest, 354 So.2d 695 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978); and Keller Building Products v. Siegen Development, Inc., 312 So.2d 182 *613 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 314 So.2d 736 (La.1975), which state that recordation does not create rights but instead makes them effective against third parties.

1986Daviet, Jr., to act on their behalf in the sale of the subject property. [4] Recently in Phillips v. Parker, 483 So.2d 972 (La.1986), the Louisiana Supreme Court expounded on the Louisiana public records doctrine and determined that the "primary concern of the public records doctrine is the protection of third persons against unrecorded interests." Because the claim of plaintiff's ancestor-in-title was recorded in Phillips v. Parker, supra , the Supreme Court determined that the public records doctrine had little applicability.

1986Daviet, Jr., to act on their behalf in the sale of the subject property. [4] Recently in Phillips v. Parker, 483 So.2d 972 (La.1986), the Louisiana Supreme Court expounded on the Louisiana public records doctrine and determined that the "primary concern of the public records doctrine is the protection of third persons against unrecorded interests." Because the claim of plaintiff's ancestor-in-title was recorded in Phillips v. Parker, supra , the Supreme Court determined that the public records doctrine had little applicability.