unwarranted hardship standard in Maryland

2015In this appeal, ACT does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that Schwalbach could not gain access to the navigable waters bounding his property without a variance. 10 Instead, ACT contends that the denial of riparian access is not an unwarranted hardship because Schwalbach has already made other extensive improvements on his land. “ ‘The unwarranted hardship standard, and its similar manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use of the property.’ ” DCW Dutchship, 439 Md. at 619 , 97 A.3d 135 (quoting Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 2

2015In this appeal, ACT does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that Schwalbach could not gain access to the navigable waters bounding his property without a variance. 10 Instead, ACT contends that the denial of riparian access is not an unwarranted hardship because Schwalbach has already made other extensive improvements on his land. “ ‘The unwarranted hardship standard, and its similar manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use of the property.’ ” DCW Dutchship, 439 Md. at 619 , 97 A.3d 135 (quoting Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 2

2015The General Assembly has since modified the definition of unwarranted hardship to clarify that the unwarranted hardship analysis *646 looks to the use of “the entire parcel or lot for which the variance is requested.” N.R. § 8—1808(d)(1) (emphasis added); see Becker, 174 Md.App. at 132-33 , 920 A.2d 1118 .

2015The General Assembly has since modified the definition of unwarranted hardship to clarify that the unwarranted hardship analysis *646 looks to the use of “the entire parcel or lot for which the variance is requested.” N.R. § 8—1808(d)(1) (emphasis added); see Becker, 174 Md.App. at 132-33 , 920 A.2d 1118 .

2015In this appeal, ACT does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that Schwalbach could not gain access to the navigable waters bounding his property without a variance. 10 Instead, ACT contends that the denial of riparian access is not an unwarranted hardship because Schwalbach has already made other extensive improvements on his land. “ ‘The unwarranted hardship standard, and its similar manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use of the property.’ ” DCW Dutchship, 439 Md. at 619 , 97 A.3d 135 (quoting Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 2

2015In this appeal, ACT does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that Schwalbach could not gain access to the navigable waters bounding his property without a variance. 10 Instead, ACT contends that the denial of riparian access is not an unwarranted hardship because Schwalbach has already made other extensive improvements on his land. “ ‘The unwarranted hardship standard, and its similar manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use of the property.’ ” DCW Dutchship, 439 Md. at 619 , 97 A.3d 135 (quoting Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 2

2015In White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 50-51 , 736 A.2d 1072 (1999), the Court of Appeals held, under a prior version of the critical area law, that the unwarranted hardship standard was the essential test, and that the other provisions provided guidance but could not be construed individually to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship.

2015In White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 50-51 , 736 A.2d 1072 (1999), the Court of Appeals held, under a prior version of the critical area law, that the unwarranted hardship standard was the essential test, and that the other provisions provided guidance but could not be construed individually to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship.

2015In Belvoir Farms, the Court of Appeals explained that the unwarranted hardship standard is generally stricter than a “practical difficulties” standard (id. at 266, 734 A.2d 227 ), but not as stringent as an unconstitutional taking standard, which examines whether “a ‘regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.’ ” Id. at 281-82 , 734 A.2d 227 (quoting Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 , 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)).

2015In Belvoir Farms, the Court of Appeals explained that the unwarranted hardship standard is generally stricter than a “practical difficulties” standard (id. at 266, 734 A.2d 227 ), but not as stringent as an unconstitutional taking standard, which examines whether “a ‘regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.’ ” Id. at 281-82 , 734 A.2d 227 (quoting Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 , 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)).

2015Stated differently, under the unwarranted hardship standard, the need for the variance “ ‘must be substantial and urgent and not merely for the convenience of the applicant[.]’ ” Chesley v. City of Annapolis, 176 Md.App. 413, 432 , 933 A.2d 475 (2007) (quoting Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 276 , 734 A.2d 227 ).

2015Stated differently, under the unwarranted hardship standard, the need for the variance “ ‘must be substantial and urgent and not merely for the convenience of the applicant[.]’ ” Chesley v. City of Annapolis, 176 Md.App. 413, 432 , 933 A.2d 475 (2007) (quoting Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 276 , 734 A.2d 227 ).

2015Coastal Bays v. Moreland, LLC, 418 Md. 111, 122-23 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 9 In White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 50-51 (1999), the Court of Appeals held, under a prior version of the critical area law, that the unwarranted hardship standard was the essential test, and that the other provisions provided guidance but could not be construed individually to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship.

2015Within its argument regarding the unwarranted hardship standard, however, ACT suggests that the hardship cannot be attributed to the land configuration and zoning restrictions, because Schwalbach purchased the property “well after the enactment of the Law and with knowledge— actual or constructive—of the restrictions imposed by the Law.” ACT cites a passage from Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md.App. 691, 717 , 651 A.2d 424 (1995), in which this Court quoted this sentence from Sibley v. Inhabitants of Town of Wells, 462 A.2d 27, 31 (Me.1983): “[W]hen a landowner purchases land with actual or constructi

2015Within its argument regarding the unwarranted hardship standard, however, ACT suggests that the hardship cannot be attributed to the land configuration and zoning restrictions, because Schwalbach purchased the property “well after the enactment of the Law and with knowledge— actual or constructive—of the restrictions imposed by the Law.” ACT cites a passage from Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md.App. 691, 717 , 651 A.2d 424 (1995), in which this Court quoted this sentence from Sibley v. Inhabitants of Town of Wells, 462 A.2d 27, 31 (Me.1983): “[W]hen a landowner purchases land with actual or constructi

2015Within its argument regarding the unwarranted hardship standard, however, ACT suggests that the hardship cannot be attributed to the land configuration and zoning restrictions, because Schwalbach purchased the property “well after the enactment of the Law and with knowledge— actual or constructive—of the restrictions imposed by the Law.” ACT cites a passage from Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md.App. 691, 717 , 651 A.2d 424 (1995), in which this Court quoted this sentence from Sibley v. Inhabitants of Town of Wells, 462 A.2d 27, 31 (Me.1983): “[W]hen a landowner purchases land with actual or constructi

2012The Board’s decision was affirmed by both the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and this Court, but was vacated and remanded to the Board by the Court of Appeals for failure to consider “all of the Wicomico County Code variance criteria and misapplying the unwarranted hardship standard.” Lewis I, 377 Md. at 390, 437 , 833 A.2d 563 . 5 On remand, the Board held additional argument but did not receive new evidence.

2012The Board’s decision was affirmed by both the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and this Court, but was vacated and remanded to the Board by the Court of Appeals for failure to consider “all of the Wicomico County Code variance criteria and misapplying the unwarranted hardship standard.” Lewis I, 377 Md. at 390, 437 , 833 A.2d 563 . 5 On remand, the Board held additional argument but did not receive new evidence.

1999Cf. Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill.2d 178, 182 , 139 N.E.2d 270, 272-73 (1956) (citing Central Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139 , 23 N.E.2d 450, 453 (1939)) (using the terms undue and unwarranted hardship interchangeably).

1999Cf. Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill.2d 178, 182 , 139 N.E.2d 270, 272-73 (1956) (citing Central Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139 , 23 N.E.2d 450, 453 (1939)) (using the terms undue and unwarranted hardship interchangeably).

1999Cf. Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill.2d 178, 182 , 139 N.E.2d 270, 272-73 (1956) (citing Central Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139 , 23 N.E.2d 450, 453 (1939)) (using the terms undue and unwarranted hardship interchangeably).

1999Cf. Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill.2d 178, 182 , 139 N.E.2d 270, 272-73 (1956) (citing Central Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139 , 23 N.E.2d 450, 453 (1939)) (using the terms undue and unwarranted hardship interchangeably).