Lang test in Maine

1983The Lang test “does not lend itself to categorical rules but ... is meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis .... ” True v. State, 457 A.2d 793, 795 (Me.1983); See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 203 (D.C.Cir.1976).

1983The Lang test “does not lend itself to categorical rules but ... is meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis .... ” True v. State, 457 A.2d 793, 795 (Me.1983); See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 203 (D.C.Cir.1976).

1989In True v. State, 457 A.2d 793 (Me.1983), we recognized that the Lang standard was meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis with the realization that the defense attorney’s function consists in large part, of the application of professional judgment to an infinite variety of decisions ... a determination whether any given action or omission by counsel amounted to ineffective assistance cannot be divorced from consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances that influenced counsel’s judgment.

1989In True v. State, 457 A.2d 793 (Me.1983), we recognized that the Lang standard was meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis with the realization that the defense attorney’s function consists in large part, of the application of professional judgment to an infinite variety of decisions ... a determination whether any given action or omission by counsel amounted to ineffective assistance cannot be divorced from consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances that influenced counsel’s judgment.

2026See Numberg v. GTE Transport, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a special employer’s agreement to pay a general employer “periodically a specified amount attributable to the cost of providing workers’ compensation benefits” did not satisfy the applicable standard, because “[t]he effect of the financial terms of the agreement between [the general employer] and [the special employer] was not to shift responsibility for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to [the special employer], but to assure [the general employer] a profit after paying all of the various costs of

2026See Numberg v. GTE Transport, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a special employer’s agreement to pay a general employer “periodically a specified amount attributable to the cost of providing workers’ compensation benefits” did not satisfy the applicable standard, because “[t]he effect of the financial terms of the agreement between [the general employer] and [the special employer] was not to shift responsibility for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to [the special employer], but to assure [the general employer] a profit after paying all of the various costs of

2026See Numberg v. GTE Transport, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a special employer’s agreement to pay a general employer “periodically a specified amount attributable to the cost of providing workers’ compensation benefits” did not satisfy the applicable standard, because “[t]he effect of the financial terms of the agreement between [the general employer] and [the special employer] was not to shift responsibility for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to [the special employer], but to assure [the general employer] a profit after paying all of the various costs of

2026See Numberg v. GTE Transport, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a special employer’s agreement to pay a general employer “periodically a specified amount attributable to the cost of providing workers’ compensation benefits” did not satisfy the applicable standard, because “[t]he effect of the financial terms of the agreement between [the general employer] and [the special employer] was not to shift responsibility for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to [the special employer], but to assure [the general employer] a profit after paying all of the various costs of

2026Indeed, a defendant is eligible for immunity under the Act only if it satisfies a two-part test known as the Lang immunity test: (1) the defendant must be “an insured person liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the injured employee” and (2) the defendant must be “the direct employer of the employee.” Id. (quoting Lang v. Edward J.

2026Indeed, a defendant is eligible for immunity under the Act only if it satisfies a two-part test known as the Lang immunity test: (1) the defendant must be “an insured person liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the injured employee” and (2) the defendant must be “the direct employer of the employee.” Id. (quoting Lang v. Edward J.

2026Lamothe Co., 479 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (alterations omitted)). immunity, that does not mean that Massachusetts law necessarily applies to the tort issues in this case. 10 [¶18] Neither party contests the court’s finding that Envirovantage was Valmont-Olivier’s direct employer under prong two of the Lang immunity test.

2026Lamothe Co., 479 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (alterations omitted)). immunity, that does not mean that Massachusetts law necessarily applies to the tort issues in this case. 10 [¶18] Neither party contests the court’s finding that Envirovantage was Valmont-Olivier’s direct employer under prong two of the Lang immunity test.

2000See State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶¶ 6-7 , 699 A.2d 1139, 1144 .

2000See State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶¶ 6-7 , 699 A.2d 1139, 1144 .

1997Brewer cannot establish that counsel’s failure to obtain the ambulance run sheet had any prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial. [¶23] Brewer also argues that a better investigation would have uncovered Vicki Holbrook, Officer Graves’s ex-wife and an acquaintance of Brewer, who would have testified that Graves and Brewer had a history of animosity arising from prior altercations and that Graves said he would “get [Brewer] one way or another.” Even if further investigation would have exposed Holbrook’s information and she had been willing to testify at Brewer’s trial, the post-convictio

1997Brewer cannot establish that counsel’s failure to obtain the ambulance run sheet had any prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial. [¶23] Brewer also argues that a better investigation would have uncovered Vicki Holbrook, Officer Graves’s ex-wife and an acquaintance of Brewer, who would have testified that Graves and Brewer had a history of animosity arising from prior altercations and that Graves said he would “get [Brewer] one way or another.” Even if further investigation would have exposed Holbrook’s information and she had been willing to testify at Brewer’s trial, the post-convictio

1985See Doucette v. State, 463 A.2d 741, 745-46 (Me.1983).

1985See Doucette v. State, 463 A.2d 741, 745-46 (Me.1983).

1983See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1360-64 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.App.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bandy, 494 Pa. 244, 249 , 431 A.2d 240, 243 (1981).

1983See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1360-64 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.App.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bandy, 494 Pa. 244, 249 , 431 A.2d 240, 243 (1981).

1983See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1360-64 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.App.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bandy, 494 Pa. 244, 249 , 431 A.2d 240, 243 (1981).

1983See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1360-64 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.App.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bandy, 494 Pa. 244, 249 , 431 A.2d 240, 243 (1981).

1983See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1360-64 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.App.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bandy, 494 Pa. 244, 249 , 431 A.2d 240, 243 (1981).

1983See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1360-64 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.App.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bandy, 494 Pa. 244, 249 , 431 A.2d 240, 243 (1981).