genuineness claim in Michigan

1989Id.

1989Id.

1985Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311 ; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), reh den 419 Mich 1201 (1984), cert den —US —; 105 S Ct 123 (1984).

1985Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311 ; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), reh den 419 Mich 1201 (1984), cert den —US —; 105 S Ct 123 (1984).

1985Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311 ; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), reh den 419 Mich 1201 (1984), cert den —US —; 105 S Ct 123 (1984).

1985Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311, 323 ; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), cert den — US —; 105 S Ct 123 ; 83 L Ed 2d 65 (1984).

1988In New Hampshire Ins Group v Labombard, 155 Mich App 369, 372 ; 399 NW2d 527 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 911 (1987), this Court stated: A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) seeks to test the genuineness of a claim by challenging the legal adequacy of the pleadings. *433 The test which a court applies in considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is whether the plaintiffs’ [sic] claim, as stated in the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. ...

1988In New Hampshire Ins Group v Labombard, 155 Mich App 369, 372 ; 399 NW2d 527 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 911 (1987), this Court stated: A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) seeks to test the genuineness of a claim by challenging the legal adequacy of the pleadings. *433 The test which a court applies in considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is whether the plaintiffs’ [sic] claim, as stated in the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. ...

1987Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 647-648 ; 401 NW2d 894 (1986).

1987Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 647-648 ; 401 NW2d 894 (1986).

1984The standard used to assess the subsection 1 motion has been well stated: "The test which the court should apply in considering motions under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) is whether plaintiff’s claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery.” Crowther v Ross Chemical & Mfg Co, 42 Mich App 426, 431 ; 202 NW2d 577 (1972). *324 In applying GCR 1963, 117.2(1), the trial court does not act as a factfinder, nor does the court attempt to probe the parties’ ability to prove their allegations.

1984The standard used to assess the subsection 1 motion has been well stated: "The test which the court should apply in considering motions under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) is whether plaintiff’s claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery.” Crowther v Ross Chemical & Mfg Co, 42 Mich App 426, 431 ; 202 NW2d 577 (1972). *324 In applying GCR 1963, 117.2(1), the trial court does not act as a factfinder, nor does the court attempt to probe the parties’ ability to prove their allegations.

1894In Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269 , it was held that where the issue is raised the burden is upon plaintiff to show that the note declared on is the defendant’s note; that the same rule applies as when want of consideration is relied upon.

1894It was incumbent on defendant in error, in every stage, to maintain his side of that issue by a preioonderance of evidence.” In Comstock v. Smith, 26 Mich. 306 , it was held that where plaintiff relied, as a basis of recovery, upon a clause in a deed which was claimed to have been written over an erasure, the burden of proof as to the genuineness of the clause was upon him, and in such case there was no presumption of law that the clause in question was seasonably or unseasonably made which shifted this burden.