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8 Michigan opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence2023This fourth element, prejudice, is critical to the analysis. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.] Although the actual length of delay itself is not determinative of a speedy-trial violation, “[a] delay that is under eighteen months requires a defendant to prove that the defendant suffered prejudice. 4 Plaintiff asserts in its brief on appeal that the trial court accounted for 60 days, but we have not located any notation supporting that assertion. -5- However, a delay of eighteen months or more . . . is presumed prejudicial and places a burden on the prosecutor to rebut that presumption.” | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2023Nevertheless, “a delay of eighteen months or more, as in this case, is presumed prejudicial and places a burden on the prosecutor to rebut that presumption.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112 ; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). “[A] presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.” Williams, 475 Mich at 262 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. DeMeyersgreen1 sentence1994See id. at 293-294 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cain
green
2 sentences2023Nevertheless, “a delay of eighteen months or more, as in this case, is presumed prejudicial and places a burden on the prosecutor to rebut that presumption.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112 ; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). “[A] presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.” Williams, 475 Mich at 262 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2023Nevertheless, “a delay of eighteen months or more, as in this case, is presumed prejudicial and places a burden on the prosecutor to rebut that presumption.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112 ; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). “[A] presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.” Williams, 475 Mich at 262 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 5 | 2016–2023 |
People v. Simpson
green
2 sentences2018People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563 ; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). [Cain, 238 Mich App at 111-112 .] We begin with the last element, prejudice. 2018People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563 ; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). [Cain, 238 Mich App at 111-112 .] We begin with the last element, prejudice. | 3 | 2000–2018 |
People v. Waclawski
green
1 sentence2023“Violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial requires dismissal of the charge with prejudice.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 664-665 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.