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61 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gummgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 174 , 652 N.E.2d 721 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 432 , 653 N.E.2d 253 . {¶ 165} Nevertheless, we give some weight to Elmore’s limited intellectual abilities and other mental deficiencies under the catchall provision of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 2006See State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 174 , 652 N.E.2d 721 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 432 , 653 N.E.2d 253 . {¶ 165} Nevertheless, we give some weight to Elmore’s limited intellectual abilities and other mental deficiencies under the catchall provision of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 174 , 652 N.E.2d 721 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 432 , 653 N.E.2d 253 . {¶ 165} Nevertheless, we give some weight to Elmore’s limited intellectual abilities and other mental deficiencies under the catchall provision of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 2006See State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 174 , 652 N.E.2d 721 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 432 , 653 N.E.2d 253 . {¶ 165} Nevertheless, we give some weight to Elmore’s limited intellectual abilities and other mental deficiencies under the catchall provision of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Slaglegreen2 sentences2002See State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 614 , 605 N.E.2d 916 . {¶ 78} Of the statutory mitigating factors, only R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) and (B)(7) are slightly applicable. 2002See State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 614 , 605 N.E.2d 916 . {¶ 78} Of the statutory mitigating factors, only R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) and (B)(7) are slightly applicable. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Treeshgreen2 sentences2002See Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 493 , 739 N.E.2d 749 . {¶ 196} ■ The remaining statutory mitigating factors are generally inapplicable in this case. 2002See Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 493 , 739 N.E.2d 749 . {¶ 196} ■ The remaining statutory mitigating factors are generally inapplicable in this case. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tibbettsgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 174 , 749 N.E.2d 226 . 2002See, e.g., Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 174 , 749 N.E.2d 226 . | 2 | 2 |
Furman v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2000Accordingly, this proposition is not well taken." Id. at 417-418. 1999Accordingly, this proposition is not well taken." Id. at 417-418. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hicksgreen2 sentences1999The trial court also erred by referring to all the statutory mitigating factors, even though the evidence related only to one factor — R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors.” See Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d at 77 , 538 N.E.2d at 1036, fn. 3 ; DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 289-290 , 528 N.E.2d at 558 . 1999The trial court also erred by referring to all the statutory mitigating factors, even though the evidence related only to one factor — R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors.” See Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d at 77 , 538 N.E.2d at 1036, fn. 3 ; DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 289-290 , 528 N.E.2d at 558 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences1995See State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 51 , 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 . 1995See State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 51 , 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Brewergreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194 , 631 N.E.2d 124 ; and State v. Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d at 64 , 549 N.E.2d 491 . {¶ 199} As to the statutory mitigating factors, Leonard’s lack of a prior criminal record is entitled to significant weight in mitigation. 2004See, e.g., State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194 , 631 N.E.2d 124 ; and State v. Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d at 64 , 549 N.E.2d 491 . {¶ 199} As to the statutory mitigating factors, Leonard’s lack of a prior criminal record is entitled to significant weight in mitigation. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Foxgreen2 sentences2006Cf. State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194 , 631 N.E.2d 124 . {¶ 78} The record does not contain evidence to support the statutory mitigating factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(6). 2006Cf. State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194 , 631 N.E.2d 124 . {¶ 78} The record does not contain evidence to support the statutory mitigating factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(6). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hartmangreen2 sentences2006See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2004-Ohio-7006 , 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 197 ; State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 306 , 754 N.E.2d 1150 ; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319 , 652 N.E.2d 988 . {¶ 128} We find the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions) to be inapplicable because of Ferguson’s prior conviction for burglary. {¶ 129} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor is not applicable, because there was no evidence that Ferguson, by reason of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to apprecia 2006See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2004-Ohio-7006 , 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 197 ; State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 306 , 754 N.E.2d 1150 ; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319 , 652 N.E.2d 988 . {¶ 128} We find the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions) to be inapplicable because of Ferguson’s prior conviction for burglary. {¶ 129} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor is not applicable, because there was no evidence that Ferguson, by reason of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to apprecia | 1 | 3 |
State v. Stumpfgreen2 sentences2017See Stumpf 32 Ohio St.3d at 101-102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (defendant bears burden of proving existence of mitigating factors). {¶ 112} Roberts’s history, character, and background, as recounted in her allocution and reflected in the trial record, present some mitigating features. 2017See Stumpf 32 Ohio St.3d at 101-102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (defendant bears burden of proving existence of mitigating factors). {¶ 112} Roberts’s history, character, and background, as recounted in her allocution and reflected in the trial record, present some mitigating features. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Keenegreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-6548 , 819 N.E.2d 1047 , at ¶ 180; State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d at 671 , 693 N.E.2d 246 . {¶ 154} As to the remaining statutory mitigating factors, no evidence was presented in regard to R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong provocation), (B)(3) (mental disease or defect), (B)(5) (lack of a significant criminal record), and (B)(6) (accomplice only). {¶ 155} Upon weighing the evidence, we hold that the aggravating circumstances of murder to escape detection, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), and murder in the cou 2006See, e.g., State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-6548 , 819 N.E.2d 1047 , at ¶ 180; State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d at 671 , 693 N.E.2d 246 . {¶ 154} As to the remaining statutory mitigating factors, no evidence was presented in regard to R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong provocation), (B)(3) (mental disease or defect), (B)(5) (lack of a significant criminal record), and (B)(6) (accomplice only). {¶ 155} Upon weighing the evidence, we hold that the aggravating circumstances of murder to escape detection, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), and murder in the cou | 1 | 2 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 456 , 709 N.E.2d 140 . {¶ 197} No evidence was presented on the remaining statutory mitigating factors, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(3) (mental disease or defect), and (B)(6) (accomplice rather than principal offender). 2006See, e.g., State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 456 , 709 N.E.2d 140 . {¶ 197} No evidence was presented on the remaining statutory mitigating factors, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(3) (mental disease or defect), and (B)(6) (accomplice rather than principal offender). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hannagreen2 sentences2019See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 101; Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 343, 738 N.E.2d 1178 . {¶ 435} Fifth, Ford contends that the trial court improperly examined all the statutory mitigating factors even though the defense did not present evidence related to many of them. 2019See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 101; Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 343 , 738 N.E.2d 1178 . {¶ 434} Fifth, Ford contends that the trial court improperly examined all the statutory mitigating factors even though the defense did not present evidence related to many of them. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hannagreen2 sentences2019See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 101; Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 343, 738 N.E.2d 1178 . {¶ 435} Fifth, Ford contends that the trial court improperly examined all the statutory mitigating factors even though the defense did not present evidence related to many of them. 2019See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 101; Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 343 , 738 N.E.2d 1178 . {¶ 434} Fifth, Ford contends that the trial court improperly examined all the statutory mitigating factors even though the defense did not present evidence related to many of them. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 101; Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 343, 738 N.E.2d 1178 . {¶ 435} Fifth, Ford contends that the trial court improperly examined all the statutory mitigating factors even though the defense did not present evidence related to many of them. 2019See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 101; Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 343 , 738 N.E.2d 1178 . {¶ 434} Fifth, Ford contends that the trial court improperly examined all the statutory mitigating factors even though the defense did not present evidence related to many of them. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fearsgreen2 sentences2014See Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 349 , 715 N.E.2d 136 . {¶ 298} The statutory mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B) include victim inducement, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1); duress, coercion, or strong provocation, (B)(2); mental disease or defect, (B)(3); youth of the offender, (B)(4); lack of a significant criminal record, (B)(5); accomplice only,. 2014See Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 349 , 715 N.E.2d 136 . {¶ 298} The statutory mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B) include victim inducement, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1); duress, coercion, or strong provocation, (B)(2); mental disease or defect, (B)(3); youth of the offender, (B)(4); lack of a significant criminal record, (B)(5); accomplice only,. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Halegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gapengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Foustgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. D'Ambrosiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bastongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Steffengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2012State v. Taylor, 76 Ohio App.3d 835, 839 , 603 N.E.2d 401 (2d Dist.1992); State v. Crouse, 39 Ohio App.3d 18, 20 , 528 N.E.2d 1283 (2d Dist.1987). {¶ 11} Here the trial court stated on the record that it was guided by the general –5– principles of sentencing, and the court expressly said that it had considered several factors. 2012State v. Taylor, 76 Ohio App.3d 835, 839 , 603 N.E.2d 401 (2d Dist.1992); State v. Crouse, 39 Ohio App.3d 18, 20 , 528 N.E.2d 1283 (2d Dist.1987). {¶ 11} Here the trial court stated on the record that it was guided by the general –5– principles of sentencing, and the court expressly said that it had considered several factors. | 11 | 2007–2012 |
State v. Crouse
green
2 sentences2012State v. Taylor, 76 Ohio App.3d 835, 839 , 603 N.E.2d 401 (2d Dist.1992); State v. Crouse, 39 Ohio App.3d 18, 20 , 528 N.E.2d 1283 (2d Dist.1987). {¶ 11} Here the trial court stated on the record that it was guided by the general –5– principles of sentencing, and the court expressly said that it had considered several factors. 2012State v. Taylor, 76 Ohio App.3d 835, 839 , 603 N.E.2d 401 (2d Dist.1992); State v. Crouse, 39 Ohio App.3d 18, 20 , 528 N.E.2d 1283 (2d Dist.1987). {¶ 11} Here the trial court stated on the record that it was guided by the general –5– principles of sentencing, and the court expressly said that it had considered several factors. | 11 | 2007–2012 |
State v. DePew
green
2 sentences1999The trial court also erred by referring to all the statutory mitigating factors, even though the evidence related only to one factor — R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors.” See Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d at 77 , 538 N.E.2d at 1036, fn. 3 ; DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 289-290 , 528 N.E.2d at 558 . 1999The trial court also erred by referring to all the statutory mitigating factors, even though the evidence related only to one factor — R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors.” See Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d at 77 , 538 N.E.2d at 1036, fn. 3 ; DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 289-290 , 528 N.E.2d at 558 . | 7 | 1991–2003 |
State v. Phillis, 08ca13 (12-12-2008)
neutral
2 sentences2013No. 08CA13, 2008-Ohio-6748, ¶ 15 . {¶15} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides, “[t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.”5 R.C. 2929.12 requires the trial court consider the seriousness of the crime and the likelihood the offender will recidivate. {¶16} Here, the trial court properly considered the purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness of the offenses and Appellant's likelihood to recidivate under R.C. 2929.12. 2012No. 08CA13, 2008-Ohio-6748, at ¶ 15 . {¶29} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides, “[t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.”1 R.C. 2929.12 requires the trial court consider the seriousness of the crime and the likelihood the offender will recidivate. {¶30} Here, the trial court properly considered the purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness of the offenses and Appellant’s likelihood to recidivate under R.C. 2929.12. | 2 | 2012–2013 |
United States v. Ruiz
green
2 sentences2010However, the statutory mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(7) are not applicable to Ketterer's resentencing for his noncapital offenses. {¶ 34} The state cites United States v. Ruiz (2002), 536 U.S. 622 , 122 S.Ct. 2450 , 153 L.Ed.2d 586 , in arguing that disclosure of the requested material to Ketterer was rendered unnecessary by his guilty pleas. 2010However, the statutory mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(7) are not applicable to Ketterer's resentencing for his noncapital offenses. {¶ 34} The state cites United States v. Ruiz (2002), 536 U.S. 622 , 122 S.Ct. 2450 , 153 L.Ed.2d 586 , in arguing that disclosure of the requested material to Ketterer was rendered unnecessary by his guilty pleas. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences2006See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2004-Ohio-7006 , 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 197 ; State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 306 , 754 N.E.2d 1150 ; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319 , 652 N.E.2d 988 . {¶ 128} We find the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions) to be inapplicable because of Ferguson’s prior conviction for burglary. {¶ 129} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor is not applicable, because there was no evidence that Ferguson, by reason of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to apprecia 2006See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2004-Ohio-7006 , 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 197 ; State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 306 , 754 N.E.2d 1150 ; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319 , 652 N.E.2d 988 . {¶ 128} We find the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions) to be inapplicable because of Ferguson’s prior conviction for burglary. {¶ 129} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor is not applicable, because there was no evidence that Ferguson, by reason of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to apprecia | 2 | 2004–2006 |
Sigmon v. Hatfield
green
2 sentences2004See State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 306, 754 N.E.2d 1150 ; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319 , 652 N.E.2d 988 ; State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 257 , 667 N.E.2d 369 . {¶ 198} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of significant criminal history) is entitled to only some weight because Foust has a prior felony conviction for receiving stolen property. 2004See State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 452 , 751 N.E.2d 946 ; State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d at 454 , 709 N.E.2d 140 ; but, cf., State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 257 , 667 N.E.2d 369 (“R.C. 2929.04[B][4] [youth] [is] entitled to little weight, since Ballew was twenty-two at the time of the offense”). {¶ 106} Moreover, although Scott’s mental disorders do not qualify as mental diseases or defects within the meaning of R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), his ADHD, dysthy mia, borderline personality disorder, and chemical dependency are entitled to some weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), as they | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Ballew
green
2 sentences2004See State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 306, 754 N.E.2d 1150 ; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319 , 652 N.E.2d 988 ; State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 257 , 667 N.E.2d 369 . {¶ 198} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of significant criminal history) is entitled to only some weight because Foust has a prior felony conviction for receiving stolen property. 2004See State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 452 , 751 N.E.2d 946 ; State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d at 454 , 709 N.E.2d 140 ; but, cf., State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 257 , 667 N.E.2d 369 (“R.C. 2929.04[B][4] [youth] [is] entitled to little weight, since Ballew was twenty-two at the time of the offense”). {¶ 106} Moreover, although Scott’s mental disorders do not qualify as mental diseases or defects within the meaning of R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), his ADHD, dysthy mia, borderline personality disorder, and chemical dependency are entitled to some weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), as they | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2000SENTENCING ISSUES Jury Instructions In his sixth proposition of law, appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in charging the jury at the penalty phase as follows: (a) giving an improper instruction under State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148 , 661 N.E.2d 1030 ; (b) referring to aggravating circumstances (plural) when there was only one aggravating circumstance; (c) not defining what a mitigating factor is; and (d) listing all the statutory mitigating factors. 2000SENTENCING ISSUES Jury Instructions In his sixth proposition of law, appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in charging the jury at the penalty phase as follows: (a) giving an improper instruction under State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148 , 661 N.E.2d 1030 ; (b) referring to aggravating circumstances (plural) when there was only one aggravating circumstance; (c) not defining what a mitigating factor is; and (d) listing all the statutory mitigating factors. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Miller
green
1 sentence2025Assignment of Error and Analysis {¶11} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states: {¶12} “The trial court erred by imposing a maximum sentence without adequately considering the statutory mitigating factors and the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” {¶13} R.C. 2929.11(A) sets forth the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing,” which are “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those p | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Morgan v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2014In Wilson, the defense argued that Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), allowed counsel to ask prospective jurors what they thought about each of the statutory mitigating factors. 2014In Wilson, the defense argued that Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), allowed counsel to ask prospective jurors what they thought about each of the statutory mitigating factors. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Awkal
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 335 . 2014Id. at 335 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Bey green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Bradley green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Lorraine green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Cooey green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Woodard green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Berry green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Joseph green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Price neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Sowders green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Byrd green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.