Chevron test in Montana

2006At the time the WCC wrote its Order, it did not have the benefit of Dempsey or Schmill II; accordingly, it relied instead upon patently misleading dicta from Poppleton for the proposition that “The general rule is that a rule of law will not be applied retroactively if any of the [Chevron] factors ... are present.” Poppleton v. Rollins, Inc., 226 Mont. 267, 271 , 735 P.2d 286, 289 (1987) (emphasis and bracketed material in WCC August 27,2004 Order). 1 However, as we clarified in Dempsey and Schmill II, it is now well-settled that a party arguing for purely prospective application of this Court

2006At the time the WCC wrote its Order, it did not have the benefit of Dempsey or Schmill II; accordingly, it relied instead upon patently misleading dicta from Poppleton for the proposition that “The general rule is that a rule of law will not be applied retroactively if any of the [Chevron] factors ... are present.” Poppleton v. Rollins, Inc., 226 Mont. 267, 271 , 735 P.2d 286, 289 (1987) (emphasis and bracketed material in WCC August 27,2004 Order). 1 However, as we clarified in Dempsey and Schmill II, it is now well-settled that a party arguing for purely prospective application of this Court

2005The Chevron factors originate from Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 , and are as follows: ‘First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.

2005The Chevron factors originate from Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 , and are as follows: ‘First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.

2013Administrative rules are invalid when they ‘1(1) engraft additional and contradictory requirements on the statute; or (2) if they engraft additional, noncontradictory requirements on the statute which were not envisioned by the legislature.” Bell v. Dep’t of Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 23 , 594 P.2d 331, 333 (1979) (citations and quotations omitted); Safeway, Inc. v. Montana Petroleum Release Compensation Bd., 281 Mont. 189, 194 , 931 P.2d 1327, 1330 (1997).

2013Administrative rules are invalid when they ‘1(1) engraft additional and contradictory requirements on the statute; or (2) if they engraft additional, noncontradictory requirements on the statute which were not envisioned by the legislature.” Bell v. Dep’t of Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 23 , 594 P.2d 331, 333 (1979) (citations and quotations omitted); Safeway, Inc. v. Montana Petroleum Release Compensation Bd., 281 Mont. 189, 194 , 931 P.2d 1327, 1330 (1997).

2013Administrative rules are invalid when they ‘1(1) engraft additional and contradictory requirements on the statute; or (2) if they engraft additional, noncontradictory requirements on the statute which were not envisioned by the legislature.” Bell v. Dep’t of Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 23 , 594 P.2d 331, 333 (1979) (citations and quotations omitted); Safeway, Inc. v. Montana Petroleum Release Compensation Bd., 281 Mont. 189, 194 , 931 P.2d 1327, 1330 (1997).

2013Administrative rules are invalid when they ‘1(1) engraft additional and contradictory requirements on the statute; or (2) if they engraft additional, noncontradictory requirements on the statute which were not envisioned by the legislature.” Bell v. Dep’t of Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 23 , 594 P.2d 331, 333 (1979) (citations and quotations omitted); Safeway, Inc. v. Montana Petroleum Release Compensation Bd., 281 Mont. 189, 194 , 931 P.2d 1327, 1330 (1997).

2008Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1932), state courts had continued to follow the flexible Chevron Oil approach that required retroactivity unless one of three exceptions was met. ¶16 We reached a compromise in Dempsey between the strict Harper rule and the flexible Chevron Oil rule, holding that “all civil decisions of this Court apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review or not yet final, unless all three of the Chevron factors are satisfied.” 1 Dempsey , ¶ 31.

2008Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1932), state courts had continued to follow the flexible Chevron Oil approach that required retroactivity unless one of three exceptions was met. ¶16 We reached a compromise in Dempsey between the strict Harper rule and the flexible Chevron Oil rule, holding that “all civil decisions of this Court apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review or not yet final, unless all three of the Chevron factors are satisfied.” 1 Dempsey , ¶ 31.

2004In Ereth v. Cascade County, 2003 MT 328 , 318 Mont. 355 , 81 P.3d 463 , Seubert v. Seubert, 2000 MT 241 , 301 Mont. 382 , 13 P.3d 365 , and Benson v. Heritage Inn, Inc., 1998 MT 330 , 292 Mont. 268 , 971 P.2d 1227 , without reference to the Porter line of cases, we applied the Chevron test to determine whether prospective application was appropriate.

2004In Ereth v. Cascade County, 2003 MT 328 , 318 Mont. 355 , 81 P.3d 463 , Seubert v. Seubert, 2000 MT 241 , 301 Mont. 382 , 13 P.3d 365 , and Benson v. Heritage Inn, Inc., 1998 MT 330 , 292 Mont. 268 , 971 P.2d 1227 , without reference to the Porter line of cases, we applied the Chevron test to determine whether prospective application was appropriate.

2003See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmissions Servs., Inc., 278 F.3d 1223, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) ("In this case, the statute in question, the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, is silent as to whether state commissions have the authority to interpret previously approved interconnection agreements."), vacated and reh’g en banc granted by 297 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.2002). .

2003See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmissions Servs., Inc., 278 F.3d 1223, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) ("In this case, the statute in question, the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, is silent as to whether state commissions have the authority to interpret previously approved interconnection agreements."), vacated and reh’g en banc granted by 297 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.2002). .