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9 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Browne v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commissiongreen2 sentences2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). 2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). | 2 | 2 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Husonred2 sentences2019But there is no doubt that the statutory interpretation itself runs directly counter to Empire's view, which was nothing more than Empire's reliance on Lentz . ¶39 Fourth, Empire suggests that Maple Grove 's new interpretation of the statutes should not be applied retroactively in light of the " Chevron factors." See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 404 U.S. 97 , 106-07 (1971). 1990A. New Principle of Law A decision is not a new principle of law under the Chevron analysis unless it has overruled "clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied," or has decided "an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id., 404 U.S. at 106 . | 1 | 4 |
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxationgreen2 sentences2007Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Chevron standard in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (holding that a new judicial rule is retroactive to criminal cases pending on direct review or not final), and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (abandoning Chevron in civil cases), this court continues to adhere to the Chevron/Kurtz standard. 51 ¶ 77. 2007Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Chevron standard in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (holding that a new judicial rule is retroactive to criminal cases pending on direct review or not final), and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (abandoning Chevron in civil cases), this court continues to adhere to the Chevron/Kurtz standard. 51 ¶ 77. | 1 | 2 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2007Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Chevron standard in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (holding that a new judicial rule is retroactive to criminal cases pending on direct review or not final), and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (abandoning Chevron in civil cases), this court continues to adhere to the Chevron/Kurtz standard. 51 ¶ 77. 2007Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Chevron standard in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (holding that a new judicial rule is retroactive to criminal cases pending on direct review or not final), and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (abandoning Chevron in civil cases), this court continues to adhere to the Chevron/Kurtz standard. 51 ¶ 77. | 1 | 1 |
Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc.green2 sentences2001See Fitzgerald, 38 Wis. 2d at 576-77 . 2001See Fitzgerald, 38 Wis. 2d at 576-77 . | 1 | 1 |
William Lowary and Sara Wyatt v. Lexington Local Board of Education, Ohio Education Association, Lexington Teachers Associationgreen2 sentences1992Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Education, 903 F.2d 422, 426-27 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990). 1992Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Education, 903 F.2d 422, 426-27 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990). [12] The first Chevron condition, referred to as the "clear break" principle, is "the threshold test for determining whether or not a decision should be applied retroactively." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 550 *113 n.12 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Cipriano v. City of Houmagreen2 sentences1990Equity The third factor to be considered under the Chevron analysis is whether retrospective application of Patterson would " 'produce substantial inequitable results.' " Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). 1990Equity The third factor to be considered under the Chevron analysis is whether retrospective application of Patterson would " 'produce substantial inequitable results.' " Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
Linkletter v. Walkerred2 sentences1990Effect on Operation of Rule The second factor under the Chevron analysis is whether retrospective application of the decision will " 'further or retard its operation.' " Id., 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)). 1990Effect on Operation of Rule The second factor under the Chevron analysis is whether retrospective application of the decision will " 'further or retard its operation.' " Id., 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co.
green
2 sentences2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). 2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Wenke Ex Rel. Laufenberg v. Gehl Co.
green
2 sentences2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). 2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State Ex Rel. Brown v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). 2023Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15 , 259 Wis. 2d 630 , 658 N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70 , 274 Wis. 2d 220 , 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112 , 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77 , 302 Wis. 2d 299 , 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question should not be applied retroactively."). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Kurtz v. City of Waukesha
green
2 sentences2007When adopting the Chevron factors for Wisconsin jurisprudence, the court in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 108 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979) specifically referred to judicial holdings: "Retroactive application of a judicial holding is a question of policy, not constitutional law. 2007When adopting the Chevron factors for Wisconsin jurisprudence, the court in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 108 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979) specifically referred to judicial holdings: "Retroactive application of a judicial holding is a question of policy, not constitutional law. | 2 | 1990–2007 |
Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.
green
2 sentences2004Co., 155 Wis.2d 608 , 613 n. 3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 59, Alta.Rev.Stat. (1980)). [42] The practice of applying a judicial decision prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting." See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 605 , 623 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)). [43] The Supreme Court has abandoned the three- 2004Co., 155 Wis.2d 608 , 613 n. 3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 59, Alta.Rev.Stat. (1980)). [42] The practice of applying a judicial decision prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting." See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 605 , 623 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)). [43] The Supreme Court has abandoned the three- | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Scott Ex Rel. Ricciardi v. First State Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2004Co., 155 Wis.2d 608 , 613 n. 3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 59, Alta.Rev.Stat. (1980)). [42] The practice of applying a judicial decision prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting." See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 605 , 623 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)). [43] The Supreme Court has abandoned the three- 2004Co., 155 Wis.2d 608 , 613 n. 3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 59, Alta.Rev.Stat. (1980)). [42] The practice of applying a judicial decision prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting." See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 605 , 623 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)). [43] The Supreme Court has abandoned the three- | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Co., 155 Wis.2d 608 , 613 n. 3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 59, Alta.Rev.Stat. (1980)). [42] The practice of applying a judicial decision prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting." See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 605 , 623 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)). [43] The Supreme Court has abandoned the three- 2004Co., 155 Wis.2d 608 , 613 n. 3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 59, Alta.Rev.Stat. (1980)). [42] The practice of applying a judicial decision prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting." See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 605 , 623 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)). [43] The Supreme Court has abandoned the three- | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employes
green
2 sentences1992Ellis, 466 U.S. at 453 . [9] WERC also analyzed the second and third criteria of the Chevron test, and concluded that Hudson satisfied neither. [10] It must be noted that the amounts "reasonably in dispute" include all fair-share fees collected from nonunion employees prior to the expiration of the initial objection period. 1992Ellis, 466 U.S. at 453 . [9] WERC also analyzed the second and third criteria of the Chevron test, and concluded that Hudson satisfied neither. [10] It must be noted that the amounts "reasonably in dispute" include all fair-share fees collected from nonunion employees prior to the expiration of the initial objection period. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hays v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Education, 903 F.2d 422, 426-27 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990). 1992Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Education, 903 F.2d 422, 426-27 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990). [12] The first Chevron condition, referred to as the "clear break" principle, is "the threshold test for determining whether or not a decision should be applied retroactively." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 550 *113 n.12 (1982). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Johnson
red
1 sentence1992Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Education, 903 F.2d 422, 426-27 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990). [12] The first Chevron condition, referred to as the "clear break" principle, is "the threshold test for determining whether or not a decision should be applied retroactively." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 550 *113 n.12 (1982). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Patricia M. CARROLL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant
green
2 sentences1990This case thus differs from the recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1990) and Carroll v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990), which, although they decided that Patterson would be applied retrospectively in light of the second and third Chevron factors, Carroll, 891 F.2d at 1176-1177 ; Lavender, 897 F.2d at 806-807 , concluded that Patterson established a new rule of law, "at least in this circuit," because the Fifth Circuit had previously held t 1990This case thus differs from the recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1990) and Carroll v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990), which, although they decided that Patterson would be applied retrospectively in light of the second and third Chevron factors, Carroll, 891 F.2d at 1176-1177 ; Lavender, 897 F.2d at 806-807 , concluded that Patterson established a new rule of law, "at least in this circuit," because the Fifth Circuit had previously held t | 1 | 1990–1990 |
William M. Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, Tony Ray Morton v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair
green
2 sentences1990This case thus differs from the recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1990) and Carroll v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990), which, although they decided that Patterson would be applied retrospectively in light of the second and third Chevron factors, Carroll, 891 F.2d at 1176-1177 ; Lavender, 897 F.2d at 806-807 , concluded that Patterson established a new rule of law, "at least in this circuit," because the Fifth Circuit had previously held t 1990This case thus differs from the recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1990) and Carroll v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990), which, although they decided that Patterson would be applied retrospectively in light of the second and third Chevron factors, Carroll, 891 F.2d at 1176-1177 ; Lavender, 897 F.2d at 806-807 , concluded that Patterson established a new rule of law, "at least in this circuit," because the Fifth Circuit had previously held t | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.